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ABSTRACT
Reverse the Curse: Colonialist Legacies of the Magic Poem
by
Karen Lepri
Adviser: Professor Wayne Koestenbaum

This dissertation investigates the conceptual relationships between poetry, magic, and
race and their effects on both intellectual and creative practices from modernism through the
post-war era. In doing so, this study works cross-disciplinarily, tracing early anthropological and
sociological characterizations of primitive religion in connection to early-to-mid-twentiethcentury literary study and writing. In working across disciplines at this particularly fungible
moment in the history of the academy, this dissertation attempts to understand how the
concurrent colonial global context effects the production and organization of knowledge just
prior to and during modernism. It ultimately seeks to de-colonize literary thinking about poetry
by performing a racial critique of the role of magical thinking in its generic conception and
production. The first chapter establishes the intellectual history of the dissertation’s key problem,
the presence of primitivism throughout modernist and post-modernish approaches to poetry and
the desire for this poetry to offer reparation; examines the ethnographic texts, especially Marcel
Mauss’s General Theory of Magic, that relate poetic language to the language of magic ritual and
animistic belief systems; considers how these foundational beliefs continued to influence
modernist critics like Theodor Adorno and C.L.R. James, and how certain poets and critics
attempt to subvert these intellectual trends that associate blackness with magic and magic with
poetry; and lastly questions the ethical implications of assuming that poetry’s “magic” could cure
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socio-cultural loss. The second and third chapters further develop and test the dissertation’s
argument that regardless of poets’ intentions, magic operates within their understanding of poetic
function, and that these understandings stem from racist, colonialist understandings of primitive
space, time, and culture, while simultaneously attempting to understand their works’ attitude
toward poetic reparation. In the second chapter, I examine Gertrude Stein’s 1932 Stanzas in
Meditation in an attempt to understand the text’s relationship to concepts of magical language,
and its trance-like, reparative effect on readers, an effect complicated by its appropriation of
primitivist concepts of time. In the final chapter, I turn to Amiri Baraka’s 1969 compilation
Black Magic to explore this work’s relationship to its titular “magic.” I ultimately demonstrate
how Baraka’s work re-theorizes a kind of poetic spirituality that eschews white capitalist magic
and offers a materialist, pragmatic poetics for surviving racism and strengthening Black
consciousness. In concluding, I look to the contemporary moment and claim that the current
upswing in the poetry community’s interest in the occult serves as further evidence for one, how
the role of magic and poetry corresponds to a social desire for reparation, and, two, how the
racialized thinking at stake in the invocation of magic in poetry continues to merit critical and
popular examination.
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Preface
I began this project with two suspicions. First, I suspected that many white modernist
poets, not seeming to invoke race, often did through their assumptions about the relationship
between poetry and magic. Furthermore, I suspected that the white modernist poets typically
studied for invoking occultism, through textual reference or life practice, were not merely
drawing inspiration from a Eurocentric mythology of a European past, but rather that their
relationship to a temporal otherwise, the long-past of history, was inextricable from the
coloniality of their world. In this vein, due to my investment in decolonializing conceptions of
the poetry genre,1 my study calls itself a study in modernism despite encompassing a period of
time from the late 1800s through the 1960s. While focusing on one high modernist poet who fits
squarely in the period, Gertrude Stein, and one Black Arts poet who falls about twenty years
later, Amiri Baraka, the intellectual formations which I argue influence poetic practice (and vice
versa) come to fruition through the organization of anthropological knowledge from the 1870s
through the 1910s. My suspicions about colonialism, modernism, and anti-colonialism’s
relationships to each other, and my desire to ask how various conceptualizations of magic and
poetry spill across these periods, force me to consider a rather broad span of time. Temporal
brackets or categories repeatedly fail my study.
However, despite admitting my suspicions about the racialized knowledge formations
undergirding modernist scholarly and creative practices, I must pause to reflect critically on the
very positing of said suspicions and to explain that they are not constitutive of this work’s
methodology. Following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s critique of a kind of criticism that would

1

See Walter Mignolo, “Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of DeColoniality,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2-3 (April 2007): 449-514.
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function merely through a hermeneutics of suspicion,2 I seek here in this preface to offer an
account of my project’s paranoia, the reading methodologies I aspire to, and the reparative aim I
harbor. I would argue first, that genre, like any category or abstract name, is given to suspicion.
But my paranoia about poetry’s attachments to a cave aesthetic began just as I was relishing the
publication of my first collection of poems. These bizarrely abstract, formally playful poems
(heavily influenced by modernist nonsense) imagined an exchange between my poet self and the
nineteenth century physicist, thermo-dynamicist, and early glaciologist John Tyndall. People
would ask, encountering the poems’ mysteriousness, where do they come from? And I would
facetiously answer, there’s a loose screw in my head—I simply lean on it. Many artists might
withhold the key to their process, but many others, like me, couldn’t exactly explain what was
happening to them when their poems happened onto the page. Was this magic? I frequently had
to ask. I soon realized how common it was for poets all around me to answer, yes.
A recent encounter with the poet Anne Waldman in the elevator of the CUNY Graduate
Center added confirmation. When I told her I was writing about poetry and magic, her eyes lit up
and she began recounting her most recent shamanistic project. I mumbled something about
wanting to question this cozy relationship—poetry, magic—but why? Why would I want to
complicate this connection when so many poets, alive and dead—not just Waldman but Diane Di
Prima, Barbara Guest, CA Conrad, Jack Spicer and many other poets in community with my
professed aesthetics—laid claim to some mystical or magical element in their poetry? How did I
become paranoid that something larger, hidden was at work in this pairing? Or was this paranoia

2

See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re so Paranoid, You Probably
Think This Essay is About You,” Touching Feeling (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 123-151.
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merely a cover for my deep love3 of poetry or a desire to believe that poetry was magic? 4 Was I
looking to manifest a strong theory of negative affects or seeking to humiliate my own
community? I invoke Sedgwick’s idea that on the flip side of a paranoid methodology is often a
reparative one,5 in order to question, here at the outset, what was I trying to repair through
unveiling the ways in which poetry and magic’s relationship gets racialized? (This reparative
reflection is key to my most significant critique of primitivist aesthetic appropriation.)
My interest in this project stems from understanding my own whiteness as constituted
through the black/white and colonizer/colonized binaries, with all their imagined qualities and
real consequences. I have learned to treat with suspicion cross-racial artistic appropriations for
their often occluded, yet still to be unpacked, desires and beliefs about the social, the aesthetic,
and race. It is not that this project is paranoid about magic and poetry, and thereby seeks to
rationalize poetry or to deny poets ethical access to a poetics of spells and ghosts. It is that this
project seeks to explore the possibility that the history of these associations is one marked by
colonial, racialized narratives about ritual practice, language, and power. I aim also to make
mistakes along the way, because, who can fashion anything but a weak theory about what is
happening in any given poet’s mind? Believing deeply in the relationship between our
understanding of history and our daily behavior, I have approached this project hoping not to

3

Sedgwick, 131.
Simone White writes, “Poetry isn’t magical or removed from dirty, compromising political and personal acts,
pettiness, racism, sexism, suffering. Absent the intervention of many other sociopolitical acts, poetry won’t save
your life. To suggest otherwise is a kind of offense against poetry’s insistence on complexity, the
multidimensionality of understanding. Taking it seriously as a carrier of information about the real matrix between
language and power, which is truly upsetting — mind-blowing — when we come near to it, changes the way you
live. Believe it.” White resists our desire to equate the thing that changes our life with “magic.” See “Exploring the
Consolations and Sources of Poetry, in Prose,” New York Times, August 4, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/books/review/poetry-will-save-your-life-jill-bialosky-why-poetry-matthewzapruder.html
5
Sedgwick, 128.
4
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destroy the magic of poetry but to learn how to invoke its particularities,6 its textured historical
body, and perhaps for a material magic to re-emerge, fully aware and sensing, from that textual
body. I want poetry’s relationship to magic to become both more complex and useful through our
capacity to acknowledge that magic is as much the tricks of occultist outsiders as the power of
the state as an abstract category used to describe (and disempower) the rituals of colonized
subjects. I seek not to reveal and destroy, but to closely read poetry and magic as imbricated in
and inextricable from each other due a history we can perhaps transcend, fleshly, materially, but
only through study.7

6

My desire to de-link without destroying magical thinking in relation to poetry reflects Walter Mignolo’s discussion
of Aníbal Quijano’s idea of desprendimiento in which he claims that the way to delink modernity and coloniality
could not be so simple as negation, for that would merely substitute one totality for another. I invoke the possibility
of seeing and knowing the particularities of this relationship by complicating it rather than forbidding it, departing
from Mignolo’s interpretation of Quijano’s critique of universalities (such as negation) as calling for
“pluriversality.” See Walter Mignolo, “Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the
Grammar of De-Coloniality,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2-3 (April 2007): 152.
7
Here I mean study in the sense that Moten studies blackness—study as social way of refusing subjectivity,
historicity, and the violence of citizenship. Is it possible that poetry’s recuperation of magic (lost but not lost through
disenchantment) is a gesture toward other ways of living, of world making? I think so, but only if we study this
making, illuminate its lacunae and enjoin its desires. For Moten and Harney, study is a practice of hoping against
hope, of a kind of optimism that works in and through a pessimism that can’t be already. See Fred Moten and
Stefano Harney’s The University and Undercommons (Social Text 22, no. 2 (June 2004)) in which they propose to
“be skeptical of what one already knows.”
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Introduction

Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip
and emptying the native’s brain of all form and content. By a kind
of perverse logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and
distorts it, disfigures and destroys it.
-Frantz Fanon1
A poem, they may say, has charm, but the word itself suggests
magic…
-Frederick Clarke Prescott2
In one rather infamous cave scene in the film Dead Poets Society,3 Mr. Keating (Robin
Williams)’s students rap and dance in a circle as they perform Vachel Lindsay’s 1922 poem
“The Congo.”4 They chant, “THEN I SAW THE CONGO, CREEPING THROUGH THE
BLACK, / CUTTING THROUGH THE FOREST WITH A GOLDEN TRACK.” The racial
ignorance of the scene glares brightly—the all-white, all-boy prep school students “going tribal”
as a way to “get into” poetry. While the film was made in 1989, it is staged in 1959, a time we
could call one of several zeniths of American conservatism. No one on screen questions these
tactics, and yet it is unclear if the scene’s primitivity should be regarded as completely weird or
utterly commonplace. Poetry, in Dead Poets, is Keating’s students’ ticket to a revitalized sense
of self-determination and expression, capacities dampened and hampered by social stodginess—
boarding school, whiteness, and the conservative backlash of the fifties. The students discover
Lindsay’s poem by reading their poetry-obsessed teacher’s out-of-date anthology from his old
days as a student. This means of discovery through their rebellious teacher implies that this
1

Frantz Fanon, excerpt from The Wretched of the Earth, ed. Bill Ashcroft et al., in The Post-Colonial Studies
Reader (New York: Routledge, 1995), 120.
2
Frederick Clarke Prescott, The Poetic Mind (New York: MacMillan, 1922), 1.
3
Dead Poets Society, directed by Peter Weir (1989; USA; Touchstone Pictures), film.
4
Vachel Lindsay, “The Congo,” in The Congo and Other Poems (New York: Macmillan, 1914), 3-11.
1

material would have, or should have, otherwise gone unread, that it had fallen out of style by
time of the boys’ schooling in the 1950s. Yet it likewise seems to imply that the very conditions
of the school—all-male, all-white, and the taboo on such a “passionate” poem—comprise the
very structure that keeps the poem, and its racism, alive, read, felt and known.
But what exactly, the audience might ask, is the poem or poetry’s threat? While poetry
plays a seemingly reparative role in the film through its capacity to restore individualism, it also
bodes extremely high stakes. One student, Neil, commits suicide under his parents’ constant
threat to cut him off from poetry and acting. One wonders why the film would speak to poetry’s
rareness (and subsequently high demand) without also attending to the racial reasons it is decanonized or barred from class. Dead Poets Society was released during a pedagogical turning
point in U.S. academia, at the brink of the nineties, when (some) professors went from assigning
their students mostly white dead poets to a more multicultural array of live ones (ones literally
expected to perform their cultural otherness live5 on the page). One cannot say that Dead Poets
anticipated this shift, or that its makers cared about its effects, but we might wonder if the boys’
easy access to the racial “thrill” of poetry is one object of the film’s imagination.
This scene from Dead Poets Society and Lindsay’s poem are symptomatic of what I
consider the pervasive phenomenon of poetry and primitivity’s intimacy. They also crystalize
this dissertation’s two-fold problem. They point to how representations of poetry’s relationship
to magic and primitivity fail to acknowledge the racialized dynamics of its relationship, and they
show how the reparative expectations of poetry are closely associated with a racialized,
colonialist epistemology of the genre. This rather white way of coming to and receiving poetry

5

See José Esteban Muñoz, Disidentifications (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 189, where
he discusses the “burden of liveness” that minoritarian subjects are expected to perform as artists, a burden that
exceeds the already burdened experience of real life, off-state, as a minority.
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imagines its healing powers as having something to do with darkness, the jungle, or even just the
imagined occult feeling of such things.
Other scholars’ responses to the relationship between primitivism and modernist
aesthetics point to a dilemma around exactly how to identify and consider primitivistic influence,
be it conceptual, formal or discursive. Christopher Bracken examines rhetorical primitivity, what
he calls “savage philosophy,” in his 2013 study Magical Criticism.6 According to Bracken, the
presence of the “savage” and forms of magical thinking in the modern philosophical imagination
enabled Western philosophy to conceive of discursive being, experience defined and made
possible by language. Many of the thinkers Bracken considers, such as Edward Tylor and Walter
Benjamin, are central also to this project; however, his consideration of philosophical discourse,
as opposed to literary genre or form, does not attend to the significance of aesthetics and
aesthetic experience in the discursive production of being, something this work will attend to
more closely through formal and material analysis of poetry.
Marianna Torgovnick’s study of primitivist discourse7 also considers modernist
intellectual formations, ones that draw their source materials primarily from ethnographies of
colonial regions,8 but her analysis focuses on the aesthetic ramifications of primitivism on

6

See Christopher Bracken, Magical Criticism: The Recourse of Savage Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2007).
7
See Marianna Torgovnik, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1990) for her analysis of modernists’ production of primitive discourse and its influence on Western popular
culture. Torgovnik makes an important case for not putting the word primitive in quotation marks: “When we put
primitive in quotation marks we wish away the heritage of the West’s exploitation of non-Western peoples or at least
wish to demonstrate that we are politically correct. But the heritage of Western domination cannot be abolished by
wishing or by typography…In the absence of such ubiquitous marks, treating primitive differently from abstractions
such as Western implies that the societies traditionally so designated do not, and perhaps never did, exist—are
simply a figment of the Euro-American imagination” (20). I will follow her lead throughout this work by also not
putting primitive in quotation marks.
8
I suggest in the conclusion that this primitivistic intellectual formations continue to exert this influence, and were
particularly visible in nineties criticism—from Jacques Derrida’s “conjuring” Marx to Barbara Johnson’s discussion
of the animated fetus.
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Western popular culture. Similar to my own research, Torgovnik includes philosophy, cultural
anthropology, sociology, linguistics, and literary criticism in her analysis of cultural objects.
Across this organization of knowledge, the figure of the primitive takes on broad set of
meanings:
Primitives are like children, the tropes say. Primitives are our untamed selves, our
id forces—libidinous, irrational, violent, dangerous. Primitives are mystics, in
tune with nature, part of its harmonies. Primitives are free. Primitives exist at the
“lowest cultural levels;” we occupy the “highest,” in the metaphors of
stratification and hierarchy commonly used by Malinowski9 and others like him.
The ensemble of these tropes—however miscellaneous and contradictory—forms
the basic grammar and vocabulary of what I call primitivist discourse, a discourse
fundamental to the Western sense of self and Other.10
In looking at how this conceptualization of the primitive happens at the site of poetic writing,
reading, and critique, my work departs from both Torgovnick and Bracken’s understandings of
the coloniality of Western discourse and its profound cultural, aesthetic, and epistemological
impact. It also extends this work by insisting not on the transfer of intellectual discourse into the
aesthetic field but in the co-terminous production of knowledge across the realms of academic
discourse and poetry.
This project also seeks to extend and complicate previous discussions of occultism and
modernist aesthetics by examining their colonialist blind spots and their literary inclusions and

9

Not only is Malinowski is well known for shifting the field of anthropology toward more ethnography-like
fieldwork, but he also wrote extensively on magic in the Austral-Asian region in his 1922 The Argonauts of the
Western Pacific, in which one can find “Chapter XVIII. The power of words in magic — some linguistic data”
(1125).
10
Torgovnik, Gone Primitive, 1.
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exclusions. While such works usefully explore occultism’s aesthetic effects and meanings for
white modernist poets, particularly occultism’s reparative value, none of these works consider
either white modernist writers who do not invoke the occult, or black modernists or Black Arts
writers who do invoke the occult. Leon Surette’s The Birth of Modernism views occultist works
like Eliot’s “The Wasteland” or Pound’s Cantos as works resisting Enlightenment ideology.
Surette writes, “The resistance to the Enlightenment places great value on the untutored,
instinctive, or intuitive, while the Enlightenment places greater value on reason, logic, or
calculation.”11 Surette’s view of modernist occultist historicism as part of the Enlightenment
project—a project whose racial production of knowledge I will discuss in chapter one—helpfully
positions poetry as an important part of how we understand the epistemology of a given
historical moment and its influence; however, Surette does not question the coloniality of
Enlightenment-era epistemology.
Other critics of modernist occultism examine certain poetries’ modes of speaking or
imagining, and particularly consider how occultist poetry might help to stabilize a destabilized
world through a different capacity to imagine that world. Timothy Materer’s Modernist
Alchemy12 explores the potency of modernist poetic prophecy, while Leigh Wilson’s more recent
Modernism and Magic13 consider how beliefs about mimetic effects might construe a belief in
poetry’s capacity to complete a broken world. (These ideas get explored further in chapter two,
where I discuss Gertrude Stein’s work in the interwar year period.) Nevertheless, these analyses

11

Leon Surette, The Birth of Modernism: Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, W.B. Yeats, and the Occult (Buffalo, NY: McGillQueen’s University Press, 1993), 285.
12
Timothy Materer, Modernist Alchemy: Poetry and the Occult (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
13
Leigh Wilson, Modernism and Magic: Experiments with Spiritualism, Theosophy, and the Occult (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2013).
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consider neither the poem’s epistemic dimensions nor how ideas about magic manifest at the
formal level of the poem.
In responding to conversations about both the discursive production of primitivity and the
occultist bent of modernist works, I critique poetry at the epistemological and the formal level
and look across criticism, theory, and other disciplines to understand the co-construction of a
colonial poetic epistemology. Furthermore, this dissertation’s attempt to decolonize the
relationship between poetry and magic depends on understanding both creative and critical urges
to depict poetry’s reparative function. Such an understanding, by which I mean criticism, would
have to take into account poetry’s always suspect position, its apparent, dangerous uselessness,
except when wielded as propaganda. As such, the genre has continuously operated as a
placeholder for critical optimism, as seen in the case of Materer and Wilson’s hopeful theories.
This reparative drive, referenced in my preface via Sedgwick, is particularly strong in the wake
of trauma. For Sedgwick, it was the AIDS crisis, while for many of the writers and thinkers in
this study, it was the widespread social trauma of the modernist era: two world wars as well as
ongoing racial violence in America,14 Europe, and the still-colonized Global South. I argue that
both the worldness and coloniality of these wars reinscribed the idea that primitivist occultism
could best cure these social injuries.
At the heart of this study is a question about the relationship between the belief that
poetry could change your life, for the better, and the belief in magic and primitivist aesthetics.
On the other side of this question lies a critique: that if this concept of reparation comes from a

14

Not only did the integration of the military during World War II lead to increased political disappointment on the
part of black servicemen upon their return to a segregated racist home life in America, but Amiri Baraka also served
in the Air Force just after the Korean War from 1954-1956, an experience partly represented in System of Dante’s
Hell. I cite this fact mainly to underscore that those who “escaped” direct experience in WWII still underwent its
dramatic after-effects, not excluding political backlash, rampant militarization, and the Cold War.

6

colonialist epistemology, then it is a weak, ambivalent reparation at best, one that shuttles the
injuries of war felt by Americans and Europeans onto the invisible landscapes and bodies of the
subaltern. Imbuing poetic magic with a racialized hierarchy of knowledge would clearly
diminish poetry’s reparative capacity. This possible knot in both the creative and critical desire
that poetry ever fix anything, ever “work its magic,” compels this investigation into past trends
in ethnography that popularized the magical thinking and actual thinking poets perform in their
poetry during both the height and fall of colonialism. As Moten says, “The logic of reparation is
grounded on notions of originary wholeness,”15 and we already know that the white Eurocentric
logic of wholeness forces incongruent pieces of the whole into a violent hierarchy.
The first chapter of this dissertation establishes the troublesome place that magic holds in
poetry and the political-epistemological formations around it. In doing so, it explores what it
considers “the dialectics of magic.” It questions the mechanisms—largely intellectual ones—by
which magic, poetry and primitivity came to be conceived as interrelated, and how this
conception of poetry was crucial to the ways people imagined post-war renewal in the first half
of the twentieth century. The chapter’s analysis does not center on magic as it gets referenced by
a poem, exemplified by James Weldon Johnson’s “White Witch,” but rather focuses on
knowledge production about and around poetry. It considers poetry’s status and character as a
genre from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, including its canonization and
teachability in the eyes of New Critics Robert Penn Warren and Cleanth Brooks. In tracing the
intellectual history of this knowledge production about both magic and poetry, I attempt to show
how the establishment of this relationship depends on colonial, racialized ways of thinking.

15

Fred Moten, “B3,” The Poetry Foundation, April 6, 2010, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2010/02/b-3. I
had a conversation with Moten in Providence, RI right around this time when he published this blog, in which he
was “stressing” about a talk he had to give about reparative poetics. He was worried he just couldn’t “get with it,”
that poetry couldn’t/shouldn’t be reparative, and he was using Nourbese Philips to figure this out.
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Through mapping the work of Edward Tylor, Marcel Mauss, and Walter Benjamin, I offer one
possible view of a long nineteenth century (after Eric Hobswan). This map spans from early,
Eurocentric ethnography, sociology and anthropology to the manifestation of these ways of
imagining the world in early twentieth century poetics, physiology, and post-war criticism of
mystical ideology. I show how at two points during this “long century,” both points occurring
immediately after the devastation of each of the world wars, the social urge to fix a fragmented
or broken sense of self and community motivated readers and poets to appropriate primitivistic
ways of reading and writing poetry. Critics like W.E.B. DuBois, C.L.R. James, and Theodor
Adorno reject poetic mysticism and attempt, instead, to redirect desperation toward materialism;
however, I show that James and Adorno’s arguments against magic, mysticism, and poetry
depend largely on poetry’s anti-dialecticism. I suggest, contrary to Adorno’s warnings, that
perhaps poetry, under the guise of its conception as magical, could indeed re-attune its war-torn
readers to a new kind of aesthetic (sensory) rationalism; nevertheless, this poetic antidote is
endlessly problematized by the racialized epistemology undergirding its possibility.
In the second chapter, I read Gertrude Stein’s 1932 poem Stanzas in Meditation through
contemporaneous ethnographic texts on magic, observing how her poems parallel magic spells. I
argue that the poem imbues the reader with the sense of a threat, one emotionally tied to the postwar context, and furthermore has the effect of heightening the reader’s attentiveness to language,
and perhaps their actual surroundings, as a way to restore sensory capacity to the numb populace.
However, I seek to demonstrate that the poem’s reparative effects arise through racialized codes
of poetic performance due to their dependence on Stein’s production of a primitivist sense of
time and through tropes that resemble racialized depictions of magical practices among colonial
peoples. Thus, I argue that inaccurate anthropological representations of non-white, not-present
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cultures, and the desire for these cultures to provide a fix for post-war alienation, co-constitute
modernist avant-garde whiteness. Through focusing on Stein, not an occultist, I show how such
magical and racialized forms of thinking poetry are present regardless of intentions or professed
aesthetics. In addition to Marcel Mauss’s description of magic spells, this chapter also integrates
Johannes Fabian and Tony C. Brown’s thinking on how colonial otherness and concepts of
primitivity effect modern concepts of time. I think through Stanzas in Meditation’s production of
both non-synchronous temporality and a temporal standstill as two ways in which primitivist
poetics take shape without direct reference to occultism or race. Ultimately this chapter troubles
any clear depiction of Stein’s poem as trance or counter-trance; instead, I posit that the
distracting, numbing, technological effects of Late Capitalism are the initial trance against which
Stein’s poetics works to repair its readers, bringing readers to an attentive, feeling state. I show,
however, that this repair, due to its primitivist premise, must be thought and experienced with
colonial consciousness, or awareness of its subaltern influence, to retain its trance-like powers.
In the third chapter, I attempt to show how the ink bleeds from Modernism into the
1960s, both with Amiri Baraka’s experimental poetics in his 1969 collection, Black Magic, and
with the ongoing reproduction of primitivist discourse within black aesthetics. I trace magic’s
shifting meanings and statuses across this compendium of three chapbooks written throughout
the sixties, seeking to show how Baraka negotiates the desire both for magic and for a way to
survive the real, material violence of racism. Baraka uses magic, I argue, as a conceptual to
backdrop to his metaphysical investigation of black subjectivity. The belief that a poem exceeds
its textual status, has a certain kind of mana, motivates Baraka’s use of the poem as a site for
anti-white aggression and the refusal of the white bourgeois status-quo. I consider Baraka’s work
in conversation with other anti-colonialist and Marxist theorists such as Frantz Fanon, Aimé
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Cesaire, and C.L.R. James in order to understand the criticality inherent in the poetics of Black
Magic, as well as a way to understand Baraka’s rhetoric of African nativity. Ultimately, I argue
that Baraka’s poetics manages to supersede the nostalgic experimentalism of many of his
contemporaries through its insistence on poetry as an improvisatory, ever-changing praxis.
Readers may feel understandably curious about this project’s co-consideration of two
poets who seem to have little to do with each other, and who had no allegiance to occultist
circles16 in either of the times or spaces where they lived. Nevertheless, both had friends deeply
immersed in these fascinations: Baraka was lovers with Diane Di Prima; Stein socialized in
Aleistair Crowley’s circle. Neither is considered an easy poet to write about due to their
controversial personal politics and their diverse and difficult aesthetics. Both moved between
writing that “made sense” and writing that didn’t. Both formed affinities with groups
antagonistic to American ideals: Stein’s fascist friends, Baraka’s Communist organizing. Most
importantly, Stein and Baraka shared an obsession with the power of the mind, with
consciousness, with how we sense our world, and with what our attention can do. They are also
each canonically representative of experimental modernist writing, and yet they write from
wildly different political positions—Stein, the white, lesbian, Jewish ex-pat, and Baraka the
Black Nationalist then Maoist-Leninist of New Jersey whose work seems to harbor as much
homophobia as queer desire.17 Baraka is not technically a modernist poet, and is more typically
historicized as member of New American poetry and the Black Arts movement. Still this project
paints Baraka as departing from modernist thinking, particularly due to the strong hold of New
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Criticism and structuralism in the 1950s and 1960s. Both schools of thought borrowed primitivist
and racialized concepts of language, and centralized this language’s perceived magic (and
necessary rationalization) in notions of aesthetic practice.
Invoking even the word magic, let alone the practice, is tricky business. Its definition is
extremely slippery, perhaps partly due to its intellectual history. French sociologist Marcel
Mauss claims in 1902 that magic is
one of those collective customs which cannot be named, described, analysed
without the fear that one may lose the feeling that they have any reality, form or
function of their own. Magic is an institution only in the most weak sense; it is a
kind of totality of actions and beliefs, poorly defined, poorly organized even as far
as those who practise it and believe in it are concerned.18
Mauss ultimately relies on Edward Tylor’s understandings of sympathetic magic, magic as a
kind of contagious effect that allows for substitutions, say, for a doll to stand in for a person, or a
word for an act.
My use of the word “magic” stems from Mauss’s likewise vague understanding of mana,
a kind of unseen force with seen effects. In this sense, magic is not always a one-to-one
transaction. Magic as force includes extremely disparate dynamics, from the kind of trance I
imagine readers of Stein’s extremely abstract work entering to the kind of Black consciousness
Baraka denotes with the power to bring about radical political and material change. For Michael
Taussig, an important thinker behind my work, colonialism brought about a new magic, a kind of
magic interdependent between that of the foreign priest and the indigenous one. Taussig went on
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to theorize the “magic of the state”19 as the way that the state (the legacy of colonialism) infuses
the dead with a magical power over the living. Amiri Baraka’s own formulation of magic as the
life-threatening aura of white supremacy and capitalism also posits magic as a sovereign effect,
far from the hands of the solitary witch in real time and place. (To the extent that magic may be
an effect of sovereignty or ultimate decisive power, it bears observing—although my dissertation
does not explore this fact—that in both Stein and Baraka’s poetics, magic represents a
particularly masculine affect, not the feminine or feminist one we might associate with magic of
long ago covens or more contemporary herbalists and astrologists.)
I often invoke the term mystical in my work, and while I never intend this term as a
synonym for magical, I do argue that there is a relationship between mystical belief, the belief in
transcendence or animism, and the belief in Mauss’s version of magic, some unseen “force”
establishing relationships between what Tylor would call the real and the ideal. Tylor himself
called magic a kind of epistemic error: “mistaking an ideal for a real connexion.”20 Thus my own
analysis of magical thinking (literally, not psychologically) interprets the magical in multiple
ways. On the one hand, I view magic as the singular power to manifest something from nothing,
from error, from a substitute, from a word. On the other, I see it as the more abstract power of
certain systems of domination that depend on their subjects holding mystical beliefs.
While I might frequently refer to magical thinking, I do so to refer to forms of thought
that unwittingly derive from magic’s discursive legacy, or forms of thought that imbue language
and poetry with a magical character. This meaning is related to but not the same as what
psychologists call magical thinking:
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thinking, similar to a normal stage of childhood development, in which thoughts,
words or actions assume a magical power, and are able to prevent or cause events
to happen without a physical action occurring; a conviction that thinking equates
with doing, accompanied by an unrealistic understanding of cause and effect
(Examples: dreams in children, in primitive peoples, and in Pts under various
conditions).21
It is particularly interesting that there was ever a need to classify, define, or pathologize this kind
of thinking or to call it primitive. Presumably most people have experienced it. Yet it also comes
as no surprise. Since its founding, the field of psychology has been using both non-Western
belief systems and ancient Western narratives to devise a science of the human psyche.
Early psychologists and sociologists’ desire to understand the human psyche and human
behavior in relation to a progressivist narrative led them both to lean upon the same trove of
ethnographic texts out of which Bracken and Torgovnik theorize “savage,” primitivist discourse.
These studies, from Frazer’s Golden Bough (1890) to Marcel Mauss’s General Theory of Magic
(1902), represent colonial peoples’ religion through the lenses of “myth,” “magic,” and “ritual,”
thereby setting colonial practices (and peoples) apart from Western, Christian ones called
“history,” “prayer” and “mass.” However, while seeming to separate capital “R” religion from
“backward” practices like magic, these writers repeatedly invoke poetry as a kind of crossroads
between the functions of mystical belief at the world’s falsely presumed center and at its
periphery. For example, Freud’s 1913 theory of moral ambivalence in Totem and Taboo: Some
Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics is largely based on
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anthropological accounts of Austral-Asian and South Pacific marital rituals and codes. To the
extent that psychology grew out of historicist, progressivist assumptions about human
development (despite regressivist tendencies), it not only privileges a hierarchy of the present
over the past but also draws racist parallels between the childhood stage of development in the
contemporary Westerner and adult mentality in aboriginals. This racialized conception of
primitive, and thereby, colonial difference as a difference of maturity and knowledge comes to
include the poet when this social science overflows into literary criticism.
Frederick Clarke Prescott,22 a professor of English literature at Cornell from 1897-1957,
was one of several modernist literary critics who wrote about a relationship between magic,
poetry, and primitivity. He attempted to use both Jamesian and Freudian theories of
consciousness to explain poetic creativity in his 1922 book, The Poetic Mind. Prescott applies
psychology’s typologies of the primitive and the child easily to the poet. “Like the primitive man
he is,” Prescott claims, “the child through resemblances personifies almost everything with
which he comes into contact.”23 Examining the similarities between “the poetic mind” and “the
primitive mind,” he articulates how the emotional and the inspirational (dream-like) qualities
more easily found in “primitive man,” not the rational qualities found in modern man, lead to
poetry. In drawing this connection between primitivity and poetry, he reproduces a colonial,
racial concept of the poetic. As opposed to New Critics who aim to demystify poetry, Prescott
wants his readers to indulge in the unknown—one not so different from Lindsay’s jungle or
darkness—and to feel its power, a power which I claim is racialized by its magical depiction:
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There is something similarly inexplicable in the action of poetry upon the reader’s
mind. Lovers of poetry…find a mystery in its effect. A poem, they may say, has
charm, but the word itself suggests magic; and this test, though as good as any,
can be applied only by the feelings, never by the reason; and it cannot be
rationally explained.24
I cite Prescott at the beginning of my dissertation not to portray him as an Ivy League eccentric
but as a literary theorist steeped in the zeitgeist of his times, a theorist as obsessed with poetry as
psycho-analysis as primitivity. Work like his prompted my initial suspicion that a larger
conceptual relationship between race, poetry, and magic became defined in the first half of the
twentieth century, and that this relationship needed to be decolonized. Meanwhile, Musgrove’s
1946 article “Poetry and Magic”25 reproduces many of the same primitivist tropes mentioned
earlier, including the hierarchical positioning of meaning below the surface of language. This
trend in literary criticism spanning continents, oceans and decades prompts me not to examine
poets who deal directly with primitivist reference or magical inspiration in their poetry, but to
question how poetry is pedagogically positioned and experienced, regardless of poetic intentions,
through assumptions about its magical, primitive grounds.
In claiming that poetry is “racialized” through its treatment by modernist critics and
poets, I must pause here to define what I mean by the terms “race,” “racialize/d” and “racism/t,”
and to hopefully inspire more clarity throughout. The term “race” rarely appears in this study,
perhaps reflecting my sense of race as a constructed concept, not a natural one, used to produce a
hierarchized knowledge about humanity and its forms of apparent difference, a knowledge that
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would enable a wholly unethical willingness to protect the lives of some and kill others. I use
“racist” to describe thoughts, actions, and representations that devalue or delimit others based on
assumptions about the meanings of race, whereas “racialized” describes thoughts, actions, or
representations that betray the presence of race working as a concept. This study also attends to
the way in which the black-white binary fails to help us imagine the wide, contradictory field of
human appearance and cultural expression. These terms and their definitions matter in so far as I
consider race always to be present conceptually in the production of knowledge throughout the
academy, then and now.26 It is nearly impossible to think what it would take for this not to be the
case.
In some ways, Vachel Lindsay’s poem “Congo” seems to know that the racial binary
won’t hold, that interdependency collapses the binary every time. He both reproduces and
reverses the same racial hierarchy upon which the separation of the primitive from the civil
depends. The very “BOOM” of what the speaker perceives to be the threat of magic or “hoodoo” in the poem is also the rhythm and touch-point that the poet desires for his own poem.
According to the logic of appropriation, Lindsay’s poem needs the “BOOM” that isn’t of his
time in order to succeed, to advance. While “forward progress” is his narrative arc—colonialism,
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conversion—the last two sections of the ending make disparate claims. First, Lindsay seems to
imagine an end to the Congo’s power though this very “progress,” figured by the river’s flow.
After all, the appearance of the twelve Apostles, a symbol of the success of Christianization,
makes its waters turn “GOLDEN” and results in “hoo-doo”’s dominion being done:
Mumbo-Jumbo is dead in the jungle.
Never again will he hoo-doo you.
Never again will he hoo-doo you.27
But the “never again” of hoo-doo is then concluded with a paradox of spoken silence (could we
say a description of any poem?)
To cry, in the silence, the Congo tune:—
“Mumbo-Jumbo will hoo-doo you,
“Mumbo-Jumbo will hoo-doo you.
Mumbo ... Jumbo ... will ... hoo-doo ... you.”28
The poem’s myriad paradoxes—the water that cuts but depends on the land for its form, the
never again and the still going hoo-doo—act out a theory of alterity, in which being depends on
opposition. As with Quijano’s dependency theory29 and Michael Taussig’s argument about the
interdependence of the Christian colonizer’s salvation and the indigenous figure’s paganism,30 so
too does Lindsay’s tired, sloping river metaphor take shape through binary’s oppositions.
Likewise, the image’s whiteness (or golden hue) appears through the blackness surrounding it.
The river Congo conveys cleanliness, refreshment, baptism, and salvation, slicing into the heart,
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the hidden, and the dark of Africa, of Congo at-large. Lindsay suspends the poet’s supposed
linguistic voracity over
…the well-known tunes of the parrot band
That trilled on the bushes of that magic land.31
Lindsay’s The Congo and Other Poems appeared in print in 1914, a year that historians
of war and poetry alike consider the first bookend to the period called modernism, yet the work
did not survive into the modernist canon. Popular during his time for his reading style, Lindsay
performed “The Congo” frequently and for important audiences, including a Poetry magazine
fundraiser hosted by publisher Harriet Monroe with W.B. Yeats and Carl Sandburg in
attendance. Yeats and Sandburg could figure as two poles of the aesthetics we expect to find
expressed in poetry called “modernist”—undeniable mysticism at one end, insistent realism at
the other, and a host of wild experiments across the trek between.
In Dead Poets, it is a teacher who attempts to give Lindsay’s “Congo” relevance. Still, in
a November 2009 podcast, “noncanonical Congo (PoemTalk #26),”32 contemporary poet-critics
Michelle Taransky, Charles Bernstein, and Aldon Nielsen debate the teachability of Lindsay’s
indubitably racist poem. Some want to salvage the poem for its emphasis on performance and
orality. (Lindsay put reading instructions in the margins.) Some think its stark contrast to New
Critics’ desired image of Modernism marks its importance on a syllabus. They see its inclusion
as an important reversal, or de-obscuring, of how we think modernism. Nielsen, however, insists
that there is no “getting past” the poem’s racism in order to find some other reason to teach it,
such as its musicality or odd form; rather, it is necessary to face the discomfort of its primitivist
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aesthetics, he says, as a way to understand how politics and poetry intersect at this historical
moment. Moderating their conversation, Al Fireis argues that despite the poem’s racist
semantics, its direct engagement with race, as opposed to other modernist poetries’ evasion
thereof, denotes its value.
Still, part of the suspicion guiding this dissertation is the belief that these “other” poets,
the ones considered not to address race, nevertheless do invoke race through their experiments
with poetic image, figure, and other tropes. To clarify, the idea that race operates in the
epistemology of poetry is not a suspicion of mine—this study thinks through and beyond this
idea because I take race as a ground from which these disciplines arose and the modern world
formed, and upon which people, including the poets in this dissertation, lived. Studies focused on
Yeatsian mysticism and the like occlude the ways in which supposedly “non-racialized” or
“white” poetries reach beyond Eurocentric mythology and root down in exactly the primitivist
curiosity and Afrophiliac appropriation that Lindsay bares on the surface. Through such “raceless” sleight of hand, these accepted brands of modernist poetry define modernist whiteness
through its seemingly innocuous abstraction and play—perhaps most apparent in Pound or
H.D.’s imagism.
But what about Lindsay’s primitivism barred it from the white modernist canon, or
rather, the modernist canon that is always, already, white? Surely, it is possible that the poem’s
obvious racism became unpalatable for critics in the post-World War II rise in consciousness
around the need for racial integration and civil rights reform. Still, given the very un-integrated
way in which the American literary canon continued to develop throughout the bulk of the
twentieth century, it still feels necessary to consider the role of critics and race in shaping our
expectations of poetry as a genre; and to ask, how did New Critics’ refusal of explicitly
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primitivistic poetries and acceptance of other more abstract or imagistic ones effect our
understanding of the genre’s cultural and pedagogical role? 33 How are the two poetries, the
discarded and the studied, enmeshed in the same socio-political fabric that produces racialized
and colonial ways of knowing? Contrary to what the critics who sideline poets like Lindsay but
celebrate poets like Pound and Stein thought, the politics of these poetries are possibly more
similar than not (despite their aesthetic divergence). Understandings of poetic language as an
inherently mystical, magical phenomenon, and the manifestations of these understandings in the
production and reception of the modernist poem force us to rethink the supposed gap between
the canon and its ousted underlings. This study will therefore cite instances of poetry’s magicphilia as always potentially infused with Afro- or primitive-philia due to modern colonialist
modes of thinking about primitivity, barbarism, and linguistic function from Modernism’s
inception and throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
Colonial thinking, as we know from Fredric Jameson,34 also spatializes time, such that
colonial-spatial realms become synonymous with the temporal realm of the past. As Torgovnick
says, the primitive functions as the trope of the child, and likewise, obsessions with colonial
otherness overlap with anachronistic desire. Part of modernists’ failed progressivism derives in
part from this nostalgic fascination with Victorian ideas and older ones harvested from the
distant past—what Mignolo calls “the constant reproduction of ‘coloniality.’”35 In addition to
this colonial dimension, Laura Doyle notes the racial bent of modernists’ obsession with the old.
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She contends that this paradox “at the heart of racialism is also the paradox at the heart of
modernism and modernity: its investment in the past is its ticket to the future.”36
My references to colonialism largely point to French and British colonies held in Africa,
the Middle East, and East Asia, what we might call their politico-geographic colonialism; and,
perhaps more importantly, to the ethnographic studies emanating from French academia (which
in many cases originate in the South Asia-Pacific region), what Quijano might call the
colonialism of the imagination.37 However, this study considers the coloniality of the white and
Eurocentric imagination, as opposed to that of the colonized, of whom Ngūgī wa Thiong’o writes
in Decolonizing the Mind. For the purposes of considering the Euro-American (Western)
imagination at the inception of modernism through the 1950s, I use colonial to refer to the
effects of present or past political, economic and socio-cultural dynamics premised on an
imperialism and its ideological assumptions about racial, gender, sexual, linguistic, and
epistemological hierarchies.38
I therefore approach this work through Walter Mignolo’s condition and question: "If
coloniality is constitutive of modernity, in the sense that there cannot be modernity without
coloniality, then the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality are also two sides of the
same coin. How are the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality entangled together?"39
Thus, my study frames the modernist period with rampant nineteenth-century colonialism on one
side and widespread anti-colonial revolutions, pan-African movements, and feminist movements
on the other. This frame, rather than modernism’s traditional one, insists on always thinking the
36
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modern as colonial, considering the far-reaching rhetorical effects of this linking, and promoting
its de-linking. It suggests that we decolonize the way we think about aesthetic production of this
period, rather than simply apply the notion of post- to what is still a deeply entrenched
epistemological structure. As Mignolo describes, “the analytic of coloniality and the
programmatic of de-coloniality moves away and beyond the post-colonial.”40
My opening remarks on Dead Poets Society are meant to suggest that these associations
between poetic creativity and primitivity, though enmeshed during Modernism, persist
nostalgically among subsequent and contemporary generations of poets and readers. Perhaps
these desires for the past persist even more so in the face of surges in conservatism and the rise
of an even more phantasmagoric technocracy. Furthermore, the relationship between creativity
and magic today persists as much as the occlusion of its racial dimensions. A recent conference
called “The Occult Humanities Conference 2017: Contemporary Art and Scholarship on the
Esoteric Traditions” was held at the university where I teach. Sponsored by NYU’s Steinhardt
Department of Art and Art Professions and the Phantasmaphile Society, the conference schedule
included speakers on literary as well as visual arts, as well as the actual art of conjuring. Excited
by the relevance of this conference to my research, I scanned the schedule, only to find that not a
single panel would take on the political dimensions of these interlinked fields, one aesthetic, one
spiritual, one driven by white culture makers like Leonora Carrington, the other steeped in a
cultural anthropology stained by colonialist history. In part due to the persistence of this
intellectual trend, I attempt in this dissertation to assess and decolonize the curious linking
between these concepts so that we might understand the conditions that allow and maintain the
thinking of poetry through racialized understandings of space, time, and humanity. Throughout
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this study, I work to determine the possible origins of poetic “cave” scenes and to examine their
racial underpinnings, given that such scenes, be it on screen or amidst a line in a poem, almost
always occur in hiding, or, to be more accurate, appear without our noticing. Now is time for the
invisible ink—the white on white signs—to become visible.
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Chapter One
“That Bewitched Spot”: Modernist Dialectics and the Magic of Poetry
When language first entered history, its masters were already priests and sorcerers.
—Adorno and Horkeimer1
Five poems with the word “witch” in the title, all written in the early part of the twentieth
century appear in the table of contents of Library of America’s millennial anthology, American
Poetry: The Twentieth Century, Vol. One: Henry Adams to Dorothy Parker (2000):2 James
Weldon Johnson’s “The White Witch,” Leonora Speyer’s exclamatory “Witch!,” Robert Frost’s
“The Witch of CoÆs,” Adelaide Crapsey’s pared down “The Witch,” and Edna St. Vincent
Millay’s “Witch-Wife.” The witch exemplifies an outsider, a speaker in tongues, and, further, a
gendered other. She surfaces here as a mark of magic—perhaps the poem’s own. The witch
draws our attention to the difference between the seen and the unseen, and in the case of James
Weldon Johnson’s poem, the unseen force embodied by the witch is racism. The speaker warns
black readers:
O BROTHERS mine, take care! Take care!
The great white witch rides out to-night.
Trust not your prowess nor your strength,
Your only safety lies in flight;
For in her glance there is a snare,
And in her smile there is a blight.3
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This witch will not heal black readers’ illnesses or grant their wishes, but rather, is a force to
flee. Johnson’s poem disassembles the white witch’s danger, which is also her allure: the trap, or
“snare,” of her eyes’ “glanc[ing]” whites, and the disease, or “blight,” of the white teeth that
flash in her “smile.” Danger might otherwise pass unseen under this enticing white glare.
The witch’s whiteness is monstrous: constructed and cruel. A scene of utter domination,
barely escaped, ensues:
My body like a living coal;
Obeyed the power of those eyes
As the needle trembles to the pole;
And did not care although I felt
The strength go ebbing from my soul.4
The speaker’s own body, rendered black but alive and consumable, “a living coal,” becomes
bound to “the pole,” at once the magnetic end of earth’s axis and an instrument of subjection.
Then weakness and apathy comes: he “did not care.” We might say the white witch is out
thieving black will. Nevertheless, the speaker’s strength, the will to act or care, gets revealed
later in the poem as something primal:
She feels the old Antaean strength
In you, the great dynamic beat
Of primal passions.5
This “primal” strangely reverberates across two skins—one Herculean, or Greek, and one that is
“you,” the presumably black “brothers” Johnson addresses. What has the modern witch come
for? The “great white witch” might not be out riding to murder, like the Ku Klux Klan, but her
magical power, despite being an ancient “white” one, can only thrive by thieving and
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accumulating blackness. In this sense, I cite Johnson’s poem as instantiating a theory6 at the
heart of this dissertation: that white modernist concepts of magic arise from a racial, colonialist
view of the world.
“The White Witch” first appeared in the 1922 Book of American Negro Poetry, an
anthology which Johnson himself edited. W.E.B. DuBois’s Dark Water, issued two years
previously, works with a similar trope, racializing evil as white. In the section called “Souls of
White Folk,” DuBois criticizes the vast failure of Christianity, “white folk’s” religion: “We have
seen, —Merciful God! In these wild days and in the name of Civilization, Justice, and
Motherhood,—what we have not seen, right here in America, of orgy, cruelty, barbarism, and
murder done to men and women of Negro descent.”7 Speaking paradoxically of seeing the
unseen, the “wilder, fiercer violence”8 perpetrated by whites against blacks in America, DuBois
implies a ghostliness, or witchiness, in the mechanisms of whiteness and racism. Calling “white”
morality barbaric and licentious, DuBois, like later critics C.L.R. James and Theodor Adorno,
attempts to deconstruct the primitive-civilized binary. It need not matter whether DuBois or
Johnson wrote at the same time, or if one influenced the other. What matters is that they both
feature and eschew the magical and the mystical—unseen forces—while also employing tropes
of whiteness and barbarism to critique racism. Still, what to make of the magical figure in these
poems, or contemporaneous writings with primitivistic lexicons but less obviously racialized
audiences? Despite how easy it seems to interpret Johnson’s political narrative, how do
invocations of magic in other poetries and theories of poetry produce the appropriative white
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aesthetic that comes to exemplify modernism? As Johnson warns, the white-witch-effect might
seem innocuous but is far from it.
In disparate strokes, this chapter attempts to explore the contentious place of magic (and
its practitioners) in poetry and the racial politics surrounding its invocation. It further asks how
the Anglo-American lyric tradition came to presume magic, poetry and primitivity to be
interrelated, and how that relationship became fundamental to a concept of post-war renewal in
the 1920s and 30s and again in the late 1940s. Moreover, this exploration of magic and poetry
focuses not on magic as the content of a poem, for as Johnson’s poem shows, the invocation of
magic, is rarely in and of itself just that. This chapter then centers on the production of
knowledge about poetry, the thinking of poetry as a genre in the late nineteenth to the midtwentieth centuries. In doing so, I offer one possible framing of a long nineteenth century9 that
traces the production of colonial anthropology in the late nineteenth century, to its mechanization
in early twentieth-century poetics, to the criticism of this ideology in the wake of World War II.
Twice during this period, after both World Wars, the desire to cure war’s social ills, isolation and
shock, fortifies what I consider an appropriative, primitivistic poetic practice and theory. While
cultural critics speak against poetic mysticism and offer instead a new materialism, their critique
of magic largely seems to rest on its inability to work dialectically, or through clear oppositions.
It seems possible, therefore, that poetry filtered through concurrent beliefs about magic might
offer shell-shocked readers a way of sensing and knowing anew, albeit of old. And still, this
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modernist belief in poetry’s reparative new-old power proves to be laden with racialized
thinking.

Hacking the Jungle’s Canon
Johnson’s 1922 Book of American Negro Poetry10 as much works as evidence of a thing
called “American Negro Poetry,” as it does, like other anthologies, buttress (or dismantle) what
we know to be the genre of poetry. There were countless poetry anthologies published during
this time. In Johnson’s anthology, his own poem “White Witch” and others point to the role of
ideas about magic and primitivity in both the evolution of poetry as a genre and its formation as a
field of study. Le Gallienne Book of English and American Poetry11 from 1935, another
formative anthology, included known popular poems like Vachel Lindsay’s “Congo” as well as
lesser known but just as exotically driven ones like Edna Matilda Thomas’s “Evoe!”12 In these
anthologies, the Greek obsessed, the nature seeking, and magic wands abound. Out of such
books as Le Gallienne’s, but not Johnson’s, New Critics like Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn
Warren began to carve the canon of poetry that would come to be called “modernist.” In 1938,
just three years after Le Gallienne’s collection of American verse appeared, Brooks and Warren
published their first edition of Understanding Poetry.13 The simple title achieves a great deal of
work in establishing poetry as not merely a genre but a specialized field of study, a body of
knowledge, a mysterious but teachable system, one that begs us to figure it out, clue by clue. We
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might ask what about poetry’s subject matter, method, or feeling made the critics want to tame it.
Or further, we could ask, what is the relationship between the association of poetry with magic
and the rise of a literary methodology determined to explain the unexplainable, to simplify the
difficult? And how is such a methodology and discipline always imbued by the ground of
racialization from which it arises? To put it another way, what does race have to do with the new
science of poetry?
New Criticism’s hermeneutic stance has since been criticized by various schools of
poets—from confessional to conceptual—and recent critics have attuned to the politics
underlying a hyper-rational approach to literary interpretation.14 Despite this backlash, the New
Critical method of approaching poetry as an object to be known and deduced through close,
detective-like reading remains the dominant way that we teach students to interpret poetry today
(and still my own knee-jerk method for analyzing poetry). Understanding Poetry offers a nowfamiliar taxonomy of the poem with sections titled “Narrative Poems,” “Descriptive Poems,”
“Metrics,” “Tone,” “Imagery,” and “Theme.” Despite their titular aim to understand poetry and
to do so as empirically as possible, Brooks and Warren ironically begin by emphasizing the
impractical nature of not just poetic speech but speech in general. They seek to illustrate how
poetry appears in the structures of ordinary language. (Concurrent theorists of the lyric, from
Adorno to Jakobson, espoused similar ideas.) Brooks and Warren portray this lyric invasion into
daily speech as language’s own will or doing, but I understand their representation of this kind of
linguistic “passion” as already racially coded as “black” and “primal,” and further, I contend that
this racialized perspective on the character of poetry is the end-product of decades of colonialist
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representations of magic as poetry. I am curious to what extent an epistemological anxiety—
which is always also a racial anxiety, be it utter disenchantment or honest confusion in a postwar colonized world—drives this modernist sense of poetic speech.
In the preamble to their “Introduction,” Brooks and Warren analyze a “scientific
statement,” to expose how poetic device infects even the most objective statement of a scientist,
the Nobel prize-winning physicist, Robert Andrews Millikan:
For sentimental pacifism is, after all, but a return to the method of the jungle. It is
in the jungle that emotionalism alone determines conduct, and wherever that is
true no other than the law of the jungle is possible.15
Brooks and Warren quickly point out the ironically non-scientific nature of Millikan’s speech
due to its reliance on metaphor; however, their choice of a statement riven with primitivist
sentiment, its play on “the jungle,” implies that the sentence’s lack of objectivity is a product not
just of its reliance on metaphor but the fact that it portrays emotional conduct through racial
metaphor. A contemporary reader easily notices this metaphor’s primitivism, but the authors,
rather than speak to this trope, note how word-pairs like “pacifism” and “sentimentalism” make
meaning.
Ultimately, Brooks and Warren show that the poetic “something of most ordinary
communications involves feelings,” not rationality, though it takes a rational approach to parse
this kind of “jungle-ish” communication.16 Brooks and Warren rationalize poetry by codifying
this exaggerated feeling as that which distinguishes poetic speech from ordinary speech. The
unavoidability of poetic speech inside ordinary speech, as evidenced for them by “jungle”
emotion, shows how, at the peak of poetry’s formation as a discipline, thinking the feeling of
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poetry required simultaneously imagining its supposed primal roots. These modernist critical
approaches, and founding approaches to poetry as a product of university study, mystify poetry
in two ways. First, it is mystified for being un-decipherable, then for being special, emotional,
primitive, and magical.
Brooks and Warren’s mystification of linguistic art was hardly new. New Critics’ belief
in the poetic text’s autochthonous ability to make meaning echoes their contemporaries’
perspectives on the occult nature of poetry. However, I take issue with the object and
methodology called Understanding Poetry for behaving like a social science while calling itself
literary criticism, and for not acknowledging its borrowings from other disciplines, ones more
obviously imbued with a racialized, colonial approach to knowledge-making. This chapter’s
attempt to reckon interdisciplinarily with the formation of the discipline of poetry, amidst the
formation of the social sciences, leads me to read both across disciplines and time to understand
the effects of this space of the “jungle,” this imagined colonial elsewhere, on how we ever try to
or do understand poetry: hacking away at a tangle of wild branches or somehow else. Reading
across these lines is an unavoidably messy approach. But this chapter proceeds with the
conviction that such messiness allows for the possibility of new perceptions and ideas. This
itinerant reading led me to many earlier anthropological and ethnographic texts that understand
and represent not only this primitive space, but also the magical rituals that gave it shape, and
suggest that this space, and these rituals, became intertwined with American and European
thinking about poetry. Ultimately, I will demonstrate how early twentieth-century attempts to
canonize and study modernist poetry construct not only a sense of the poetic as magical, but also
a belief that this deposed, anarchic cultural framework, revived through poetry, could heal the
effects of living in a modern “wasteland.” Of course, Johnson and DuBois would not, could not,
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share this belief in poetic witchery. They were too keenly already aware of the perils of
abstraction—the unseen ideology of race having wreaked tragic, visible havoc.

Ethnography’s Leaks
Primitivist aesthetics subsumed the cutting edge of white elite circles that surrounded
intellectual and creative figures like H.D. and Walter Benjamin in his brief but later years. While
arguably much of the mysticism and spiritualism that fueled modernism drew inspiration, like
Robert Graves’s The White Goddess,17 from local mythologies and the history of European
paganism, the prevalence of magic in modernist aesthetics and thought must also be viewed in
relation to colonialist primitivism. The flow of ethnographic studies of European colonies during
the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries produced a racialized concept of
magic, one that treats magic as a mysterious other under the gaze of an ethnographic one. Early
ethnographies produced during the period focus on systems of religion and language,
predominately in colonial territories. These ethnographies circulated around departments like
philosophy, psychology, sociology and linguistics, influencing scholars and critics,18 even
serving as useable evidence at times for new theories and methodologies.19 Furthermore, many
of these early ethnographers and anthropologists, from Edward Tylor to Marcel Mauss to James
Frazer and Bronislaw Malinowski, repeatedly recognize something like poetry in the uses of
language within religious ritual. The frame for observing rituals as poetic seems to stem from the
ethnographers’ European understandings of lyric, not from the aesthetic or cultural frame of the
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subjects observed—in other words, the outside pushed in. However, this qualification does
nothing to explain why turn-of-the-century cultural recorders and synthesizers coded magical rite
as poetry. What, we might ask, drove the theorizing of magic as akin to poetry or this recognition
of the literary in the ritualistic? What would this interrelationship afford their mainly white,
European, modern readers?
Both Marcel Mauss and Edward Tylor’s anthropological writings help us to question how
these correspondences signify for modernist critics and poets. They also show how reading
cross-disciplinarily helps us to understand thinking on magic and poetry in the years leading up
to modernism. Tylor and Mauss wrote concurrently with global colonization reaching its apex
and social sciences arising in universities. This overlapping Victorian historical context makes it
productive to consider the period’s literary production against this background of ethnography
and anthropology. Magic became elemental to modern aesthetic practice and poetry criticism
through these scholars’ simultaneous description, racialization, and classification of colonial
cultures and their theorization of an unbroken trans-spatial, trans-temporal humanism.
Sociologist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss was born in 1872 into a family of social
scientists. Most notable is his uncle Émile Durkeim.20 Mauss became known for his work on
gift-exchange, which he conducted after earlier studies of primitive religion, mainly of sacrificial
rituals and magic. In Mauss’s 1902 A General Theory of Magic, a book exemplary of early
anthropology, he draws from a mix of ethnographic accounts of Australian, Hindu, and ancient
Greek cultures, among others, and, in doing so, universalizes the concept of magic despite
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drawing most of his evidence from colonized realms. By describing the uses of language in
magical practice, Mauss both connects the idea of magic to that of poetry and eerily predicts
particular aesthetic markers of poetic experiment in later decades. He insists that “all magic is
formulaic,” whether it has to do with numeric structures, “[n]ot any number of times, but
according to sacred and magical numbers,” or certain forms of “archaisms and strange and
incomprehensible terms.”21 Mauss calls verbal rites “merely an automatic action,”22 like one of
William James’s writing experiments. While this emphasis on not only formulaic but also
automatic repetitions reminds us of Joyce or Stein, the near requirement for anarchic twists
points to Pound and Eliot’s eclectic poetic ethos. Mauss intensifies the correspondence between
magic and poetry by noting its use of compression: “[I]t is more common for [spells] to shrink in
size: the onomatopoeic muttering of a phrase, the naming of a person involved.”23 Through
excessive repetition, even words that mean via their sounds (onomatopoeic ones) may be
muttered until “the names themselves become unrecognizable.” The prevalent role of names in
spells, and their curious power in relation to a world of things, resounds clearly in Poundian
Imagist proclamations and Williams’s concurrent “no ideas but in things.”24
Mauss seeks a structure, a science, in magic, not unlike the structure New Critics seek in
the poem. He finds it in the omnipresence of language, be it spoken, written, or merely thought.
“[T]here is no such thing as a wordless ritual,” Mauss states, while admitting that “an apparent
silence does not mean that inaudible incantations expressing the magician’s will are not being
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made.”25 Importantly, when introducing “spells,” Mauss clarifies, “we do not wish to imply by
this that it is the only kind of verbal ritual26 in magic,” and further, that “verbal magic…is
extremely differentiated.”27 This differentiation is critical to Mauss’s proto-structuralist project.
The prologue begins: “Up to now, the history of religion has consisted of a blurred bundle of
ideas.”28 Mauss proceeds to explain this disorganization as a product of the lack of “scientific
terminology” for an anthropology of religion, claiming that “our aim is not only to define words,
but to set up natural classes of facts”—a crystal-clear proposal to make a science, or a discipline,
of religion, including magic.29 Curiously, lacking a scientific terminology for magic, Mauss
turned to a literary one.30
Despite Mausss’s interest in organizing and defining the knowledge of religion, he
refuses to offer his reader a finite definition of magic and, in effect, leans heavily on the titular
“general” and the vagaries of systemic analysis. He calls magic:
one of those collective customs which cannot be named, described, analysed
without the fear that one may lose the feeling that they have any reality, form or
function of their own. Magic is an institution only in the most weak sense; it is a
kind of totality of actions and beliefs, poorly defined, poorly organized even as far
as those who practise it and believe in it are concerned…the interest lies in the
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beliefs involved in magic, the feelings it provokes and the agents who perform
it.31
He emphasizes the behavior of the group instead: “collective customs,” “a kind of totality,”
“poorly organized.” He also asserts his interest in “beliefs” and “agents,” not facts and
phenomena. Similarly, my study is concerned less with defining magic than with understanding
people’s implicit or explicit beliefs about it. In focusing on the agents and believers, he parallels
the way language depends on social consensus to the way magic works: “And just as words have
only a distant relationship, or none at all, with the things they describe, between a magical sign
and the object signified we have very close but very unreal relations—of number, sex or image,
qualities which in general are quite imaginary, but imagined by a society as a whole.”32
Mauss fashions a social theory of magic, positing magic as a social system dependent on
a collective imagination. This social dimension of magic produces immense opportunity for
collective action: “The whole social body comes alive with the same movement. They all
become, in a manner of speaking, parts of a machine or, better, spokes of a wheel.”33 The
mechanistic portrayal of ritual participants, ones who move as if in a trance, seems at once
extraordinary and ordinary to Mauss. The individual practicing magic appears ambivalent; a
contemporary magician “is no longer himself,” and at the same time, “magic has tried to cast off
all collective aspects…it is exploited only by individuals.”34 It seems that Mauss points to magic
as both a site of opportunity in his fin-de-siècle moment and a site of caution. His analysis of
magic’s dependence on collective participation sounds both like a theory of mass political
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consciousness and a warning against bestowing this consciousness too easily on the wrong
magician.
Mauss confers upon verbal magic a medicinal power in addition to its social
ramifications. He categorizes poetic tropes like naming, punning, description, and onomatopoeia
as “sympathetic magical rites.”35 Mauss uses this language of sympathy and contagion to link the
magical and the poetic to prevalent understandings of the nervous system and disease. The
medicinal effect of magic happens through naming:
It is only a matter of naming the actions or things in order to bring about a
sympathetic reaction. In a medical spell or in a rite of exorcization, play is made
on words like “withdraw,” “reject,” words for illness itself or the demon
responsible for the evil. Puns and onomatopoeic phrases are among the many
ways of combating sickness verbally through sympathetic magic…[including] the
mere description of a corresponding non-verbal rite.36
This description of medicinal rite’s word play bears a striking similarity to poetic experiment.
Poetic language appears embodied and “combati[ve].” Certain sounds or tropes might literally
expel disease. Mauss’s use of a “poetry-rich” lexicon to analyze medicinal rites lays a certain
groundwork for the ways in which I attempt in to understand both the belief in poetry as
reparative and the ways that this belief gets practiced, theorized, and critiqued.
Mauss’s inclination to develop a social theory based on anthropological studies and even
to define magic through poetry harkens after his British predecessor, the founding social
anthropologist Edward Tylor (1832-1917). Perhaps the first anthropologist to triangulate poetry,
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magic, and primitivity, Tylor is most known for his long, two-volume study, Primitive Culture,37
an evolutionist, universalist study of animism. Tylor uses a Darwinian, developmental model to
theorize modern culture’s derivation from primitive roots. Like Mauss, he depicts culture’s
evolution as one organic system by reorganizing, remixing and restating diverse ethnographic
reports on colonialized cultural groups along with historical and mythological accounts of
European antiquity. Tylor teaches his readers to see contemporary culture and ideology as having
evolved, in stages, from its primeval roots to the present day. However, different from Darwin’s
“tree of life” or Plato’s “great chain of being,” Tylor refers to a “general scheme of knowledge,”
an intellectual map that begins with the primitive, not the person, with the history of ideas, not
creatures.
Tylor’s thinking relies on a historicist ideology of development, similar to that which
motivated Marxist and Darwinian thinkers, a progressive ideology that hierarchizes Western
ways of knowing and sensing over others. He invents the term “survivals” to name the
phenomena that conjoin his present to a primitive past. Tylor’s neologism eschews Darwin’s
sartorial term “vestige,” preferring the more valorous “survival.” Tylor’s theory of survivals
attempts to rationalize the relationship between primitivity and modernity, and, perhaps, to shock
readers with the persistence of these “rude,” undefeatable remnants of their own past.38 Tylor
depicts these lowly survivals as nonetheless forceful and steadfast, as “opinions belonging
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properly to lower intellectual levels, which have held their place into the higher by mere force of
ancestral tradition.”39
Unsurprisingly, Tylor first locates the survival in language and, more importantly, in its
metaphoric, poetic function. Using language as his primary exhibit of how survivals work, he
asks rhetorically, “[I]s not a pregnant consideration that the language of civilized men is but the
language of savages, more or less improved in structure, a good deal extended in vocabulary,
[and] made more precise in the dictionary definition of words?”40 While Tylor claims that
contemporary language offers increased variety and precision, his primary point, that civilized
and “savage” languages are “more or less” the same, rests on language’s synonymously poetic
and defective function: metaphor. In Tylor’s opinion, “the vast defect of language as a method
of utterance” then and now is due to “the fact that speech is a scheme worked out by the rough
and ready application of material metaphor and imperfect analogy, in ways fitting rather the
barbaric education of those who formed it, than our own.”41 Tylor critiques language’s failure
due to its dependence on material comparisons, or metaphoric references, and he further roots
this failure in its “barbaric” inventors. Tylor strangely casts metaphor as both a failure and a
survival against the forward prerogative of development. His treatment of metaphor opposes
philosophy’s traditional view of metaphor as complex and curious for how it skirts away from,
withholds, and transforms the meaning of words. Certainly, modernists took pleasure in
amplifying the distance (between words and meaning) that a metaphor could manage.42
Metaphor’s persistent rudeness, or imperfection, leads Tylor to judge even contemporary poetry
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for being “too little beyond the savage stage…still as it were hacking with stone celts and
twirling laborious friction-fire.”43 The final image of Stone Age man making fire from friction (a
kind of mana, or something from nothing) drags the poetic temporally backward toward both the
incomprehensible and the magical.
While it is easy to critique Tylor’s bias anachronistically, his use of poetry to explain the
savage and the animistic offers a crucial foundation for this study’s query into the forces that
structure the conceptual relationship between race, magic and poetry. For Tylor, language’s
figurative or comparative function reflects our most base nature. Due to the similar ways in
which subsequent anthropologists like Mauss or literary critics like Brooks and Warren continue
to think about figurative language as both magical and primitive, it is crucial to delve deeply into
Tylor’s albeit antique and distant (he’s neither poet nor critic) theory of metaphor.
Tylor confusedly celebrates and debases the figure of the savage in his discussion of
poetic language. In one turn, he writes, “Language, appearing as an art in full vigour among rude
tribes, already displays the adaptation of childlike devices in self-expressive sound and pictorial
metaphor, to utter thoughts as complex and abstruse as savage minds demand speech for” (403).
Tylor’s qualification of metaphor and onomatopoeia, or “self-expressive sound,” as “childlike,”
and his close placement of “complex” and “abstruse” next to “savage,” point to the narrow
confines into which his contradictory use of the primitive draws him (surely, the invention of fire
blurs any attempt to divide the miraculous from the material). How can rudimentary language be
childlike and complex, pictorial and abstruse? Or is it that Tylor points to language as a site of
intellectual evolution independent of biology, that language develops into a sophisticated form,
despite its “rude” users? It is as if resorting to poetic gesture—pictorial, metaphoric,
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onomatopoeic, or mimetic speech—is evidence not even of language’s backwards “jungle” state
but of the speaker’s own primitivity.
Tylor continues to link poetry and savagery while his analysis straddles the long past
classical “primitive” and the trans-temporal primitive of the present day. Tylor’s blurring
movement, or indecision, suggests that the root of linguistic wildness resides in between these
temporalities of past and present, both in myth and in the ongoingness of “savage thought.”
Poetry is pudding proof of this ongoing “weaker” expression:
In so far as myth, seriously or sportively meant, is the subject of poetry, and in so
far as it is couched in language whose characteristic is that wild and rambling
metaphor which represents the habitual expression of savage thought, the mental
condition of the lower races is key to poetry—nor is it a small portion of the
poetic realm which these definitions cover.44
Tylor sets “the mental condition of lower races” equivalent to the mental condition of poetry. By
calling this state of mind “lower” and separating it by “race,” he invokes and demotes colonized
peoples for their “wild” yet “habitual” poetic language. Simultaneously, he deems poetry a
vestige, a remaining track, a fossil, perhaps, of the beginning of language. Tylor paints poetry not
as evidence of sophisticated development, but rather as a crude element that persists despite
evolution; a pinky toe, you could say.
What we must take from Tylor’s position on the poetic quality of root language is his
interrelation of this original speech and the savage, the “lower races,” the colonial other, and the
“wild.” These categories reflect the various ethnographic sources from which both he and Mauss
wrote. While Tylor seals poetry and primitivity in relationship, Mauss adds magic to this mix,
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and further raises questions about the social and aesthetic reasons why people at the start of the
twentieth century may have craved magical poetry—not just for kicks, but perhaps for a cure.
Both of these texts highlight the conceptual co-constitution of poetry, magic, and race, and also
lead us to question the ethical ramifications of early twentieth-century poets’ appropriation,
practice, and co-theorization of these ideas, be they in the hands of Vachel Lindsay or James
Weldon Johnson. Particularly, what happens when this vestige, poetic language, becomes a
crucial site of inquiry for those seeking a solution to post-war isolation?

Antidotal Poem
Sydney Musgrove,45 an Australian literary critic, not only carries forward Victorian ideas
like Tylor’s about the primitivity of poetry, but he also seems to believe that poetry’s magic is
exactly its ability to offer a social cure to post-war readers. Musgrove begins his 1946 essay
“Poetry and Magic,”46 much as I might have begun this chapter if I were constructing not
deconstructing poetry and magic’s relationship:
The object of this paper is to examine the link between poetry and magic. These
two activities are among the oldest practised by mankind, and the existence of a
connection is apparent even on a superficial view. When one considers the
essentially irrational nature of each, the use of rhythm as an organic component in
each, the similarity of the relationship of rhapsode and shaman to their respective
audiences, one feels no surprise that the Romans used the same word—vates—for
both "seer" and "poet." The connection is clear enough at a primitive cultural
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level; but I wish to suggest that, even on the highest levels of Western civilisation,
magic in one form or another has been present as a force operating just beneath
the surface of things and exerting a profound influence on poetry. All poets, in
some sense, have "drunk the milk of Paradise."47
Throughout passages like this one, Musgrove simultaneously theorizes magic and poetry’s
relationship and reproduces a racialized Victorian ideology about both. His hierarchized
depiction of culture comes as “no surprise” to a post-theory reader today, but what remains
curious is his swift movement from the parallelism of poetry and magic to his rendition of
cultural levels. The proximity of Musgrove’s placing “Western civilization” over “a primitive
cultural level” to his describing magic as “operating just below the surface” of material reality,
“things,” and language, compels us to ask how these hierarchies relate. Lacanian and structuralist
theorists have argued how meaning (not just magic) gets ranked beneath the word;48 furthermore,
critical race theorists like Henry Louis Gates have followed that notions of race itself are
embedded within such linguistic, structural hierarchies as well as figures of speech.49 Looking
back to Musgrove’s summary and suspiciously paradisiacal, milky landing, it is hard not to
notice that even at the “highest level,” the primitive, magical, and poetic meaning is made to play
bottom. This generic focus on poetry, not literature generally, also raises the question of how
genre relates to magic’s low ranking. Musgrove’s pun risks not only racial othering and
demeaning but also generic demotion. In thinking genre and genus, or poetry and race, together,
such forms of categorization reveal themselves as always both aesthetic and bio-political.
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Musgrove was a vanguard of interdisciplinary and cross-regional study, work that would
connect seemingly separate literary phenomena. He is most known beyond his Australian-New
Zealand roots as the writer of T.S. Eliot and Whitman (1952), a cross-Atlantic, cross-period study
that deeply affected such subsequent “crossings” and pairings in Anglo-American scholarship.
Eliot and Whitman’s shared position as poet-catalogers of war’s destruction—be it physical or
conceptual—makes “war” the missing keyword in his title “Poetry and Magic.” Musgrove, who
taught classics, Shakespeare, and modern poetry at University of Auckland, represents not a
random mid-twentieth century literary critic theorizing magic as linked to poetry, but a key
indicator of the globalist intellectualism of his time. His literal proximity to the Austral-Asian50
realm also stands out, as this region was elemental to the endless ethnographic studies on
primitivity repurposed by Tylor and Mauss.
Musgrove’s essay figures significantly for this chapter’s inquiry into magic, poetry and
primitivity, both for suggesting that the magical quality of poetry could help cure the lost
generation and for how he justifies this argument. He demonstrates first how poetry resists logic
(recall Brooks and Warren’s similar belief in the impulsive qualities of poetic speech), and
second how it combats what he calls social “separation.” He works through James Frazer’s
classic concept of sympathetic magic, wherein “like produces like” and symbolic correspondence
gains a medicinal potency; but Mugrove’s interest in magic and poetry extends beyond sympathy
into what he calls magic’s participatory requisite.51 Participation, for Musgrove, has a double
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meaning. Not only do members of a group participate in a ritual through their prescribed roles,
but also, according to his theory, cause and effect co-participate in each other during a magical
ritual. One does not beget the other, he argues, but rather, in magic, cause and effect produce
each other. Thus, Musgrove reasserts magic as antithetical to scientific logic.52 Cause and effect
become mixed up, mistaken, and unknown through magic.
Musgrove translates this mixing of cause and effect into his second key concept, the
mixing of two modes of being: “personalism” and “non-separation.” Non-separation is how he
figures the poetic as reparative. We might decode personalism as individualism or singularity,
and non-separation as spiritual oneness or collectivity. According to Musgrove, the primitive
Greeks achieved a perfect balance between the two forms of being. Despite Western
philosophy’s penchant for personalism, or seeing ourselves as utterly singular subjects,
Musgrove suggests that we notice non-separation’s presence and attraction throughout history:
the Christian extension of mortal life into eternity or the Romantic attempt to achieve oneness
with a mere blade of grass. In each of these leaps toward non-separation, a poetic act—say, a
prayer or the sweep of the composing hand on the page—forms the bridge to this immanent
plane of being. What is the relationship between Musgrove’s theory that magic could restore
non-separation and contemporaneous or earlier theories of collectivizing poetics? It had been
forty years and two world wars since Marcel Mauss depicted magic as a collectivizing system of
belief.53
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It is not hard to understand why Musgrove wouldn’t cite Mauss’s 1902 A General Theory
of Magic. The book was not translated into English until 1972, seventy years after it first
appeared in print. Musgrove instead speaks to the work of his literary and British near
contemporaries, from Yeats to Sitwell: “I do not intend to prophesy, and I do not suggest that we
should all take a course in practical magic; but I am sure that the general lines on which a poetic
recovery, and a human recovery, must take place are those of participation in the group and in
the more-than-group, in whatever form is best suited to our generation.”54 In other words,
Musgrove calls for less personalism, more non-separation. Referring to his own post-war
generation, one including survivors of both world wars, Musgrove implies a need to return the
lost to home, to the familiar, to the group; and he further implies that the poetic, through its
primitive, illogical magic, could do the trick.
Musgrove’s survey and theory of the relationship between poetry and magic (a report
whose brevity, he remarks, precludes commenting on “black magic”) prompts me to question the
how and why of his project. Certainly, Musgrove traces a history that evades the racialized
reality which Johnson and DuBois suggest underscores the poetics of magic. It is natural to
wonder how Musgrove came to conceive of this particular, reparative poetic magic, one issuing
from white poets and toward white readers. His proximity to such crucial sites of primitive
ethnography could have influenced his interest in theorizing literary magic. By the point of
Musgrove’s essay being published, Frazer’s ever popular Golden Bough had appeared in its 2nd
abridged edition, and its 1937 Aftermath had already been released. So why interweave poetry,
magic, and “paradise” at this tragic, post-Hiroshima moment and amidst the rise of New Critical
and psychoanalytical approaches to literary study?
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Musgrove’s reference to a “human recovery” implies that the traumas wrought by both
world wars55 motivate his mystical criticism. And yet the reparative magic he posits in poetry
depends on an appropriative occultism, one derived like a natural resource from the colonized
regions over which these very wars were partly fought, these same social injuries sustained.
World Wars I and II’s global disruption and devastation increased the desire to understand
sociality and emotion scientifically. This desire in turn placed increased faith in the Social
Darwinist progressive ideology of human moral development, one which works along two
vectors: past to present and dark to light. Musgrove himself speculates as to which “primitive
faculties” were still vibrant in modern post-war culture. He notes that the primitive “group
faculties of perception and communication” have mostly “atrophied” except for “panic.”56 We
might easily sense the strength of modern panic (and shell-shock) in the image of a Cubist
painting or the sound of a joltingly atonal opera.
While Musgrove uses the concept of magic to confer a healing power to poetry,
physiologist Walter Cannon, famous for coining the “flight or fight” response, uses magic to
understand the damaging effects of war. The introduction of technologized trench warfare had
brought about the then novel phenomenon of “shell shock,”57 a nervous disorder of varying
degrees suffered by soldiers who had been near major explosions (an early twentieth century
version of post-traumatic stress disorder). Doctors in Cannon’s day were mystified by how
physically unharmed men were dying of systemic shock, or, one might say, prolonged panic.
Cannon, who taught at the Harvard Medical School during the first half of the twentieth century,
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began researching and publishing on wound shock immediately following World War I, but not
until his 1942 article “‘Voodoo’ Death,”58 does he draw a connection between the “primitive
faculty” of fear and the mystery of shell-shock. While the United States descends into the Second
World War, Cannon uses medical records of shell-shocked World War I veterans and
ethnographic accounts of “voodoo” religion to wager that, just like voodoo, fear, albeit invisible,
can kill you. Cannon’s historic study, despite its unconventional entry via the back door of
“black magic,”59 proved that fear could kill, that men “might well die from a true state of shock,
in the surgical sense—a shock induced by prolonged and tense emotion.”60
Cannon’s assimilation of voodoo into his analysis of the physiological effects of fear
offers significant evidence of both the popularity of thinking about magic and the feasibility of
using magic as a serious framework through which to understand the horrid effects of war.
Working at the crux between hard science and “soft” culture, Cannon’s use of voodoo also
renders magic a socio-political phenomenon. Building toward his theory of wound-shock death,
Cannon casts voodoo death as a social kind of death, or death by isolation. In making this turn,
Cannon sublimates magic’s mystical or religious effects as socio-political ones. He would seem
to agree with Musgrove that magical access or susceptibility has more to do with one’s sociality
than with the invisible power to affect harm. Cannon describes how voodoo manifests isolation:
“The community contracts…all people who stand in kinship relation with him withdraw…He is
now viewed as one who is more nearly in the realm of the sacred and tabu than in the world of
the ordinary where the community finds itself.”61 Strangely, the victim of voodoo becomes
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unordinary, outside the community, while the one who handles this power, the magician or priest
and his followers remain inside, a part of the commons. Cannon’s understanding of magic as
fundamentally social recalls Musgrove’s concern for post-war isolation or excess personalism. In
the disorder and aftermath of mechanized warfare, our most primitive affect, fear, becomes a
modern epidemic, and with it, magic and poetry, come to seem like antidotes.
But how exactly might a poem soothe wound shock? The mystical-materialist
philosopher Walter Benjamin offers several corroborating ideas about both the magic of poetry
and how certain kinds of poetry might serve to protect readers from post-war shock,
fragmentation and alienation. Benjamin’s thinking on the magic of language seems to echo New
Critics’ belief in poetry’s autochthonous ability to signify, while his messianic perspective on
historic ruptures make him a less-scientific interlocutor on the question of how humanity might
recover from the disastrous effects of technologized warfare and art. Benjamin famously blames
these modern hazards for objects losing their aura, or put another way, for people losing their
animism, Tylor’s principal theme in Primitive Culture. In Benjamin’s specific writings on magic,
he is less concerned with poetry than language generally. Nevertheless, my desire to think amply
about ideological cross-pollination takes a strong cue from Benjaminian thinking.
In his 1933 essay “On the Mimetic Faculty,” Benjamin describes language as “a medium
in which the earlier powers of mimetic production and comprehension have passed without
residue, to the point where they have liquidated those of magic.”62 1933 was a year of exilic
movements for him, through Paris and elsewhere, including Brecht’s house. While it is unlikely
that Benjamin read Marcel Mauss’s General Theory of Magic, never having cited it in his
notebooks, he, like so many of his contemporaries in Germany, France, Spain and elsewhere,
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was immersed in primitivist zeitgeist—the Musée de l'Homme,63 shamanistic protocols,
Picasso’s masks. Modernist concepts of primitive language and its magical properties abounded.
Benjamin’s concern with mimesis, language, and the primal reflects ideas about magic’s
sympathetic (and ultimately pathetic) function. In mimesis, like follows like. Like is also the
vehicle for conferring similarity between words and images in a poem’s most classic trope—the
simile. And this material likeness, not signification, is, for Benjamin, the stuff of magic, of
ancient ritual, liquidated, cashed out. In this sense, metaphoric alliance ensues from sympathetic
magic.
Benjamin’s drive to inculcate a ready public—one that could perceive the
imperceptible,64 decode the undetectable, and parse a revolutionary from a dictator—seems to
undergird his theorization of language’s magical function. Devastation wrought by World War I
and the rise of totalitarianism provides a crucial backdrop to Benjamin’s theory of poetic
language’s potency. Why, in this post-war moment, does Benjamin obsess over a mysticism at
once Jewish and other worldly, European and not European, and why does he equally obsess
over the specialness of language? What was he hoping to fix with words? In “Antitheses on
Word and Name,” a poem-like piece, also (re)written in 1933, made up of two columns of
revised fragments from earlier writings, Benjamin declares that “[t]he magical function of the
alphabet [is] to provide the nonsensuous similarity with the enduring semiotic ground on which it
can appear.”65 Magic, in this sense, affords us faith that the sound of the word carries the
meaning, despite their apparent differences. Magic carries you across this linguistic divide—
63

A still extent museum of anthropology, the Musée de l’Homme was established in 1937 by Paul Rivet and
showcased cultural artifacts and history from both Europe and beyond.
64
See Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility,” in Selected Writings Volume 3 19351938, translated by Edmund Jephcott et al (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), 101-133, for his theorization of how
watching of Charlie Chaplin films could train the masses’ in their perceptibility such that they could potentially
detect fascist propaganda before it became the rule of law.
65
Walter Benjamin, “Antitheses Concerning Word and Name,” 717.
50

letter and sound—as metaphor carries you across the semantic one. Magic transcends the letters’
ambivalence towards the words they compose. The mystical materiality of language gives us the
capacity to sense the nonsensuous—a magical feat indeed, and perhaps one that could heal a
state of shock.
Susan Buck-Morss writes that “Benjamin claimed this battlefield experience of shock
‘has become the norm’ in modern life.”66 She explores his theory of modern numbness in his
later 1939 essay “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire.” From the loud noises of factories and streets
to the glare of jolty cinema and highly schematized print, the average urban citizen was believed
to be rapidly adjusting not only to the trauma of war but also to this new, shocking, fullyindustrialized world. Benjamin writes, “Haptic experiences of this kind [the flash of
photography] were joined by optic ones, such as are supplied by the advertising pages of a
newspaper or the traffic of a big city. Moving through this traffic involves the individual in a
series of shocks and collision.”67 Fears of another world war in addition to anxieties about
industrial commodity culture were thought to flood and dampen the senses; the modern citizen
proceeds numbly, his “smiles…function[ing] as a mimetic shock absorber.”68 The iconic flâneur
floats through city streets aimless, bored, unsensing. One could say the anaesthetized writer or
reader, like Benjamin’s estranged ambler, is not only separated but also separatist, too good at
separating cause and effect, too good at staying a “person,” a rationalized individual. But how to
get non-separated again? How to face the endless shocks of modern life together, at “home,”
rather than alone or “afar”? A certain kind of poetry (a magical kind?), some say, was necessary.
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But what are the stakes of advocating that white Anglo-Americans achieve collectivity through a
belief in poetry and magic’s capacity to produce non-separation? Especially if that very poetry is
racialized through its associations with magic, and if that magic imagined is to be black, brown
or colonial as opposed to the magic Johnson imagines to be white? In other words, how does
some poetry enact the very social separation which its white modernist theorists envision
collapsing?
In the same essay on Baudelaire, Benjamin uses Freud’s “Beyond the Pleasure
Principle”69 to propose a poetics for the age of shock, or we could also say, the age of separation
and non-participation. He adopts Freud’s concept of consciousness to explain how the mind can
protect against trauma in the modern era: “In Freud’s view, consciousness as such receives no
memory traces whatever, but has another important function: protection against stimuli.”70 In
other words, modern consciousness is the act of not receiving or imprinting what the senses
absorb—a non-absorptive, separated (mind over here, sense over there) mode of living.
Benjamin computes, “The threat posed by these energies [of consciousness’ shield] is the threat
of shocks. The more readily consciousness registers these shocks, the less likely they are to have
a traumatic effect;”71 in other words, the mind would register but not remember such effects. For
Benjamin, poetry with “a large measure of consciousness” could either train readers to skirt such
trauma or heal these warring traces.72
A certain mysticism infuses Benjamin’s depiction of a poetic consciousness that could
protect against the traumas of war. But it is difficult to resolve the tension in Benjamin’s work
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between his Judaic messianic beliefs and his Frankfurt School training in dialectics.73 If we
applied dialectical analysis to magic, we would have to ask not just what is magic, but also, what
is the other of magic? What is not-magic? According to Musgrove, if non-separation is magic,
then separation would be not magic. Non-separation would allow for relationality, a sense of
being multiple and immanent. Such integration, Musgrove and Benjamin seem to suggest, would
also make us capable of perceiving flashes of history and visions of the future, those necessary to
prevent the recurrence of fascist, exceptional rule.
These three thinkers—Musgrove with his representation of poetry as a form of magic that
could return a war-torn generation to itself, Cannon with his distillation of wound-shock death as
akin to a voodoo-driven, socially-effected death, and Benjamin with his quest for a poetics that
could maintain social consciousness in the face of constant shock—form a triangular foundation
to the idea of the poem as a magical and primitive antidote to post-war trauma. This suggestive
antidote is already problematic for its intellectual roots in primitivism. Musgrove’s references to
“primitive panic” and black magic establish how widespread presumptions about poetic
primitivity were by the end of modernism and how focusing on Western antiquity obscures the
coloniality of such thinking. Also, Cannon’s dependence on voodoo for a medical theory of
wound shock underscores the popularity of and ease of access to ethnographic information
during this period. Lastly, Benjamin’s belief that only a certain kind of poetry could prevent the
damaging effects of shock suggests that there is another kind of poetry that might do the
opposite, perhaps induce shock, fear, social isolation, a voodoo-like differentiation of the Other
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from the group, and perhaps even death at the hands of totalitarian rule.74 (Chapters two and
three will consider possible kinds of poetry that might possess such potencies.) The poem’s
supposed dichotomous effects, that it could possess as much antidotal potential as social evil,
urges further exploration of how beliefs about the poethics75 of poetry also relate to concepts of
race and primitivity.

Barbaric Critique and the Other of Dialectics
As we have seen, some theorists couch their thinking in primitivist discourse and use the
notion of the primitive to invoke a temporally-transcendent, racially-other poetic figure.
Meanwhile, other critics reverse this primitivist rhetoric by replacing it with what we might call a
rhetoric of the barbaric with a key twist—the modern European is the barbarian. Cultural critics
like C.L.R. James and Theodor Adorno in the aftermath of World War II and the Weimar
Republic invoke notions of magic and barbarism not to wax nostalgic about a reparative
mysticism but to criticize the historical, economic, and cultural conditions that had legitimated
mass genocide, atomic warfare, and fascist rule, including continued oppression through
colonialism, one exacerbated by the economic pressures of total, global war. James’s and
Adorno’s rhetorical barbarian, like “the rhetorical primitive” cited in the introduction, forms part
of their method for conceiving and articulating difference in the here and now of modernism. As
a figure born of modernism’s militaristic and political insensibility, this barbarian loses its
classical clarity as the one whose language cannot be understood, or the one who is utterly
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foreign, and instead begins to signify imperial, hegemonic rule itself. This rule’s language, and at
times violent abstraction, is the same that occasions an entirely new poetry. James and Adorno’s
theorization of the barbarism of mysticism and abstraction and their shared call for dialectical
materialism raise questions about the part played by poetry and about the kind of poetry which
might transcend dialectics.
In C.L.R. James’ 1947 essay, “Dialectical Materialism and the Fate of Humanity,”76 he
speaks to the perversity of the West’s rise to global power and its white supremacist assumption
that, in doing so, it had realized a worldwide moral order. James was not only a Marxist critic but
also a poet, playwright, and novelist, born in Trinidad in 1901. His diasporic life and work avidly
crisscrossed generic and political boundaries, including the United States, Britain, Ghana and the
Caribbean. Such movement mirrors this project’s understanding of geographic, aesthetic, and
disciplinary boundary-crossing as one characteristic that binds modernism to colonialism. (In a
sense, my performing a trans-spatial, trans-temporal critique of Atlantic colonialism and
aesthetic appropriation reflects James’s own trans-Atlanticism.) The interplay of C.L.R. James’s
root identity formed in postcolonial Trinidad and his relational identity77 formed through living
and working on both sides of the Atlantic, in worlds labeled not colonial (despite always already
being so), makes James’s invocation of “barbarian” particularly important. Like Johnson’s
“White Witch,” in which he pins evil magic on whiteness, James’s poetic injunction against the
Western barbarian shows how black-white dichotomies overflow and leak. James’s barbarian
rhetoric does not reverse earlier Western uses of the hierarchizing, exiling term, but rather his
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critique complicates the meaningfulness of racialized and moralistic categories, including the
primitive.
Writing in the immediate aftermath of World War II and the detonation of the atomic
bomb, James assesses the deployment of modern techno-magic in the hands of despotic,
European rulers and blames their monstrous ethics on civilization’s damaged psychological state,
one driven by fear. These barbaric magicians are the ones who orchestrated and condoned the
Holocaust by which entire populations were tabooed. James employs the oxymoronic
description, “the most achieved stages of barbarism,”78 to highlight both the West’s false
presumption of continual progress and the actuality of its “backwards” morality, its ruthless
violence and slaughter. Yet James argues that this barbarism, particularly Germany and Russia’s
“systematic brutalisation and corruption of their population[s],” issues not from the margins,
spaces his readers might deem “backward,” undeveloped and primal, but rather from the forces
of civilization itself.79 He adds, “Only a shallow empiricism can fail to see that such monstrous
societies are not the product of a national peculiarity…but are part and parcel of our
civilisation.”80 Importantly, James marks this civilization as “ours,” his and the rest of Europe
(and America’s), so that Russia and Germany are not scapegoats for the West’s destructive,
racist legacy. Moreover, by including himself, a Black, Trinidadian, Marxist critic, as part of the
very civilization that produces a regressive moral order, James further collapses any black-white,
primitive-modern, colonized-colonializing, binaristic assessment of the state of affairs. Instead,
he supplants colonial and racial politics with a particularizing, collectivizing materialism.
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So what then, for James, could counter such untenable, pervasive barbarism? If his
materialism is not “shallow,” what defines its depth? For James, the masses do. Actual bodies,
actual collectivities, embody the hope of materialism and foretell the ultimate defeat of the
barbarians, for, he reasons, the extremity of modern cruelty is evidence of how strong a force the
masses are, how great a threat they could pose to zealous rulers:
The unending murders, the destruction of peoples, the bestial passions, the
sadism, the cruelties and the lusts, all the manifestations of barbarism of
the last thirty years are unparalleled in history. But this barbarism exists
only because nothing else can suppress the readiness for sacrifice, the
democratic instincts and creative power of the great masses of the people.81
In other words, barbarism in the form of modern, totalitarian power squashes humans’ usual
willingness to sacrifice themselves for not only the collective “people” but their “democratic
instinct” and “creative power.” James implies that democracy itself is primal, first, “instinctual,”
not a quality of progress over time, and that creativity, too, is not individual as Enlightenment
thinking would indicate, but a quality of people’s connectedness. Interestingly, James invokes
sacrifice,82 a ritual most readers would read as Christian or primitive right at the moment when
he calls us to embrace our utterly material and plural existence as social masses (and matter).
Despite his materialist grounds, James maneuvers “mass”’s double-meaning, in the religious
sense, gathering, praying, and coming together to sense the supernatural. Doing so muddies his
distinctions between material and mystical, empirical and spiritual, barbaric and civil.
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Reflecting on the war-shocked masses, James writes, “The dream of progress has become
the fear of progress. Men shrink with terror at the hint of scientific discoveries.”83 So how to
restore their faith in empiricism? How to keep them from regressing to the confines of the
church? James hopes to re-inscribe a better rationalism, one capable of making good on the
promise of socialism and opposing mysticism’s incapacitating apathy, an apathy that threatens
democratic instinct and creativity. To James, mysticism is wrong for accepting “the inevitability
of barbarism…or the hope, the belief, the faith that history will offer some way out of the
impasse.”84 He portrays apathy as faith in oppression’s unavoidability or the belief in time’s
fixing capacity. By this logic, apathetic subjects adhere to a certain kind of magic or debilitating
power, one which escapes empirical comprehension, the magic of both history and state
sovereignty, in the sense Michael Taussig85 argues. In contradistinction to this form of
succumbling to power, James proposes using dialectics to rationalize socialism, insisting that
“the inevitability of socialism is the absolute reverse of religion or mysticism” and that “[t]o hold
fast the positive in its negative, and the content of presupposition in the result, is the most
important part of rational cognition.”86 James reverses the colonial order of things (civil:
barbaric, center: periphery) with this “most important” rationalism, or better said, dialectics. In
this way, he carves out a starkly secular, Marxist, material dialecticism, one completely split off
from Hegelian spiritualism.
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James presents several important contradictions that complicate our analysis of how
magic87 (including mystical belief) gets conceived at this historical moment. First, he points to
contemporary people’s anachronistic fear of progress due to the horrors wrought by military
science. Secondly, he claims that belief in the mystical or spiritual, science’s supposed
counterweight, still cannot subsume science’s moral failures. And thirdly, he paints the
barbarian88 as ironically not outside but inside the castle walls. James’ contradictory uses of the
term “barbaric” make it seem intellectually untamable, or untranslatable, and perhaps, like the
primitive, the poetic, the magical, becomes a category that fails to function dialectically. Instead,
his invocation of barbarism and mysticism remains tethered to a hierarchical and collapsing
structure. The barbaric-civil dichotomy’s incapacity to hold (as James himself shows through his
contradictory uses of barbarism, and Adorno also will) points to just how messy the magical
turns out to be. Magic emerges as dialecticism’s negative, and as that which can’t be cleanly
negated. My analysis of Adorno’s own distillation of the barbarism of poetry seems to hint at a
similar claim, that the poetic and the magical fail to function dialectically, resulting in the
possibility of a different kind of sensing.
Like James, Adorno also warns against the barbarism of the West. He narrows his
critique, however, from mysticism or spiritualism writ broadly, to the conceptual frame of
abstraction, and in doing so, takes aim at poetry. In 1949, Adorno remarked blankly: “To write
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.”89 (This dictum is still a rallying call among contemporary
poets pushing each other to consider the politics and ethics of their poetry, despite the fact that
87
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Adorno later changed his mind.) Adorno corresponded closely and argued often with Benjamin;
they disagreed on matters mystical. Adorno wrote to Benjamin in 1938, “If one wished to put it
very drastically, one could say that your study is located at the crossroads of magic and
positivism. That spot is bewitched. Only theory could break the spell.”90 Adorno worked
tirelessly to theorize the nexus of art and politics, and to excavate any dregs of what he
considered the dangers of magical thinking, or barbaric thought. He sought to “make sense” of
the travesties of the Third Reich and the role aesthetics played. Writing from the position of
political asylum in the United States, Adorno made his famous declaration against poetry in
“Cultural Criticism and Society,” which appeared in 1949, just two years after James’ own
critique of totalitarian barbarism. I wish not just to question the similarity of James’s and
Adorno’s rhetoric of the barbaric but also to examine Adorno’s shift from censoring “barbaric”
poetry in the post-war moment to later articulating a role for poetry in delivering us from the
universal to the particular. In his 1957 “Lyric Poetry and Society,” Adorno recants his earlier
proclamation and grants a critical, aesthetic role to poetry’s ability to re-attune us to the
particulars of experience
First, let’s consider the fuller context of Adorno’s Platonic, anti-poetry ruling eight years
earlier in order to better understand his use of the term “barbaric”:
Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture
and barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes
even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today.
Absolute reification, which presupposed intellectual progress as one of its
elements, is now preparing to absorb the mind entirely. Critical intelligence
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cannot be equal to this challenge as long as it confines itself to self-satisfied
contemplation.91
For Adorno, the division between culture and barbarism no longer functions. As in James’s
critique, this particular dialectic proves to be collapsing. Adorno blames the failure to recognize
this collapse on the reification of the mind’s intellectual and cultural activity, including
aesthetics. He further attributes the ethical failures of world war—what Hannah Arendt would
call how it became possible to do without thinking92—to this miscalculated risk, the risk of total
abstraction. “Absolute reification” of language, made evident in modernist poetry, makes poetry
barbaric, and therefore un-writeable. The only poetry worth writing would require the “selfsatisfied,” reified minds of post-war readers to possess a kind of perception and penchant for
inquiry which they had lost. But what did Adorno mean exactly by poetry? Myth, mimesis,
metaphor, lyric form, image? And what quality of the poetic which had accumulated up to
Adorno’s moment, from Baudelaire through Mallarmé, H.D. and Pound, other than the
doubleness of language or the usual remove of words from their meaning, made poetry worth
exiling or being deemed barbarous, indeed, of another language?
Our consideration of the poem’s barbarism finds further context in Adorno’s Dialectic of
Enlightenment,93 which he co-wrote with sociologist and fellow Frankfurt Schooler Max
Horkeimer, and published in 1944, just before “Criticism.” Adorno and Horkeimer take aim at
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the notion of “intellectual progress” captured by the highly metaphorical term enlightenment.94 It
seems utterly fitting that a book deconstructing the concept of this historical period appears in
the final years of the period critics call modernism (as if Adorno were wetting the reed for a
similarly atonal song on a period in the making). One might say the global disasters of
modernism comprise the ironic bookend of this long trail of presupposed “intellectual progress,”
one indivisible from technological and capitalistic development, from the eighteenth century to
the early-twentieth century. Whereas James reveals the barbarism of civilization, Adorno and
Horkeimer point to the equally paradoxical magic of logic. By drawing parallels between
mysticism and Enlightenment-era secularism and rationality, Adorno and Horkeimer reveal the
concept of the Enlightenment to be merely that, an idea, not a major epistemological shift.
Adorno and Horkeimer lead me to think that (un)thinking the relationship between magic,
barbarism, and poetry could further destabilize such staid categories as the mystical and the
rational, and their inherent epistemology and morality.
Adorno and Horkeimer paint the close association of language and logos as essential to
how the Enlightenment project intertwined the magical with the rational, heaven with hell, and
any object with its opposite. In a sense, they present language, through its poeticism, as nondialectical. On language’s referentiality, they write, “Even the division of subject and object is
prefigured in it. If the tree is addressed no longer as simply a tree but as evidence of something
else, a location of mana, language expresses the contradiction that it is at the same time itself and
something other than itself, identical and not identical.”95 Language here prefigures a split but
94
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contained self, subject and object, as well as an inner dialogue or addressable self, resembling
Adorno’s feared “self-satisfied contemplation” of the reified mind. Albeit animistically, Adorno
and Horkeimer also apostrophize language as issuing passively from an invisible speaker: the
tree “is addressed.” The speaker who names the inanimate object “tree” triangulates a third
meaning, an elsewhere, a “something else” that language embodies apart from objects. It rules
from a distance, abstractly, detached from material. Referring to “something other than itself,”
language’s positivistic metaphoricity and, per Musgrove, its non-separation of word and meaning
make it magical.
It is strange how Adorno and Horkeimer seem to suggest that language refuses
dialecticism, that it cannot be defined negatively, for it contains its negative. It is itself and its
other. In this way, language seems to pose a threat to dialecticians.96 Recalling Musgrove’s own
assessment of magic (and poetry) as that which confuses cause and effect, it could be said here
that language confuses positive and negative. Furthermore, their work suggests that poetry’s
magic lies with its inherent positivity—one not unrelated to Benjamin’s sensuous alphabet—a
positivity that is barbarous, foreign, outside, other to dialectics itself. (If what you say, therefore,
is, then we are working with delusion, not dialectics. However, for Benjamin this was not
delusion but a deitic logos—for him, names are positivism’s most quotidian product, the “mute
magic of nature.”97)
Not only do Adorno and Horkeimer fail to name the epistemological threat seemingly
attached to magic and poetry, that which would destabilize the dialectical tradition, they also
imbue their own criticism with repeated traces of primitivist rhetoric. Adorno and Horkeimer
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themselves animate language through address, personifying “tree,” and invoke invisible actors
and mana, the common term for magical force. They perform magical criticism, to use
Christopher Bracken's term.98 They trace language’s doubleness as a tool of domination back to
priests and magicians.99 Not so differently from James, the two draw a clear line from animistic
primitive cultures to post-animistic industrial ones, recalling, “When language first entered
history, its masters were already priests and sorcerers.”100 Freud’s theory on taboo, Mauss’s work
on magic, and Durkeim’s on primitive religion all fuel Adorno and Horkeimer’s attempt to close
the distance between the European “enlightened” world and the colonized worlds from which
these social theories arose. Co-opting this primitivist rhetoric, Adorno and Horkeimer argue that
rationality “tabooed the knowledge which really apprehends the object.”101 In other words, it
barred thought from what James would call deep empiricism. They reveal Enlightenment
positivism to be a totalizing trope, or “universal taboo.”102 Accordingly, language’s domination
of the masses (the horde) is a function of its universalism, its complete occlusion of any
outside—no reality exists beyond the logic of logos. The Enlightenment’s own taboo on magic
and its insistence on logic produce its own “white witch”-like glare and spell-like effect on the
vulnerable masses. For Adorno, only a return to negative dialectics could make it possible for
people to sense what they epically had failed to sense: the rise of totalitarian rule.
“The Concept of Enlightenment” usefully complicates our understanding of Adorno’s
1949 banishment of poetry, for clearly poetry has the capacity to make its readers reconsider the
distance between apprehender and apprehended object, what Kant would consider the ideal space
98
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for play. Drawing these two works together makes it possible to understand what Adorno
considers the reified intellect at play within a poem: a closed, self-referential, universal, singular
system. Additionally, “The Concept of Enlightenment” allows us to realize that Adorno calls for
an exogamy of mind, a perception of particularity and difference from the outside, that in and of
itself depends on thinking totemically.103 I point this out not to criticize Adorno but to illuminate
how anthropological structures of perceiving difference breach his thinking even when his
critical eye is turned on Europe itself. Adorno’s description of poetry’s barbaric abstraction
communicates through ethnographic belief and practice. His invocation of “wildness” in his
Aesthetics,104 “barbarism” in “Criticism,” and “taboo” in Dialectic of Enlightenment illustrates
primitivism’s centrality to modernist aesthetic philosophy. Given that Adorno’s life-work
continually examines how aesthetics sits at the crossroads of the political and the social, his
rhetorical barbarism makes it possible to question how magic’s attachment to poetry also
proffers an aesthetic-epistemological hierarchy, a set of beliefs about knowledge and genre that
is racialized and colonialized through its rhetoric of primitivity. Through his obsessions with
Enlightenment formations of knowledge, formations inseparable from the colonization of North
and South America, Adorno demonstrates how modernism produces itself (aesthetically and
racially) through these colonial, primitive foils.
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Tracking the correspondences between the Victorian anthropology of magic, the rise of
cultural criticism centered on barbarism and poetry, and the proliferation of poetry criticism
driven by magical thinking, reveals several possible camps of understanding this modernist
cultural formation premised on primitivity. On the one hand, poetry can be seen as a vestige of a
primitivistic take on language—its base function, to name, to draw onomatopoeic parallels—one
best left to this “crude” function. On the other hand, through both Musgrove and Benjamin,
poetry’s very primitivity is seen to offer a possible antidote to the numbing effects of modern
warfare. The ensuing critical debate focuses our attention on the central problem of perception,
our capacity to sense the concrete in a world turned so abstract. But my sense of the frailty of
Adorno’s dialectical critique makes me wonder what role poetry plays in either reproducing or
rebuking these dialectics. What kind of poem could avoid becoming totalizing? What poem
could speak to James and Adorno’s masses without dominating them with either-or choices—are
you with us or against us? How might magic’s positivism become an attractive ethos for a poem
responding to a crisis? This poem might have to administer a counter-shock,105 as Benjamin
argues Baudelaire’s poems do, a shock that startled its readers to attend to the present.
James, Adorno and Horkeimer each express concerns about the masses’ inability to
perceive accurately due to their mystical attachments or what Adorno and Horkeimer call the
spell of animism. They write, “The regression of the masses today lies in their inability to hear
with their own ears what has not already been heard, to touch with their hands what has not
previously been grasped.”106 As Benjamin asks what kind of poetry would be perceivable by our
shocked consciousness, Adorno and Horkeimer might respond, what kind of poetry would make
possible hearing “what has not already been heard” or even grasping “what has not previously
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been grasped”? Even a purely dialectical poem, a poem of perfect correspondence, would always
echo back to its tabooed other, the mess of mana, the saying that is doing, the saying that is
making, the bewitched spot.
In the next chapter, I will explore Gertrude Stein’s extremely long, extremely abstract
poem, Stanzas in Meditation, and propose that the experience of this poem might make it that
“certain kind of poetry” that Benjamin believed would return readers to their senses, albeit still
through a feeling of poetic time that depends on thinking the primitive.
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Chapter Two
“To Spell and Not Spell Well”: The Ghost of Race in Gertrude Stein’s Poetic Experiment
It is always not only not foolish
To think how birds spell and do not spell well
And how could it do birds and words
I often say so not at all amount
—Gertrude Stein, Stanzas in Meditation,
1932
If one wished to put it very drastically, one could
say that your study is located at the crossroads of
magic and positivism. That spot is bewitched. Only
theory could break the spell.
—Adorno, a letter to Benjamin, 1938
All About War
In a letter postmarked November 15, 1933, Gertrude Stein writes to Carl Van Vechten,
friend, music critic and Harlem Renaissance “cataloguer”:
I had a rather amusing time today, we were lunching with…a retired army general
and it would appear that he had in his division at the front two American Negro
regiments, he was very interesting about them and more than that he reads all the
books that he can get hold [of] translated from the American about anything to do
with Negroes. He has all of Seabrook’s and was very xcited [sic] about hearing
about your Paradis de Negres and I am sending it to him as soon as we get to
Paris.1
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Van Vechten had been a central albeit problematic white critic and writer on the Harlem
Renaissance, lauded for popularizing black writers with white audiences while criticized for
assuming an unwarranted place of belonging in the black community. Stein likewise was a
cynosure for the writers and artists of a chosen not given locale, Paris. Much has been written
about her centrality as a figure of Parisian modernism and beyond; she was the one who hosted
the salon in which almost every major figure of the period appeared at one point or another. She
famously sat for Picasso and edited Hemingway. In this brief letter, however, Stein not only
plays the familiar roles of friend and promoter of modernist artists and writers but also that of
maker and passer-on of books that represent black lives through racist stereotype. Stein’s
familiar reference to William Seabrook draws attention to not only the fact that modernist poets
read ethnographies but also the colonial, racial, and magical aspect of these readings. Seabrook
was a noted American travel writer and contemporary cannibal. His book on Haitian voodoo,
Magic Island, was published in 1929 and translated into French the same year, reflecting both
the primitivist zeitgeist of the era and France’s colonial ties to Haiti. Seabrook also wrote Jungle
Ways (1930), a record of his immersion in West African ritualistic life. Stein’s response to the
general’s interest in Seabrook is that he must read Van Vechten’s Paradis de Nègres, a book
whose English title’s racial slur even Van Vechten’s father counseled against.
This fragment of correspondence quickly constellates Stein’s interest in racial otherness,
primitivism, magic and war—topics whose relationship I will deepen and complicate by reading
Stein’s 1932 poem, Stanzas in Meditation.2 Stein wrote this most abstract, difficult, book-length
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poem the same year that her most popular and accessible book, The Autobiography of Alice B.
Toklas, appeared in print. Stein’s extensive accounts of war in both The Autobiography and her
1945 memoir, Wars I Have Seen, prompts a consideration of how Stein’s writing responds to the
“shock of modernity” wrought by both world wars. In her fifty-page chapter “The War,” in The
Autobiography, Toklas narrates various war adventures, like delivering supplies to French
hospitals in Stein’s Ford truck, as well as intimate, fearful scenes at home. In one such scene,
Toklas describes a nighttime air-raid alarm:
Well I too said when she woke me, is it a revolution and are there soldiers…I
don’t quite know, she answered, but there has been an alarm. Anyway you had
better come. I started to turn on the light. No, she said, you had better not. Give
me your hand and I will get you down.3
Writing Wars I Have Seen during World War II, Stein paints her life as endlessly infused with
war and enemies, if not by experience then by books.4 She paints a direct relationship between
the constant state of war and human emotional life: “What is there inside,” Stein both states and
asks, “that makes one know all about war.”4 Modernists seemed to think poetry could ease this
pain of overabundant knowing. Yet, what could a formidably abstract book like Stanzas in
Meditation do to affect the social ills wrought by war? What kind of poetics could restore faith
that it is okay to turn the lights back on?5
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Stein’s position as a war writer6 underscores my interest in the role of magic in her work.
Susan Buck-Morss’s writing on the role of aesthetics in this numbed-out post-war period helps to
refine one way I conceive of magic—ultimately a phenomenon that restores our senses and
circumvents shock. Buck-Morss’s consideration of World War I’s dulling effects, the rise of
anaesthetics, and Benjamin’s “Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproduction” point to
the possibility that a poetry like Stanzas in Meditation could indeed help such a senseless age.7
Specifically, Buck-Morss rereads Benjamin’s artwork essay as proposing a new kind of
perception for modern times, one brought about through poetry and capable of countering the
post-war culture of shock. Benjamin suggests a primal link between the illusion of the
technocratic state and magic: “Tradition henceforth assumes the character of the phantasmagoria
in which primal history enters the scene in ultramodern get-up.”8 But how to face this
“ultramodern” technocracy? Benjamin wonders “how lyric poetry can be grounded in experience
for which exposure to shock has become the norm. One would expect such poetry to have a large
measure of consciousness.”9 Stanzas in Meditation certainly offers a rather different “measure of
consciousness” or form of meditation. This kind of poem, read this way, might stall the effects of
modern technological excess by heightening the reader’s consciousness. Stein’s use of puns,
names, onomatopoeia, repetition, numbers and a temporal standstill might offer a coping strategy
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for loss, the shock of war, self-estrangement and socio-political liminality. Both Buck-Morss’s
critique of social anaesthetization and Benjamin’s depiction of a poetic consciousness that could
re-aestheticize, or re-instate a sensing, perceptive social body, help to frame this analysis of
Stein’s Stanzas in Mediation as an aesthetic poem and a counter-spell to disenchantment,10 one
that could restore feeling to modern aesthetics.
Yet, what kind of new or borrowed ways of sensing or thinking would this belief in
poetry require? In Christopher Bracken’s Magical Criticism (2013), he argues that such
Benjaminian thinking, particularly the mana Benjamin posits in language, harbors a racialized
figure, and that this holds true for much of the Frankfurt School.11 Recent studies like Bracken’s
attempting to rethink modernity in terms of its entrenched coloniality prompt me to reevaluate
the effects of Stein’s spell-like writing on its readers. Therefore, to think critically about the
poem’s trance-like, meditative qualities and its primitivistic performance, I read Stanzas in
Meditation through contemporaneous texts interested in magic, such as Marcel Mauss’s A
General Theory of Magic,12 Walter Cannon’s “‘Voodoo’ Death,”13 and Benjamin’s essays on the
magic of words and the dialectical image.14 Through this contextual analysis, I demonstrate that
Stanzas’ perceptual reparation (achieved by its sense of language and time) depends on
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racialized, colonialist concepts of primitivity and magic. The correlations between the
characteristics of magic spells and those of Stein’s poem as well as the poem’s construction of
what Johannes Fabian calls “the time of the Other” reveal the conceptual mechanization of race
in modernist poetry.15 By invoking racialized concepts of time and magical ritual, Stanzas
obscures the whiteness of avant-gardism and codifies the mechanization of racialized otherness
in how we read experimental poems. Furthermore, the production of a poetic antidote to
modernity through the presupposition and appropriation of its supposed opposite, primitivity,
underscores the ethical contradictions within early twentieth century white avant-garde
aesthetics.16 Not only are these aesthetics constituted through binaric concepts of race, space and
time (the here and now of whiteness, and then and there of blackness), but they also blur the
categories of rationality and mysticism, science and poetry.

Stein & Race
In performing a critical race study of Stein’s Stanzas in Meditation, I investigate how
concepts of magic become enmeshed in this construction of white avant-garde aesthetics, even
when not explicitly representing the occult or the racial other. Scholars such as Laura Doyle have
shown helpfully how ideologies of modernist racialism work not just through representation but
also through form, and particularly through “nostalgic experimentalism,” or an ironic
“investment in the past.”17 In her analysis of Stein’s Making of Americans, Doyle usefully thinks
through the racial implications of the book’s dual emphasis on reproduction and progress,
15
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working not simply to acknowledge Stein’s racism but “to understand it: not in order to deny the
problem but in order to move into it, as a step toward moving ourselves historically through it.”18
Similarly, this study seeks to move into the function of racialized concepts in Stein’s Stanzas in
Meditation in order to more deeply understand how even an innovatively reparative poem, a
poem that returns us to our senses, also underscores ideologies of inequality.
Though written in 1932, Stanzas in Meditation was published posthumously in 1956 and
reissued in a corrected edition in 2012. After a flurry of Stein scholarship in the eighties and
nineties on representational works like Three Lives and abstract works like Tender Buttons,
including criticism on Stein’s relationships to race, gender, sexuality and history, I question, in
part, what the publication of a corrected version of Stanzas in Meditation in 2012 should or could
yield. Renewed attention to an extremely abstract work by Stein might seek to rescue her, again
(first as a woman poet, then as a white one), from a canon of white modernists at risk of
contemporary academic irrelevance. As Sonia Saldívar-Hull argues, critical focus on Stein’s
radical style distracts attention from her racism and classism.19 She writes, “The reader who has
been mesmerized by Stein’s radical writing style may overlook the ‘negro’ next to the earthworm
in Stein’s great chain of being.”20 Re-centering Stein studies on an extremely abstract work like
Stanzas risks blinding readers to the relationship between aesthetic radicalism and the politics of
race. Expanding on decades of criticism on Three Lives’s representational racism, I make an
epistemological and formal argument about how even non-representational modernist poetry gets
racialized. This argument synthesizes Christine Ferguson’s21 theory of the interrelationship
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between the rationalist character of eugenics and the mysticism of spiritualism with the supposed
irrationalism of abstract, non-sensible poetry like Stein’s Stanzas in Meditation. It also departs
from Daylanne K. English’s22 analysis of Stein’s pathologization of racialized characters in
Three Lives to think more about how the avant-garde white text achieves its reparative or healing
effects through racialized concepts of lived experience. My analysis of an extremely abstract
work seeks to think how race is still at work in a text without the use of racialized characters,
dialect or words with nonsensical racial diction, adapting Lorna Smedman’s thinking on the
formal appearance of race in an abstract text like Tender Buttons to Stanzas.23 Despite this
difference in my textual focus, I continue to explore what Michael North sees in modernists’ use
of racial dialect: “the deeply contradictory response of Europe to the cultures it was
colonizing.”24 North contends, “Stein and Picasso found African art to be both elemental and
intriguingly artificial: modernism is, at least in part, what they made of this contradiction.”25
Indeed, the production of white modernism through colonialist aesthetics and thought
underscores the contradictory status of Stanzas in Meditation—appropriative magic, reparative
experimental lyric, or both?

Modernist Occultism
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One might ask, why pursue an inquiry about magical reparation through Gertrude Stein?
True, despite B.F. Skinner’s claims to the contrary, Stein swore that she didn’t practice automatic
writing or other mystical acts of consciousness. The surrealists were her friends, not her method.
Stein made faster friends with mathematicians, cognitive scientists, and analytical philosophers
than occultists or mystics. She did not collude with notable occultist writers like H.D., Eliot, and
Pound despite their common American roots. Because she was not explicitly of the occultist
camp and not not of it, it is useful to ask how mystical, racialized concepts of language and
experience might have influenced her poetry, and perhaps modernists’ poetry more generally.
While Stanzas in Meditation certainly represents the modernist canon more generally for its play
on form (the stanza), long length, and unpopular difficulty, Stein’s work is not emblematic of
occultist modernism.
Accordingly, Gertrude Stein is absent from studies of modernist occultism.
Notwithstanding Stein’s social entrenchment in Paris and her absence from occultist spaces like
Quest Society meetings in Kensington, it is nevertheless difficult to understand why she escapes
reference. Various scholarly understandings of the relationship between occultism and
modernism speak directly to stylistic and conceptual concerns relevant to Stein’s work, such as
history, prophecy, mimesis and the uncanny. Foundational among these studies, Leon Surette’s
The Birth of Modernism (1993) links occultist works like Eliot’s “The Wasteland” or Pound’s
Cantos to historicism, philosophy, and metahistory, but not anthropology.26 Rooting this
interpretation in Enlightenment debates about knowledge, he posits modernist occultism as a
desire to complicate the Enlightenment’s bifurcation of body and mind, intuition and reason.27
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Yet Surette does not acknowledge the other, racial hierarchy informing this “Enlightened”
division of thinking and feeling, nor does he recognize the Enlightenment project as the
production of racial knowledge and its pursuant eugenics. Despite Surette’s misrecognition, his
discussion of occultist creative practice as history writing brings to mind Stein’s own metahistories such as The Making of Americans (1911) and her three autobiographies. Stein remarks
in Stanzas in Meditation, “This is her autobiography one of two / But which it is no one which it
is can know” (152).
Timothy Materer, a contemporary of Surette, examines the same poets plus some women
and younger writers, H.D., Robert Duncan, Sylvia Plath and Ted Hughes, in his Modernist
Alchemy.28 Materer assesses the occultist effect on a poet’s work by the poet’s degree of mystical
belief and practice. He also attributes modernist interest in the uncanny to occultist fascination.
Materer further argues that, despite the typical perspective that the modern lyric self speaks from
a decentered, turbulent “I,” the occultist poet harnesses the voice of prophecy and wisdom during
an uncertain time. Occultism, for Materer, shapes modernist poets’ concept of poetry, technique,
and vision. Materer raises useful questions, regarding H.D.’s work, about whether poetry in this
moment attempts to unify art, religious belief, and science. This question echoes Sydney
Musgrove’s indication that “magic poetry” could bring about non-separation, a fix to the
separation wrought by the trauma of war. Secondly, Materer’s distinguishing between the
unsettled lyric self and the prophetic one highlights the potential of the latter. Might the
prophetic poet heal the fragmented poet, or might she be the same poet? Does Stein’s synthesis
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of thesis and antithesis (her constant self-contradiction and exhausted over-rationalization)
reflect H.D.’s synthesis of science, religion and art?29
According to Leigh Wilson’s more recent study, Modernism and Magic: Experiments
with Spiritualism, Theosophy, and the Occult (2013),30 modernists practiced magic as a means to
achieve a new understanding of artistic mimesis, one that accepts the primacy of artificiality.
Therefore, magic concerns itself with the material world as we experience and reproduce it for
others—magic does aesthetics. Overall, Wilson argues that modernist attempts “to challenge
representational practices in order to remake the world” depend on a belief in magic31—I
contend that they also depend on a belief in poetic reparation. If we accept that industrialization
and the terrors of war cast their own disenchanting spell, it seems that Wilson’s version of
magical art works as a counter-spell by envisioning a better world. She uses Philippe LacoueLabarthe’s notion of a general mimesis that sees itself as “‘the realization of a still unfinished
reality’” to argue that modernist magic could occasion this form of mimesis.32 The question
remains, how does this social function of poetry, the responsibility for world-making or worldcompletion, work when we bring the racialized underpinnings of this belief in magic to the
surface? Can we still consider such a poetry prophetic or healing?

Colonial Stein
Past conversations about Stein’s poetry and race, and about modernist poetry and magic,
prompt further questions about the global, colonial, and historical context in which modernists
29
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wrote. Stein’s life outside the United States complicates her relationship to these contexts and
our thinking of her work as performing a kind of magic, like time travel. Stein spoke on her own
poetic practice in relation to “time-sense” in her 1925 lecture “Composition as Explanation.”33
She speaks to her well-known use of repetition as an attempt to construct a different temporality
altogether: “In the first book there was a groping for a continuous present and for using
everything by beginning again and again.”34 Stein also construes her creative process as
involving a fractured sense of time:
The time when and the time of and the time in that composition is the natural
phenomena of that composition and of that perhaps every one can be certain.
No one thinks these things when they are making when they are creating what is
the composition, naturally no one thinks, that is no one formulates until what is to
be formulated has been made.
Composition is not there, it is going to be there and we are here. This is some time
ago for us naturally.35
Stein’s theory of poetic practice precludes thinking as much as it precludes existing in the same
time-space as the work itself. But what concepts of self and world would make it possible to
believe that this is how poetry happens?
Bringing together various critics’ discussions of literary temporality and primitive
temporality shows the colonial sense of self and world embedded in Stein’s interest in the altered
time-space of writing. Fredric Jameson’s “Gertrude Stein and Parts of Speech” explores the
unruly “aesthetic geopolitics” (his term) of Stein’s lectures by examining her equally unruly
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grammar.36 Jameson posits Stein’s concept of composition as synonymous with spatialized time,
a dimensionality that defines American-ness for him at this modern moment. Jameson’s
discussion of Stein’s aesthetic space-time, its constant redirection to the “actual present” of
reading and writing, reminds us how, like an imperial power, the text occupies multiple
dimensions simultaneously, for example, the reader’s space and time and the writer’s. Kelley
Wagers also suggests that Stein enacts an intersection of the reader and writer’s temporalities by
writing a ficto-history, The Making of Americans, that calls on and involves the reader who must
“bear” this history.37 Wagers further offers that, despite the book’s racialist obsession with
progress, the text’s cross-temporality both counteracts traditional historical linearity and posits
history as collectively produced.38 This cross- or poly-temporality is critical to how I consider
Stein’s formal production of primitivity. Considering the racialized dimensions of time, Tony C.
Brown depicts the primitive as time itself in The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage: An
Enlightenment Problematic.39 “Primitive” signals a kind of “before” that captures both the
imaginable past and the chaos or the nothing that preceded it. Brown’s two kinds of time, a
historical one and an ahistorical one, which structure our concept of the primitive, give us a
unqiue way to consider the primitivity of time in Stanzas in Meditation. Thus in reading Stein’s
difficult, long poem, we must ask, what are geopolitical, historical, and social dimensions of this
poem’s space-time? How do they relate to magical or primitivist thinking? And how can
understanding Stein’s aesthetic-political position relative to imperialism help us to reconceive
the connection between race and modernist poetry?
36
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Critic David Eng’s discussion of Monica Truong’s Book of Salt,40 which tells the story of
Stein’s Vietnamese chef, urges us to de-obscure the ghost of race in modernist writing. Eng uses
Lisa Lowe’s idea of “the violence of…modern humanist forgetting”41 to signal the danger of
absenting race from critique. Eng’s study examines the relationship between modernist aesthetic
freedom and the obscuring of race, racialized knowledge, experience, and aesthetics, in work that
does not explicitly mention race but absents it. The question becomes, how does forgetting what
words mean, or aphasic writing, become a condition of racial oppression, colonialism, as well as
the avant-garde?
In the humanistically titled Everybody’s Autobiography (one might say an attempt to
recall, not forget, everyone), Stein introduces her Vietnamese cook Trac (one who, as Bình, in
Truong’s book develops an affair with a male poet). In Stein’s queer depictions of Trac, he filters
in and out of focus. In each of his roles, as cook and as queer, per the hierarchies of household
and world, Trac is appreciated but barely seen. While Stein narrates Trac’s appearance and
disappearance, memory stands in his place: “Trac anybody can remember what Trac is, nobody
has seen him lately but that does not matter Trac is always faithful to his memory, and his
memory is being present ever after.”42 Trac is the one who has memory and whom others
remember. Queerly puncturing Trac’s presence in Everybody’s Autobiography is a visit from
Van Vechten: “So Trac began the summer with us but really we knew he would not like it…then
Carl came, just for twenty-four hours and he made ninety photographs…Trac has never forgotten
him naturally.”43 “Carl,” known for his interracial gay affairs, pressumably photographed and
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pursued a romance with Trac. Van Vechten’s close relationship to Stein exemplifies her
closeness to circles that exoticized and desired difference. Trac appears here as a visible ghost of
race (roped with sexuality) in Stein’s work and life, forcing the question of what the racial other
signifies: here, memory not forgetting. We might further ask how the absence, or forgetting, of
any racial representation in Stanzas in Meditation defers racial difference from a body to a kind
of feeling or mind sense.

Stein’s Concept of Mind
That a new sense of space and time could yield a different consciousness, Benjamin was
well aware. Noting Stein’s own interest in the mind helps in understanding the interplay between
concepts of consciousness and her poetics. Steven Meyer argues that Stein’s earlier studies in
psychology under William James led her to conceive of writing as a process of discovery, an
experimental science located between “the psychological states of attention, inattention, and
intention.”44 Meyer, along with Ulla Dydo, Marjorie Perloff, and Joan Retallack, thinks about
Stein as a creative empiricist altering readers’ minds. Both Dydo and Retallack connect the title’s
final word “meditation” to Stein’s interest in states of mind. They each speak of how Stein’s
forms of observation and attention produce a meditative, hyper-attentive mindfulness in her
readers. Retallack defines Stein’s meditation as an “emptying out [of] one’s sense of identity and
distinct objects of concern. It is a giving over to what is not self-possession.”45 Dydo also
describes the experience of reading Stanzas as “clean[ing] out our minds and ears; sometimes it
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gives us access to the virgin territory of the making of poetry itself.”46 Dydo’s references both to
emptying and to virgin territory, a distant and violently gendered time-space, cast meditation as
not just scientific but also mystical and colonial. Dydo further suggests that Stein makes possible
“new, unstable and ambiguous forms and meanings. They sound strange precisely because they
are new and unfamiliar. They are indeed anarchistic.”47 What Perloff and Dydo call Stein’s
anarchistic mind-sense48 reflects Doyle’s concept of modernists’ paradoxical, racialized pastseeking—Stein’s experiments are part of how she “both critiques and colludes in the racial order
of things.”49 But to what extent do the states of mind discussed by these scholars comprise a
scientific experience, a poetic one, or a magical one? What’s at stake if we label it one way or
another? In an attempt to study how such a mindful, reparative poem depends on colonialist
concepts of experience and otherness, we must first understand the poem’s magical qualities, and
then deconstruct the racialization of this magic.

The Magic of Stanzas
We might typically imagine the magician entrancing others, but French sociologist
Marcel Mauss, in his 1902 General Theory of Magic, speaks of the doubleness of the magician’s
capacity to both possess and be possessed.50 (This doubling of the possessor as the possessed
parallels two literary forms of possession: that of the writer writing and the reader reading.)
Anthropologist W. Lloyd Warner also describes the directionality of voodoo as a double
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movement, “first away from the victim and then back, with all the compulsive force of one of its
most powerful rituals.”51 Mauss also posits the magician or priest as socially doubled. He might
be “strange” or foreign but also “among us”52—a perfect social caption for Gertrude Stein’s life
as an outsider.53 I am interested in Mauss’s perception of magic as multi-directional for how it
corresponds to the complexity not only of Stein’s life but also of the work she left behind.
Thinking of magic’s double-ness encourages us to contend with the multiple contradictory
positions she occupied: an American and a foreigner in France, a Jew and a sympathizer with
Fascist leaders, a lesbian and a critic of femininity, a loner and a socialite, a famed writer and an
unknown outlier. These compositional fragments of Stein’s identity make it difficult to assess her
relationship both to the difference of others and to the belief that a poem could magically
transform her own difference.
To begin, Stein’s playful treatment of names and numbers both entrances us and wakes
us up. Stein’s word play depends on the duplicity of language. As magic conducts a double
movement, toward objects and away, so do jokes or pun turn on a paradox. Stein’s constant
punning is a form of magic and at the same time a detectable ruse if we pay attention. Mauss
writes, “pun[ning] and onomatopoeic phrases are…sympathetic magic;”54 they play upon
likeness and call upon the reader to participate by recognizing the similarity. Much of Stanzas in
Meditation appears to revolve around a one-word pun: the word may, which also announces the
woman’s name: May. Interestingly, in Walter Cannon’s writings on voodoo and wound shock, to
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hex someone is to name them, to call them out from the crowd.55 Mauss confirms the place of
names in magic spells when he writes, “Mythical spells end up consisting of nothing but a single
proper name or a common word. The names themselves become unrecognizable.”56 By
comparing Stein’s handwritten version to Toklas’s typed one, Dydo discovered that Toklas had
changed countless occurrences of the word (proper name) may to “can.”57 Her discovery
suggests that Stein was punning on her former lover May Bookstaver’s name through the
constant use of the word may instead of can. An uproar in the Stein-Toklas household had
recently taken place when Stein’s unpublished novel Q.E.D.—the one detailing this former
romance—was outed. In the restored, original version of the poem, Stein writes,
May be I do but do I doubt it
May be how about it
I will not may be I do but I doubt it
May be will may be (146).
Stein’s punning on the name word (m)May reads like magic, a spell on a name. The lowercase
“m” limits may’s ability to properly name, while its spacing apart from be also limits its meaning
as “potential” action. The word may gets played as adverb in the first line, a verb in the third (“I
will not may”), and a noun in the last (“will may be”). Such ambiguity and failed mimesis make
the reader doubt the poem’s aboutness. Even the desirous invitation, “how about it,” cancels
itself on the next line: “I will not.” These doublings and reflections, not to mention the
quintupling of the word may across four lines, instantiate trickery (may/May) and ambivalence
(doubt’s mantra: maybe so, maybe not) at the heart of the poem’s logics. Stein’s repetition of
may succeeds in rendering the word unrecognizable, except, of course, to Toklas. One has to
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wonder, however, whether repetition makes the reader notice may more or less. The text’s
ambivalent relationship to naming and magic seems to mirror the speaker’s own ambivalent
relationship to the rejected lover. The poem does and does not name May outright. It does and
does not conjure the absent person.
The poem’s ambivalent relationship to naming corresponds with Mauss’s description of
the oppositional effect of sympathetic magic: “When like evokes like it drives away its
opposite…In this way, the abstract notion of similarity is inseparable from the abstract notion of
contrariety.”58 To some extent, Mauss seems to speak to our understanding of the often-invisible
power of binaries, how invoking one term of a pair conjures or reifies the other term.59 The use
of a name in such a vacuum of reference brings the unnamed to mind too. Taking this notion of
contrariety into account, it seems that Stein manipulates the magic of names, both their presence
and their absence. Stein notes a nominal absence when writing on roses: “That they would have
been named / Had not their labels been taken away / To make room for placing there” (100).
These lines make an almost pre-structuralist critique of object-name relationships by noting the
absence of labels on things we name with language, and then rationalizing this absence with the
need “to make room for placing them there,” as if to say the object and the word could not
possibly inhabit the same space or time. When names do appear, they dwindle in a sea of Stein’s
ambivalence:
I think very well of Susan but I do not know her name
58
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I think very well of Ellen but which is not the same
I think very well of Paul I tell him not to do so
I think very well of Francis Charles but do I do so
I think very well of Thomas but I do not not do so. (108)
The power of identification diminishes in opposition to the speaker’s assertion “I do not know
her name.” Furthermore, while the repetition of “I think very well” establishes the I’s
dominance, the I names no speaker in particular. Stein’s convoluted grammar—the imperfectly
palindromic “do not not do so” and the insistently self-contradicting “do I do so”—derails the
affection we might associate with knowing someone’s name or thinking well of them. Dropping
last names, the speaker fails to pinpoint specific people and only airs floating labels. The names
confer no recognition—that which both empowers and subjects.
The lack of recognition in this act of naming obscures but maintains the magical thinking
behind the act of naming in Stanzas. Perhaps through the artificiality of the event of naming, the
reader finds satisfaction in the sensuous materiality of words themselves, the very words that
might have previously frustrated. Stein teaches us to re-see words not just as labels but as
powerful in and of themselves. Benjamin, in his 1933 fragment “Antitheses Concerning Word
and Name,” calls naming “the mute magic of nature…the communication of matter in magical
community.”60 He locates this magic in the nonsensuousness of words like names whose looks
and sounds have nothing to do with their significance and yet can signify as such. This is magic
for Benjamin—the materialization of meaning in the word, logos. Stein’s deflation of names in
Stanzas in Meditation is just one way in which she renders word as merely word, and thus
returns the word to a magical-material state. Of course, to be unnamed, or to lose one’s name, is
to become a generalized Other, or worse, a subject made object, a commodified being. Obscuring
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the name may and de-signifying proper names potentially reifies abstraction and
unrecognizability. It also makes abstraction and unrecognizability into conditions for
experimental poetics and possibly primitivity too.
Stein’s use of the pronoun they throughout Stanzas in Meditation raises more questions
about how the poem, in working through and against the magic of naming, also risks masking
identity or emptying names of meaning. They has no specific identity, no gender, race, ethnicity,
or number. In this way, they and pronouns generally disrupt the power of these categories and
proper names. But while magic might depend on the repetition of a specific name, it seems that it
could also be magical, or counter-magical, to remove identity markers all together. Still, this
removal is blind to the significance of identity markers that systematically oppress through the
mechanisms of colonial or state recognition, the address Althusser61 identifies as the
interpellative power of the law. To what extent is the abstract, non-referential poem still
producing a knowledge about the power of names that speaks to racialized, anthropological
concepts of their magic?
Thinking about the use of the pronoun they in Stanzas in Meditation reminds us both of
the magical effect of naming and the poem’s historical context between two world wars, wars
fought in part to preserve colonialist empires.62 From the beginning, they’s constant comings and
goings feel like a physical, mental, and material invasion of the poem’s space, its rooms or
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stanzas. What does Stein do with the fear of or threat posed by the repeating, invading they?
Does the poem manage to hex them, and help the speaker (and readers) to cope with being
targeted for one’s difference (in Stein’s case, her unlawful grammar, gender, Judaism, or desire)?
Stein writes Stanzas in Meditation from the countryside, a space to which she and Alice
repeatedly retreated under threat of war, and where they hid during the Holocaust. Her poem
alerts the reader to apprehending a possible threat while also signaling the difficulty of this
alertness. Stein writes:
Coming as it did at one time only
For which they made it rather now
Coming as well when they come and can
For which they like it always
Or rather best so they can be alert
Not only needed in nodding
But not only not very nervous
As they will willingly pass when they are restless
Just as they like it called for them
All who have been left in their sense…
Always alike and mind do they come. (58-59)
Repeating pronouns, paradoxical syntax (“not only not very nervous”), and recurring “comes”
and “comings” might indeed lull a reader to sleep. Rhythmically too, the poem lulls as each
line’s tone rises quickly up and then steadily falls by the end. What is the significance of they in
reference to stimulants (that which is “needed in nodding”) or the production of tranquility (“not
only not very nervous”)? If readers merely let words linger before their eyes like a pendulum,
they might become entranced by the lack of logic or clarity. Are they/we then all under Stein’s
spell? However tranquil and likeable the trance might seem, it is not harmless. Participants in
Stanzas’ rite “com[e] through with this as their plan / Always in arises. / Liking it faintly and
fairly well” (59). The they comply in common liking or pain. The a-grammatical placement of
the verb “arises” after the preposition “in” leaves the word free to signify as the verb “to get up,”
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or as a noun form of the verb, multiple “getting’s up;” or, further, it could refer to the plural of
“aris,” meaning a sharp edge. This double meaning alters how we see both the subjects’ sociality
and their collective will to entrancement. The phrase “Always alike and mind,” sounds like
“always alike in mind,” and hints at a conformist, inattentive nature. It makes us question who is
not “alike” and minding it.
The oppressive presence of these others leads the reader to question who they are, what
they want, and who is the speaker in relation to them. While they’s polysemous appearances
render these questions unresolvable, they’s multiplicity ends up othering the I, or speaker.
Against the thicket of theys and the speaker’s absenting, the lyric I thereby must interrogate a
relationship to the collective other. Is she with them or not? Will she survive them or not? In
Retallack’s analysis, she counts “forty-seven [‘they’s’]( not counting ‘their’s’ and ‘them’s) in the
first two stanzas of Part I alone,” and depicts they as “feared patriarchal figures…angry siblings,
estranged or judgmental family members, stern teachers, scornful peers, a public that ignores
one’s work—but most of all the unknown in others.”63 They might appear hostile by sheer
number, or by performing negative, hex-like deeds, but most importantly Stein’s lyric neutralizes
it. In effect, they becomes a dummy or doll, the site or the victim of the trick. After the speaker
launches the poem alchemically, “I caught a bird which made a ball,” they critiques the speaker’s
art, “And they thought better of it.” However, the speaker then strips their judgment of any
value, saying, “But it is all of which they were taught,” as if their erroneous criticism was due to
limited inculturation. The speaker’s “But they must not stare when they manage” cancels out
they’s stare with “must not.” Moreover, the next three lines, “Whatever they are occasionally
liable to do / It is often easy to pursue them once in a while / And in a way there is no repose”
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(57), give the unnamed, invisible subject the power to chase “them.” The tone of “caught,”
“stare,” and “pursue” feels dominating, yet each of they’s actions is either admonished or
abstracted into non-action. Still, this effort—to compose a poem capable of resisting its own sea
of others—is continuous; “there is no repose,” Stein announces, ten lines into of her longest
poem—so exhausting is lyric protection.
The shiftiness of they’s possible identity draws additional attention to the gendered and
racial dynamics of spelling and counter-spelling in the poem as well as the experience of passing,
crossing the borders of identity. They’s viral exhaustion of the poem bespeaks a mostly
masculinist, white omnipresence (one similar, perhaps, to Stein’s white, spacious, butch
presence), but in this poem, they’s gender wavers. They occupies the poem’s space in a
masculine, colonialist fashion, but at times raises questions of “sisterhood” and “color.” They’s
gender instability draws the attention to the force of contrariety and ambivalence toward
categories in Stein’s work:
Secretly they met again
All which is changed is made they may be merry
For which they could in any regulation
Manage which they may have in any case of trial
Of when they do or sing sisters
And so much is taken for granted
In which appointment they color me
Or leave it as not in a glass or on the grass
They pass (141).
Change and exchange accompany the altering pronoun’s significance. There is a change toward
good times despite the threat of a trial, and there is secret living, safely “pass[ing]” and sharing a
treat—all against the vibrancy of green grass. There seem to be two “they’s”: the “they” that
comes and goes as it pleases, from earlier in the poem, and a new mysterious “they” who are also
“sing sisters” who could be witches or “which”-es on “trial.” When Stein writes, “they color
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me,” it is unclear if she refers to the negative criticism her poetry received or to blushing before
so many like-minded “sisters.” Furthermore, the phrase “they color me” raises the specter of
race, the possibility of the speaker’s coloring by her admission into the category of those who
practice magic, secret merriment, or perhaps lesbianism. Queer sexuality and racial “color” are
always already intertwined.64 The “they” that “pass” invokes racial passing, social rejection, and
being saved from a witch-hunt or slaughter, as with the biblical Passover. As a plural, nonspecific pronoun, “they” is a word both open to totalities and utterly bound to the specifics of a
word like “witches.” Through this doubleness and subterfuge, Stein’s poem theorizes the danger
and magic of referentiality.
Numbers, like names, play a critical role in many systems of magic and in Stanzas in
Meditation, where they fail, like words, to work according to formula or expectation. Mauss
comments on magic spells that “involve numbers and directions. Movements and words must be
repeated a number of times. Not any number of times but according to sacred and magical
numbers, such as 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 20, etc.”65 Stanzas in Meditation’s use of number-words
and a numbered structure (five numbered parts broken into stanzas with Roman numerals) posits
an ambiguous relationship to formula. Sequence is a given logic, not a motivated one. And yet
sequencing likewise instills a sense of ritual due to its predictability. Through sustained spaces of
reading with marked times for rest, this text alludes to formality without subscribing to it.
While Stanzas’ sequencing might make the poem appear logical, its use of numbers and
words does not add up. Paradoxically, Stein pairs numbers with their mimetic partner in syntax
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or their homophonic partner in sound. Where Stein avoids representation or typical formula, she
substitutes the following:
I said the difference is complicated
And she said yes is it it is
Or she said it is is it.
There seems so much to do
With one or two with six not seven
Either or.
Or believe (110-111).
In these lines, Stein presents one pattern, then turns it inside out; “is it it is” (question followed
by declaration) becomes “it is is it” (declaration followed by question). If the words were
numbers, computing the two phrases might yield zero, a null sum, but since they are words, the
“complicated” “difference” is the semantic expression of authority or not, knowing or not
knowing. Stein seems to parry these contrasting speech patterns (and positions) against numbers,
as if to call attention to what happens when the expected pattern or the significance of the word
fails to cohere. If “[e]ither or,” “one or two,” doesn’t matter, or if the meaning of their difference
depends on “believ[ing]” and not deciding, then poetic language becomes a site of magical
creativity, a something from nothing, not a predetermined system.
Stein’s use of numbers reads like spell-inducing mantras in readers’ mouths. In “Stanza
IX,” Stein riffs on the stanza’s number:
How nine
Nine is not mine
Mine is not nine
Ten is not nine
Mine is not ten…
I am not nine
May be nine
Mine one at a time
Not one from nine
Nor eight at one time
For which they may be mine. (146)
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The first four lines of this passage indicate that neither word-sound nor shape produces
equivalence, despite mine and nine’s similarity. Neither does rearranging word order confer
equality; thus difference springs from an error not in formula but in semantics. Seizing on two
words’ similarity, Stein interrogates the arbitrariness of difference. Her repeated iteration of the
n- and m-sounds, the sound-point of difference, simultaneously merges and opposes “mine” and
“nine,” both entrancing us and alerting us to this trance.
The passage above emphasizes the importance of sound to Stein’s meaning, and to how
her poem alerts readers to their capacity to sense. I, as sound, letter, and Roman numeral one,
repeats again and again. In the singular possessive “mine” and in the highest single digit “nine,”
the ay sound multiplies the speaker’s singularity. The sustained ahne sound also invokes the
German for one, ein, and Stein’s own name. Writing to Lindley Hubbell, Stein insists on the
tether between sound and meaning: “‘[J]ust how meaning is related to sound and just how you
must conceive meaning so that sound does not count, is the thing that endlessly holds us…and
after all the meaning is reliable only if it creates in and by itself the sound.’”66 Stein suggests that
we rely upon the meaning that compels its own sound onomatopoeically, or materially, like
names or labels do. She calls on us to sense language and notice the meaning of words’ sonic
relationships. Additionally, Stein’s multiplication of the self by merging “mine” and “nine”
enables hearing the poem as a spell of self-protection (more strength in numbers) and
collectivization (through accumulating singulars). As “the thing that that endlessly holds us,”
sound turns the individual reader into a self-possessing group—an us who can better attend to the
sensuous world rather than become entranced by memories of war, factory noises, or political
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discourse. This counter-spell perverts the numeric signifier, while maintaining enough sonic
coherence to feel trance-like. These trace-like effects place the poem between the ethnographic
prescription for magic spells and Stein’s own theory of poetic composition—an inventive,
meditative space where an ongoing negotiation with the present ensues.
Stanzas in Meditation further performs a sense-inducing magic through the alchemic
metamorphosis67 of words. Her metamorphic treatment of words presents shape-shifting as a real
option for repairing representational damage or escaping too much recognition. However, words
that sound alike but appear different serve to redirect our attention to how we perceive language.
We become re-attuned to our senses. Dydo calls Stein’s form of metamorphosis “interlacing.”68
Stein might have called it “threading,” evoking the gendered difference between an alchemic
transformation and a woven accumulation, the former masculine, wizardy, and the latter
feminine, witchy. Below, a man holds Stein’s thread:
It came very closely but no one was just yet
Not to be frightened as they meant at all
I do not care that he should make threads so
Threads are tenderly heads are tenderly so and so. (71)
These lines might relate to an actual tailor, seamstress, or weaver, but the sonic and visual
closeness of “thread” to “threat” draws our attention back to the word frightened. If we continue
to read sonically, the morphed “threat” in “thread” finds its echo in the earlier “yet.” Similarly,
the word “threads” makes the reader hear what they cannot see: the prick of the needle that
“sew[s]” a head onto “so and so.” Stein’s “thread” literally binds together these multiple
meanings into one, while maintaining their difference. Not only does “thread”/threat echo in
“heads,” but also the repetition of “tenderly” so close to heads produces the image of a small doll
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laid across a guillotine or stuck with voodoo pins. These “heads are tenderly so and so,”
unworthy of naming or remembering; they underscore the risk of non-recognition, and undo the
spell that demands a name. Again, Stein’s lyric seems to ameliorate the looming threat through
our heightened attention. There will be no mistaking threads for heads, or “so” for “so.” We
notice each distinctly.
Most generally, Stanzas in Meditation recalibrates our capacity to notice through the
relative absence of concrete nouns, adjectives, images, or names; this linguistic void, this
nothing, calls upon the reader to notice and respond to something. The sudden appearance of the
specific name of an animal, food, action, or element of nature jolts readers to attention after
wading through endless unspecific pronouns or recurring uncommon syntax and “erroneous”
prepositions. When Stein shifts from the vague, “That it is now that it is there / That rain is there
and it is here / That it is here and that they are there” (80), to the sensory, romantic meditation,
“It is very often very strange / How hands smell of woods / And hair smells of tobacco / And
leaves smell of tea and flowers” (81), the reader not only notices the latter’s specificity, but also
returns to the particular one syllable beats and repeating t’s, th’s, h’s, and r’s in the nonspecific,
earlier lines, thus relearning to sense without direct reference. Through these sudden shifts, the
reader experiences the relationship between word shape and sound as novel and flexible, as
unwrought matter. In this regard, not only does the word become a magical material69 again but
also the space of the poem works vis à vis a concept of the word’s primitivity. Stein’s extremely
infrequent specific words maintain an objective thread or line of possession to her readers.
Chickens, dogs, sheep, raspberries, cake, robins, and nightingales appear fleetingly, and the
infrequency of detail serves to empty the mind and ready it for meditation. Details are small
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tokens or rationed candy that make us stay; one “chicken” must last several pages of nonobjective nouns and other non-imagible words. This rarity of specificity forces readers to
recalibrate their reading or seeing, perhaps to become more aware of what’s inside a word and
around it, a kind of counter-trance or counter-spell that increases perception.
Even focusing on Stein’s titular “meditation” as a means of reading the poem’s attentionproducing effects seems to depend on a reader’s primitive imagination. Thinking about Stanzas
in Meditation as an act of meditation reveals the possible contradiction between the rationality
attached to empirical noticing and the irrationality attached to magic. Mid-poem, Stein writes,
“Once again I think I am reflecting” (77). This self-possession in meditation correlates easily to
the magician who “to a certain extent, can control his possession; he brings it on
by…monotonous music.”70 Certainly Stanzas’ “monotonous music” possesses us and helps us
reach a heightened consciousness, but at what cost? Some critics discussing Stein’s consciousraising effects seem to fall back on the trope of primitivism. Dydo interweaves her own
definition of meditative reading with a pre-historic, pre-literate past, a “back-when” naiveté: “To
read a stanza, we must give up our reading habits, abandon expectations of language behavior,
and read aloud word for word, literally, I am tempted to say naively, as if we did not know how
to read.”71 For Dydo, becoming pre-literate or newly-literate, we encounter what she calls “virgin
territory.”72 However, this critically imagined “virgin territory” of non-sense where we re-learn
to read is inevitably also the raced, gendered territory of colonization, a space-time imagined and
idealized by reader and poet in the moment always before destruction.
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The Other Time of Magic
In a primitive time-space with colonialist parameters, a prior moment and a prior location
just before their disappearance, time appears to stand still. Stein’s own claim that, in writing
Stanzas, she wanted to make “‘a long dull poem too and a bare one,’” speaks to duration,
attention and stillness (ibid, 506). Stein poses a relationship between the surface-level “this-ness”
of meditative thinking and the stopping of time altogether when she writes,
This that I think is this.
It is natural to think in numerals
If you do not mean to think
Or think or leave or bless or guess
Not either no or yes once.
This is how hours stand still. (Stanzas, 149)
Stein’s form of “not mean[ing] to think” could lead one to “think in numerals,” to confuse
“bless” and “guess,” and to embrace an ambivalent “not-either” ether in life. Stanzas seems to
argue for the re-attunement to what this experience is; and, from this might come a temporal
standstill.
Benjamin’s mystical-messianism posits the standstill as crucial to making people aware
of the modern emergency. Arresting time occasions a dialectical image that merges the past with
the present. This image interweaves a primitive temporality with a historicist one, a static sense
of time with a progressive one. For Benjamin, “[w]here thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a
constellation saturated with tensions, it gives that constellation a shock, by which thinking is
crystalized as a monad…the sign of a messianic arrest of happening.”73 Stanzas’ incredibly long,
monadic, not momentary standstill is Stein’s ultimate act of poetic magic. It stops the parade of
history, war, and countless visitors through the writer’s life and rooms. As Stein writes in her
1945 Wars I Have Seen, “Death starts history and fears” (9). Stanzas, maybe, can stop them. “I
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could go on with this” (Stanzas, 160), Stein writes, “I wish to remain to remember that stanzas
go on” (ibid, 112); the forever of writing (reading) Stanzas is how the poet (reader) steps outside
of time’s onward slaughter. But this freedom, to skirt time, and the poem’s survival, arises
through an aesthetics that reconfigures aspects of blackness’s then-there for whiteness’s herenow.
De-obscuring the mechanisms of primitivity and race at work in Stein’s curative poem
(and the modernist poetic imagination more largely) particularly depends on understanding how
not just Stanzas’s standstill but its temporal difference works. Johannes Fabian, in his book Time
and the Other, posits his theory that the conceptual nature of time has changed over time, and,
particularly, that anthropologists, working in the aftermath of global colonization, spatialized
time in order to distance themselves from their subjects. He writes, “Primitive, being essentially
a temporal concept, is a category, not an object of Western thought.”74 By insisting on the
distinction between the colonial subject’s then/there and the European’s now/here,
anthropologists’ understanding of their subject was skewed. Unable to believe that two kinds of
time could coexist, or that the time of ritual and the time of science would ever overlap,
anthropologists struggled to represent the other accurately. And yet poetic time has almost
always embraced a fractured time-sense—the time of the writing, the poetic event75—and the
reader’s reading always seeming to co-transpire in time and space. That Stein’s nonsense, “Not
either no or yes once,” yields a “stand still” prompts us to question how the poetic event depends
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on what Fabian theorizes as anthropology’s then-there/here-now colonialist binaries while also
riskily skirting their limits.
Working through the history of philosophy, not anthropology, Tony C. Brown’s more
recent theorization of primitive time helps us to consider anew how a poem’s temporal standstill
harbors a racialized figure. Brown describes “the problem of thinking the primitive” as a
temporal problem in his analysis of the primitive’s conceptual influence on eighteenth-century
aesthetic theory.76 His critique frames primitive temporality as outside of linearity altogether
rather than “first.” According to Brown, there stands “the inescapable yet infinitely troubling
figure of the not-quite-nothing, the primitive: the absolutely first or, more significantly, what is
before the first, beyond any temporal existence.”77 This depiction of the primitive speaks directly
to the temporality of Stanzas in Meditation. Time in Stein’s poem does not accumulate in
reading, but ceases to count at all—it enacts the nothing. Stein’s no-time is ultimately neither
here nor there. Stanzas’s temporal standstill is not just due to the poem’s magical characteristics.
The poem’s temporality also stems from the trouble of “thinking the primitive,” or rather its
reliance on a racialized, colonial concept of pre-colonial time. In The Autobiography, Stein
herself paints a relationship between people of African descent, primitivity, and nothingness:
“Gertrude Stein concluded that negroes were not suffering from persecution, they were suffering
from nothingness. She always contends that the african is not primitive, he has a very ancient but
a narrow culture and there it remains. Consequently nothing does or can happen.”78 Despite
saying “the african is not primitive,” Stein racistly represents him as narrow, inconsequential,
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and existing in the same temporality that Brown claims defines as primitive, in a space outside of
time where “nothing does or can happen.”
Not only does Stanzas in Meditation’s primitivistic temporality suspend time, but it also
collides multiple grammatical times,79 and therefore produces a no-time “before the first.”
Coinciding tenses evoke a chaotic sense of time beyond knowability, making the poem another
“thing that endlessly holds us,” an ongoing possession. In the poem’s final lines, subjunctive,
imperative, past conditional, future, progressive, and perfect tenses crystalize into all-time and
no-time:
Let them be mine therefor.
Everybody knows that I chose.
Therefore if therefor before I close.
I will therefor offer therefore I offer this.
Which if I refuse to miss may be miss is mine.
I will be well welcome when I come.
Because I am coming.
Certainly I come having come.
These stanzas are done. (249)
Here the imperative “Let” commands future action while “chose” stresses pastness. “Before”
beckons to a past before that past or before the present about to become past. “[I]f” and “may be”
evoke conditionality and promise, while the end-stopped lines deliver a finality extremely rare in
the rest of the poem. The last line ironically bears the present tense “are,” despite the poem not
just ending but announcing (and accomplishing) this end with the finality of “done.” Still, Stein’s
penultimate “come having come” sitting above “done” smites any doneness or accompli:
everything is already. For Brown, the temporal nothing frames the concept of the primitive, but
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suspending time also produces duration, not no time but an extended time, one that feels
messianic in Agamben’s sense of the word, an end-time that feeds on its own unendingness.80
Certainly any reader of Stanzas has felt this version of apocalyptic time in the poem’s apparent
eternality. Inside this temporal suspension on the page, the reader, speaker, and larger, imagined
social body of the between-the-war era achieve a material-mystical connection.
Stanzas in Meditation’s poetic parallels to a magic spell and the poem’s abstracted sense
of a threat produce highly attentive readers, ones hungry for the reparative effects of attending
closely to experience. Perhaps these readers would rediscover their ability to, as Adorno and
Horkeimer wish, “hear with their own ears what has not already been heard.”81 Reading the
poem in response to post-world-war psycho-social contexts—fear, shock, anaesthesia, and
nonsense—allows us to think more broadly about how colonial concepts of otherness effect the
conditions through which reparation is imagined or thought possible. Since the collective trauma
wrought by World War I was also the result of global colonialist competition, it becomes a
colonial, racialized phenomenon when poets in an American-European context employ a poetics
of magic—a poetics retheorizing the forms of time, space, and consciousness associated with
those colonial realms—in order to restore post-war consciousness. The aesthetics of Stein’s
“avant-garde” whiteness arises through believing anthropological generalizations about how a
non-specific group of non-white others experience the world, and through desiring that the
colonized world deliver some kind of cure for modern malaise.
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See Giorgio Agamben’s chapter “The Fourth Day: Apostolos” in The Time That Remains, trans. Patricia Dailey
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 59-87, in which he draws a parallel between the recursive
structure of the sestina, particularly its condensed repetitions in the final stanza, and his conceptualization of
apocalyptic time as containing a sense of both infinity and an approaching finality—a temporality unique to the
experience of an end-time.
81
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkeimer, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” in Dialectic of Enlightenment:
Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans.Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University
Press, 2002), 28.
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I have sought to demonstrate how Stein’s Stanzas in Meditation is shot through with
racialized forms of occultist thinking, through the poem does not avow any belief in occultism.
This kind of writing is a product of knowledge-making about race, poetry, and magic that came
into prominence during her lifetime. Stein’s composition, regardless of her intentions, theorizes
the poetic through techniques resembling the characteristics of magic as rendered by
anthropologists studying “primitive” cultures in colonized spaces elsewhere to Stein’s world.
The same poetic events that recall Mauss’ theory of magic—punning, naming, repeating,
counting, and merging two into one—double back on themselves in Stein’s work, indicating a
desire not to trance but un-trance, to produce a meditative alertness to the disenchanting spell of
technologized Late Capital. This paradoxical position on magic complicates my claim that the
poem appropriates a racialized form of ritualistic transaction. Still, the poem’s temporality
underscores how primitivity structures the poem’s thinking. Stanzas’ production of primitive
time reflects a conception of time that depends upon and reproduces a racialized, primitive, preliterate other: it is this time that structures our82 experience of Stein’s avant-garde work. Because
time is ultimately conceptual and ideological, not just aesthetic or linguistic, Stanzas in
Meditation’s temporal difference attests to the theorization and work of racialized concepts in
modernist avant-garde poetry. Stein remarks, “To think how birds spell and do not spell well”
(164)—so too do poets.
Nonetheless, how do the stakes of this ambiguous position look differently when that
poet is an American black poet in post-war Harlem? In the next chapter, I will explore Amiri
Baraka’s 1969 collection Black Magic, a collection that traces his journey from downtown to the
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Surely many different kinds of readers might experience time in Stein’s Stanzas differently, still I suggest that the
structures of this time might indeed produce a cross-temporal readership, such that there exists an entranced
univocal “we the readers.”
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“heaven” of Harlem, the one Van Vechten glorified. Baraka shows how the concept of magic
works to define not only white but also black avant-gardism. Similarly, I examine the role of
magic in the belief that the poem both avenges and repairs.
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Chapter Three
Unstuffing the Doll: Defiguring Magic in Amiri Baraka’s Black Magic
The West is an insane asylum, a conscious and
premeditated receptacle of black magic… Scat
black magic, but to scat or scatter is not to admit
formlessness. The aftersound is more than a bridge.
It ruptures interpretation even as the trauma it
records disappears.1
—Fred Moten
We need magic
now we need the spells, to raise up
return, destroy, and create.2
—Amiri Baraka, “Ka ’Ba”
When I die, the consciousness I carry I will to
black people. May they pick me apart and take the
useful parts, the sweet meat of my feelings. And
leave the bitter bullshit rotten white parts alone.3
—Amiri Baraka, “leroy”

Like countless other widely canonized modernists or other experimental heroes of New
American Poetry, Amiri Baraka’s free expression of now unpopular political views of gender,
race, religion, and sexuality can be troubling for critics who wish to grant his life’s work critical
value. I suspect that the distance which many critics keep from Baraka, as opposed to say, Stein
or Pound or Williams, concerns both his “radical” racial politics and the continued, guarded
whiteness of the English discipline.

1

Fred Moten, In The Break: Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2003), 39.
2
Amiri Baraka, Black Magic: Sabotage – Target Study – Black Art (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969)
146.
3
Ibid, 217. All subsequent references to the poems in the collection Black Magic, the principal object of this
chapter’s analysis, will be cited parenthetically by page number.
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Critic Werner Sollers and biographer-critic Jerry Watts both discount Baraka’s Black
Magic (1969), the focus of this chapter. While twenty-one poems from this two hundred and
twenty-five page compendium of three short books were anthologized in Transbluesency (1995),
the large bulk of this collection has never been reprinted and has been barely discussed except in
some remarkable early Baraka scholarship included in Donald Gibson’s Modern Black Poets.4
Jerry Watts writes that the poems in Black Magic represent Baraka’s “attachment to a dying and
destructive white ethos,”5 despite the myriad ways in which these poems chronicle Baraka’s
spiritual and political formation across the 1960s. While Aldon Nielsen calls Baraka’s work of
this time “spirit writing,”6 Sollers describes the collection as “merely a transcription of a Dadaist
scream.”7 However, the first poems to seem at all Dadaist8 or scream-like do not appear until the
last sub-section, Black Art, and further, the scream thematized there is an urgently referential, not
nonsensical, scream9 against anti-black racism and capitalist oppression, more in line with the
Marxist politics of Dadaism that its anarchistic aesthetics.
So why has this collection been mostly ignored? To make the collection, Baraka selfanthologized three smaller books10 from 1961-1967 (Sabotage, 1961-1963; Target Study, 19631965; and Black Art, 1965-1966), turbulent years for Baraka, romantically, creatively, and

4

Donald B. Gibson, editor, Modern Black Poets: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1973).
See three essays attuned to Baraka’s early career by Lee A. Jacobus, “Imamu Amiri Baraka: the Quest for Moral
Order;” Clyde Taylor, “Baraka as Poet”; and Arthur P. Davis, “The New Poetry of Black Hate.”
5
Jerry Watts, Amiri Baraka: The Politics and Art of a Black Intellectual (New York: NYUP, 2001), 228.
6
See Aldon Nielsen, Black Chant: Languages of African Post-Modernism (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1997).
7
Werner Sollers, Amiri Baraka /Leroi Jones: The Quest for a "Populist Modernism" (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1978), 197.
8
Likewise, Sollers misses the relevance of any Dadaist echo in this text, one that resounds the Marxist
underpinnings of both movements—Dada and Black Arts.
9
Fred Moten might call this scream the maternal scream of the Middle Passage, a scream he analyzes in the
newspaper photograph of Emmett Till in his casket, in “Black Mo’nin in the Sound of a Photograph”, In the Break,
192-210.
10
The individual collections are in fact not that small. Sabotage was forty-one pages; Target Study, sixty-five pages;
and Black Art, one hundred. Clearly Baraka could not find or did not seek a publisher at the time.
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politically. He released them as one book under the curious title, Black Magic. The book went
out of print shortly after its 1969 publication. None of the poems were reprinted until the
Transbluesency in 1995. Despite the absence of critical attention to this collection in the decades
that followed, it seems that the cover designer Quentin Fiore had some idea of the title’s
significance. 1969 was a contentious historical moment. By the time Black Magic appeared,
Emmett Till, Martin Luther King Jr., John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Malcolm X had all
been killed. The Black Panthers had already released a revised, Marxist version of their ten-point
plan. And here comes (then named) LeRoi Jones with a book of poems about looting Jewish
storefronts, killing white devils, and raising black consciousness.
The Fiore cover features a white Play-Doh-like voodoo doll with black-inked teeth, skyblue eye-blotches, and a blond cap of painted hair, stuck all over with pearl-headed pins. The
section titles “Sabotage – Target Study – Black Art” run small across the bottom. The title, the
doll, and the details of the sub-sections spell out content ill-suited for white readers not ready to
be held accountable for their complicated complicity in the actual sabotage of black life in the
United States. The representation of the target as a white voodoo doll seems to accept that Black
power might find recourse in mythical “black arts” or magic. Picturing “black magic” this way
makes readers think of magic as germane not only to the occult practices of a primitive past but
also to the black vernacular, one that includes the racial drama of American history and its
present.11 The image aptly centers the contradictory status of magic as straddling a long-ago past

11

To conceive of the primitive as past is to eclipse the history of contact between colonists and indigenous peoples
and to further eclipse indigenous people’s continued life upon and claim to the land I live on. My reference to both
the vernacular and to American history here intends to foreground as much that the history of magic in African
spiritual practices is synonymous with American history as much as the presence of magic in indigenous religious
practices is.
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and what Tony C. Brown calls the continuous present of blackness that the concept of primitivity
invokes.12
In the years leading up to Black Magic’s publication, Baraka sought a new sense of
community, home and self, particularly spiritually. He begins by abandoning the bohemian,
downtown New York scene, which had been his home-away-from Newark. Diane di Prima, selffashioned magician, features front and center in this early phase of his journey, as his once lover
and co-publisher of the Beat poetry newsletter The Dancing Bear. His experiments and
associations post-Downtown with Yoruba and Black Islam evoke a desire for a kind of religious
belonging that would transcend “Black American” and re-suture him to an originary, African
spirituality. This spiritual journey should be seen as a strategic move to combat the effects of
racism and the effects of colonialism. As Spivak notes, American slavery and racism have
constituted a form of internal colonialism which has included but has not been limited to the
secularization of African cultures.13 Against this context, Baraka’s spiritual journey14 sought
self-possession, community belonging, a way to make sense of the material world, and a set of
beliefs about the unforeseeable world beyond. On the back cover of his later book of poems
Hard Facts, from 1975, he writes, “Earlier our own poems came from an enraptured scream
against whites as the eternal enemies of Black people, as the sole cause of our disorder +

12

See Tony C. Brown, The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota
Press, 2012) for his theory of primitive time as operating outside of linear chronology, and composing the nothing of
time, which I interpret as kind of eternal, continual present. While Brown is thinking through the primitive’s
operations in eighteenth century thought, I argue that this racialized figure still influences 1960s Euro-centric spacetime, whereby colonial space-time is deemed “black” and magical, as a foil to “white,” “rational” space-time of
colonizer cultures.
13
See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Teaching for the Times,” The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language
Association 25, no. 1 (Spring, 1992): 3-22. Spivak’s call for critics to investigate the “sublation of internal
colonialism,” which she cites as the secularization of African spirituality and magic, is based on her reading of Jack
Forbes, Black Africans and Native Americans: Color, Race and Caste in the Evolution of Red Black Peoples (New
York: Blackwell, 1988).
14
This questing does not end for Baraka in the sixties—by the mid-seventies he turned away from a strict separatist
and Black Islamist view, dropping Imamu from his name. He also did not abandon white community upon returning
to Newark, where he ultimately was a pall bearer for William Carlos Williams.

108

oppression. The same subjective mystification led to mysticism, metaphysics, spookism, &c.,
rather than dealing with reality.”15
Despite Baraka’s reflective criticism of his spiritual poetics, I read Black Magic as an
attempt to address the real disorder of his present moment and the particularities of these
conditions through a strategic racial, spiritual, and political essentialism.16 In Black Magic, I see
Baraka not only navigating away from drug-addled, white bohemia and toward Black Islam and
black radical politics, but also devising a cultural and aesthetic theory about black resistance in
conversation with past and present movements, including white modernist primitivism, the
Beats, Négritude, black Marxism, and idealist and metaphysical philosophies. In this chapter, I
bring the anticolonial historical moment during which Black Magic appears to bear on the text’s
relationship to race, magic, and linguistic form, particularly the ways in which these poems enact
a poetic theory about the materiality of sound. To this extent, my reading of Black Magic’s
formal qualities departs from Nielsen’s own thinking in Black Chant about the important
inseparability of orality and textuality. In this way, working both on and off the page, the poems
not only contain the space-time of pan-African politics, the rise of Black Islam in the United
States, and post-Marxist protests across the globe but also provide a space in which such political
contestations against racism, colonialism, and capitalism can be engaged at lower stakes. The
book also reflects contestations at the level of Baraka’s identity, shifts in name, family
allegiances, and aesthetic and religious creeds as well as a changing relationship to “the Black
aesthetic tradition.” Nathaniel Mackey, in his analysis of what he calls Baraka’s “changing

15

See backcover of Amiri Baraka, Hard Facts (Newark, N. J.: People's War, 1975).
See Gayatri Spivak, “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,” in The Spivak Reader: Seleected Works
of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. ed. Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean (New York: Routledge, 1996), 203-236.
Spivak reclaims ethnic or racial essentialism from its critics as a possible willed, strategic response contingent upon
specific material, political conditions of a historical moment in the process of decolonization.
16
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same,” or his restless aesthetics and politics, reads this indeterminate positionality as containing
both alienation and resistance.17
Through this indeterminacy, Black Magic inverts what might usually be called
appropriative, primitive aesthetics and subverts the racialized Manichean dialectic of pure
whiteness and evil blackness upon which such aesthetics rest. My analysis thereby complicates
earlier arguments in this dissertation about linking aesthetic experimentalism and magic by
raising questions about how the poet’s racial position shifts the political stakes of invoking magic
in poetry. A close analysis of the whole of Black Magic reveals the significant work this
collection achieves, including: its theorization of good and bad magic; its interrogation of the
materialism of sound and the immaterialism of text; its manifestation of the violence a text can
perform; and its improvisational iteration of “rebeginning.” Black Magic negotiates
contemporaneous critiques of barbarism and primitivistic depictions of blackness alongside
diasporic Africana thinkers such as C.L.R. James, Aimé Césaire, and Frantz Fanon. It also posits
the material poem as a crucial site for improvisational resistance, collectivity and political
transcendence though what Moten calls “interanimation,”18 or the re-presentation of the original
contradiction between subjective and objective being. Through its critique and improvisation,
Baraka’s work problematizes poetry’s relationship to magic, replaces magic with a spiritualdialectical consciousness, and reveals “magic” as the false art underpinning real obstacles to
black mattering: whiteness, the American dream, and the false promises of capitalism. In sum,
Baraka’s poetry suspends or interrupts the capacity of the black figure of primitivity to figure as

17

Nathaniel Mackey, “The Changing Same: Black Music in the Poetry of Amiri Baraka,” boundary2 6, no. 2
(Winter 1978): 358.
18
Moten, In the Break, 22.
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doll, magic object or poem. In its place, Baraka writes the figure of whiteness and liberates
blackness from figurality, through sound, spirit, and dialectics.
In closely (and distantly, wholly) reading Black Magic amidst contemporaneous
discourse on magic, race, poetry and primitivity, I aim to give this part of Baraka’s lifework
proper critical attention in line and in collaboration with Mackey and Moten’s thinking on
Baraka. In analyzing specific aesthetic markers of Baraka’s work—Dadaist nonsense and
neologisms, chant-like invocations, broadside-like formatting, slang, and jazz elements—I offer
readers a new way to understand magic’s place in his poetics. Also, by attending to the book’s
metaphysical investigation, I open up a new critical discussion of Black Magic’s emphasis on
violence and its possible relationship to the poetics of magic. My work calls on critics to rethink
the violent underpinnings of Baraka’s work (the main cause of its dismissal) first as primary to
black American experience, and secondly as textual; I read the anti-white violence in Black
Magic as taking effect through the space between the material and the mystical. Inside this
liminal space, one not inherently bodily, violence is real but survivable. This violence, like a
knife that passes through but leaves no hole, reflects a belief in the magical qualities of language
and text. These observations lead me to view the poems’ linguistic attack on the white majority,
including its more and less accepted minorities (the bourgeoisie, Jews, and queers) as not just a
response to centuries of anti-black oppression, but rather as a strategic destruction meant to
occasion a new construction. Baraka’s poems reject and destroy the American dream of class
mobility (a.k.a. white magic) and manifest a different black magic of Pan-African consciousness.
This black magic of improvisational, political communion through music, speech, and
bodies transpires inside a black, magical space-time, and imagines a return to Africanness, a
return reminiscent of what historian Reiland Rabaka calls a critical, dialectical return in
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reference to Aimé Césaire’s poetry.19 In this vein, Black Magic can be seen as a reformulation of
Négritude through a strategic engagement with anti-colonial thinkers Césaire, Fanon, and C.L.R.
James. Since this construction occurs in the wake of destruction, Baraka’s “re-beginning”
depends on imagining an alternative, Africana space-time infused with primitive pastness and
local vernacular too. Through Baraka’s “unfocused” or diasporic aesthetic and his persistent
dialecticism, his poetics refuses the modernist trap of nostalgic nativity20 and restores praxis to
magic.

The Spells, To Raise Up
The doubleness of magic—the bad and the good of it—undergirds Black Magic. Direct
references to magic abound in contradictory forms, at times as “white evil” and at other times as
the long-lost spiritual strength of African-roots. More often than not, magic for Baraka lies in the
guise of the artificial, material, thing-obsessed world, the wave of a capitalist hand that makes
you want (more) stuff. In the poem “After the Ball,” in the first section, Sabotage, Baraka
describes “the magic dance / of the second ave. ladies, / in the artificial glare / of the world” (17).
Here magic seems to lure the speaker, and yet the dancing women form a ground against which
the constructed quality of the world gets reflected, unwelcomingly, back to us.
Baraka repeatedly posits magic as tangled with the way language works, from its
alphabetic constituent parts to its capacity to sound and to make others make sound. The
speaker’s relationship to the magic of letters coincides with his articulation of the selfhood he
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Reiland Rabaka, The Négritude Movement: W.E.B. Du Bois, Leon Damas, Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor,
Frantz Fanon (New York: Lexington Books, 2015), 191.
20
See Laura Doyle, “The Flat, the Round, and Gertrude Stein: Race and the Shape of Modern(ist) History,”
Modernism/modernity 7, no. 2 (April 2000): 249-271. While Doyle argues that modernist anachronism is racialized
by its narrative of progress, her analysis largely centers on white modernist writers. Therefore, it may be useful to
explore further the significance and methods of Baraka’s resistance to such nostalgia.
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desires. “Among things with souls, find me,” Baraka writes in his poem “Success,” producing a
self that is both material and spiritual (21). (This line also ventriloquizes Marx’s speaking
commodity, a concept Moten theorizes in his In the Break in order to articulate the grounds out
of which black subjectivity speaks the conflict of being both subject and object.) In this same
poem, Baraka writes,
Picking thru the alphabet
or leaning out the window. (Lives
and magic.) (21)
It is tempting to read a kinship between the poet-speaker, sifting through his materials, and the
parenthetical magic. Still the ambivalent “or” between the two activities, letter picking and
window watching, makes them equivalent and swappable. A question arises about the difference
between writing and living. Is one just ambivalently picking letters or actually experiencing the
world and striving to change it? The parenthetical phrase “(Lives / and magic)” seems to decode
the scene that precedes it, replacing ambivalence with deliberate togetherness: and. So too, the
parentheses seem to mark the phrase as a complete set, and to contain it. Magic appears to have
leaked out; however, by the end of the poem: “The proportion of Magic / has seeped so low. /
For the 1st person plural / American, then, / Atlantis / in blind overdose” (21). The poem depicts
America as a lost, drowned city, one that perhaps was once magical, but now faces low supply
due to addictive consumption. In this poem, magic seems positive when correlated to the
alphabet or writing and to the mythic promise of America; but, in noting how such a promise is
only ever afforded to whites, Baraka contradicts magic’s positive portrayal. So how to
understand magic’s slipperiness as a concept at play in Baraka’s thinking?
In the first section of Black Magic, Baraka’s experiences with drugs complicate the
reader’s ability to locate his sense of magic. In “Houdini” (no accidental reference to magic), he
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writes, “Poured/ white powder / on the back of a book / … Feeling / the change, the bag-like
quality / of ease” (7). However, by the time Baraka becomes the sober, self-realized poet at the
end of his collection, these drugs come to embody white supremacy’s systemic destruction of
black life. Reflecting on drugs, Baraka theorizes white magic as that which dulls the senses,
empties the soul, and replaces the spiritual self with a wholly material one.
While throughout Sabotage and Target Study, references to magic make it appear dull,
pitiful, ghostly, and escapist, some poems fashion it otherwise. Following “Witches and Devils,”
a mostly drug-centric poem in which “Steel insects / fill us with madness” (51), “Friday”
continues the theme of a drug-induced reverie. It also confronts what might come of praying for
or playing with “magic,” whether believing in it or shooting it in your veins. Perhaps the
perceptual difference on drugs21 would help you distinguish good magic from bad, the one you
wield against others versus the one others wield against you. The poem “Friday” begins like
scene directions:
And so we leave. Hurrying. The bags packed,
minds in halfzoom position. One kit I carry,
contents: 3 knives, a revolver, 1 ½ ounces of
bush. Then get in
the wind. (52)
It then continues like a poem born of getting high: “the sun follows, in its quick breath, /
matching our own I am rising. The air is still” (52). Getting high leads to a scene of becoming, a
makeover, wherein we find the speaker mid-stride between seeming suicidal and musically
combatting despair:
When you are dead Good. And let the crying cease. Baroomed off a ship
where the ghosts of magic fucking conduct their pitiful search.

21

The speaker’s drug-use could be thought as a kind of self-violence, in line with that which Fanon theorizes as the
colonized black person’s aggression against himself as a result of the colonizer’s aggression against him. (The
Wretched of the Earth).
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The social butterflies have turned to Pterodactyls. A poetic bird of the
second measure. The measure of the rhythm, hear me, stretching
past Your eyes. (52-53)
Death in these lines brings a certain reckoning. The speaker calls for an end to despair: “let the
crying cease.” “Magic” is dead despite being resurrected as a team of phantoms who will never
find you no matter how hard they look. But here begins the transformation—the lostness
necessary to occasion one’s re-discovery. Death wins you no magical return, but the
Pterodactyls—the extinct, treacherous dinosaurs that live only in the imagination—become
“poetic bird[s]” and produce a musical sound that expands, scream-like: the screech of a trumpet.
The poem suggests that the capacity to sound offers a kind of escape or better magic because it
begins in the material and has the ability to move beyond material and visual limits. The speaker
calls, “hear me,” emphasizing his presence through sound, just before he flees “past Your eyes,”
escaping their scopic trap.
The formal aspects of “Friday” also depart from typical appearances, seeming to abandon
their identity as a page in a book, or their formal textuality. Like other poems in the book, this
one is oriented horizontally across two pages, making the reader rotate the book to read it. This
unconventional format could be a product of Baraka’s irregular and long line-lengths. Turning
the page to fit these long lines draws attention to the fact that these are lines of poetry, not prose,
lines of a determined, not accidental, length. Given this purposefulness, the uneven line lengths
and especially the extremely short lines that tend to finish each stepped-stanza give the sense of a
leaving-off, a sudden break, a run-for-it. The poem ultimately lands on the speaker’s departure, a
departure which began with “One kit”:
Your mind and eyes are open. You are strong. Leave
them Leave
them. (53)
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These final lines reduce the poem’s subjects to “You” and “them,” drawing a clear line between
social groups.22 The speaker addresses himself, “You,” despite using “I” earlier in the poem. By
breaking the line after “Leave,” the speaker and leaver is visually and materially split off from
the “them.” Likewise, by positioning the two “them”’s above each other, Baraka highlights their
sameness, their union, and the speaker’s necessary separateness. If the poem’s speaker
overcomes despair and articulates a determined, possible selfhood despite magic, then where
does the potential for self-preservation and escape (be it from drugs and/or the Village) come
from? If it doesn’t come magically, but does come poetically, musically, then, how can these can
be kept separate?
“Friday” is not the only poem where Baraka points to a weak magic. However, in his
poem “The Visit,” Baraka begins to acknowledge how he separates some forms of magic from
others. In some senses, “The Visit” is a brief poem about holding onto some parts of one’s past
despite needing to break away from it:
What I never wanted, came back
for me to love it. (Above the sirens
and the bogus magic of the laughably damned) Came back,
there light struck me, social songs, racial songs,
and love, like a versified cliché, came down on me. (40)
When Baraka points to “the bogus magic,” he implies the presence of a not-bogus magic. There
is the magic of the impure, the “damned,” but also the magic “light” of “songs, / and love;” 23 the
former rains down like a reprimand, the latter a heavenly missive, and a musical one.

22

One might note the echo here of “they”’s omnipresence in Stein’s Stanzas in Mediation as discussed in Chapter 2.
It is tricky to separate my analysis of Baraka’s conceptualization of poetry from his thinking on music. Blues
People was published just prior to writing of much this book, in 1963. There is a particular tension between the
rootedness of his musicology and the fleetingness of his poetics. It is crucial to consider that Baraka is working out a
theory of black consciousness across these two texts that is as much grounded as it is full of flight.
23
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Many early moments in Black Magic like “brujo explosions could free you” (51) make it
hard to tackle magic’s status. Is brujo the drug, the dealer or an actual wizard? However, notions
of magic and of the poem as spell resurge in a more self-convinced form in the last and longest
section of the book, Black Art. Here, an alphabet capable of being picked through (as imagined
earlier) comes alive through rampant capitalization. Black Art, written during Baraka’s
conversion to the Nation of Islam, often turns the poem into an animated chant, a speech with
mana. “Ka ’Ba” reads as a poetic invocation, a call to fellow Africans of the diaspora to know
their beauty, profess their suffering, and break off their literal and metaphorical chains:
We have been captured,
brothers. And we labor
to make our getaway, into
the ancient image, into a new
correspondence with ourselves
and our black family. We need magic
now we need the spells, to raise up
return, destroy, and create. What will be
the sacred words? (146)
The title of the poem refers to what is considered the most holy site in Islam,24 the giant black
and gold-painted, cube-like monument in the center of Mecca, the ultimate destination in a
Muslim’s hajj. Yet Baraka seizes the blackness of this iconic object and image as a portal
through which he can commune with black ancestors from a lost place and time. The “We” of
the speaker’s here and now needs “the” [definite, particular] “spells” that could enable a
“getaway” from the state of captivity, spells thought to belong to “black family.” Magic here is
not just needed because, as written earlier, “the proportion… has seeped so low” (21), but now
magic is the deeded right and possession of the speaker’s newly recognized community of
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It should be noted that neither the Nation of Islam nor most contemporary Islamic sects ascribe to belief in magic
per se, but Baraka did briefly explore a mystical version of Islam.
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belonging, one whose beliefs stand in sharp contradistinction to white supremacism. This
instantiation of magic clarifies how Baraka’s “good-black magic” opposes “bad-white magic.”
This positive magic, appearing largely in Black Art, is intrinsic to Baraka’s newly forming Black
aesthetics and community of black artists.
The next poem, “The Spell,” answers “Ka ’Ba”’s call by materializing spells on the page:
The Spell The SPELL THE S P E L L L L L L L L L L !
Away and sailing in warm space. The eyes of God-our on us
In us. The spell. We are wisdom, reaching for itself. (147)
Repeating the title phrase three times in the first line, Baraka uses capital letters to emphasize
spell’s sound and its materiality. He further proves the word’s sonic-material capacity by
stretching it, a material test, reproducing the last letter L like a stuck key, a visual stutter, or a
held note, the “UHL”-sound of “lull.” In the same sense that the poem becomes more object-like
through the capitalization of “spell,” the credibility or force of the spell gains weight through its
sonic, visual, and material presence. Baraka turns word into object through repetition and
capitalization, mirroring the self-reaching seen in “wisdom, reaching for itself” (as if a word after
completing its task of signifying reaches back into its own thingliness). This reaching for oneself
implies a kind of dysphoria or “obsession,” a sense of sitting (sessere) outside (ob-) oneself. One
might ask, why would anyone need magic in order to be what one is? But if the subject at hand is
Baraka, or a fellow member of his “black family,” then attaining a sense of really being inside
oneself, a sense of self-possession, would be critical to opposing colonial captivity and surviving
racism.
Several pages after “Ka ’Ba,” the poem titled “Trespass Into Spirit,” shows how part of
Black Magic’s magic (and its spirit) is the materialization of the sonic in the collaborative space
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between the page, readers, and beyond. As lines of non-linguistic sound stretch across the
horizontally-oriented page, the poem claims its latitude:
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaahahaaneene ahahaahneene neeeeneeaahaaahneeeahhh
woooooouhhhahhhheeehhhhhhhhhh ohhhhh ahahahahahahauahuahuah. (151)
The chant continues, non-semantically, with long, breathy tones across high E- and low Opitches. After five lines like this, the speaker switches codes: “A Chant to rise with all.” Yet
right after this prayer-like summation of the preceding part of the poem (one that sounds and
looks like a chant), the poem swerves suddenly into three lines of non-sonic, non-chantable
nonsense, heavy on unpronounceable consonant combinations, and mixed with random, nonfunctioning punctuation:
diry jsolekks eoo fjoel fjkks ei OO dkkle;pspekl”melks;;a;;sll. (152)
After this utterly broken, nonsensical alphabetic chain, the diction of the poem again swerves
into consistently recognizable words but barely sensible syntax: “the machines head is gone //
red noise dirty fanning hurt love test run love and” (152). If we consider the title, the distinct
linguistic modes throughout the poem could be steps in the process of this illicit journey, this
trespass into the non-rational, non-empirical, nonsensical world of spirit.
So what power or effect does each mode serve, or what is achieved by their co-presence
in one poem? The vowel-centric, soundable lines at the beginning invite a choral reading, a
communal response. Meanwhile, the almost Nordic, prohibitive consonant-centric second section
might quell such a chorus, permitting only a lone struggler to parse each individual letter, one at
a time. Still, these difficult, unassimilable lines could also exemplify a bebop jazz aesthetic, and
the fact that this solo remains of a piece with the improvisational group and scene only
emphasizes the jazz element. Finally, the word-by-word semantic unity of the final section,
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paired with its syntactic disunity, calls on readers to pay close attention to the sounds they speak
while letting go of sense. It tells them to focus on sound rather than meaning, on materiality not
message. Authorship transcends the speaker: “wake wake moisture and sun, describe me,
angels!!” (152). Language is given over to spiritual bodies and the animated natural elements of
water and light. Words will come back from these elements to give the speaker of the poem
materiality. “[D]escribe me.” In other words, assure my presence. Baraka produces an animistic
poem, bestowing words with spirit along with thingliness. The poem’s effects far exceed
communication within the material world. There is no hint in this poem that magic is low, bogus,
or evil. We arrive at the other side of Baraka’s magic dialectic, the side of Afro-centric spiritual
power.
Like “Trespass into Spirit,” Black Art’s subsequent chant-like poems negotiate the
materiality of “world” and the spirituality of words. Baraka’s poetry becomes what we might call
“extra-material” by altering the directionality of the page, emphasizing sound not meaning, and
resorting to mostly capital letters. Through the aliveness of these words (and the poem), he can
reckon his present reality with his dream of black liberation. This materialization of the poem
seems deeply tied to Baraka’s formulation of both a good magic and a retributive one that
together can defeat white magic and white mythology. To some extent both this counterpoint to
racism and this opening toward mysticism necessitate magic as a form or process through which
the poem can continue to matter—both exist and have meaning—despite the belief that the nonmaterial world does too. The poems “Vowels 2,” “Sacred Chant for the Return of Black Spirit
and Power,” and “Part of the Doctrine” all amplify their thingliness through capitalization, while
poems such as “Race,” “Tele / vision,” and “Human to Spirit Humanism to Animal” speak
more directly to the overlapping space between material and immaterial forms of being: “the
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reality of the spirit” (223). These poems show that Baraka cannot satisfy a profession of faith by
merely stating it as such, but that through the sonic and visual manipulation and materialization
of text, Baraka forces a link between the poetic and the mystical. These moves also emphasize
the centrality of process, not product, to his poetics. This mystical-material link is intensely
formal and performative, not just topical. This linking is also ultimately how Baraka reclaims a
poetics of praxis, a use for poetry as a tunnel between worlds.
Mystical-Material Sound
Working under the presumption that questions of objective reality and being relate
differently to black lived-experience than to my own white lived-experience, I think it is crucial
to underscore the intersection of Baraka’s position as a person of color and his ongoing
interrogation of metaphysical questions. I draw attention to these differences on both lived and
theorized planes, not with the intention of reifying racial difference, but with the desire to remind
readers that structures of racial consciousness have from the beginning depended on differing
relationships to the idea of being a subject or an object in the world. Furthermore, the black
subject’s position relative to the history of racialized oppression is life-threatening in ways not
true for white subjects (though of course, as James Baldwin repeatedly argues, white supremacy
debases its perpetrators too). Baraka’s arrival at a celebration of a spiritual self through a poetics
of hyper-materiality bespeaks his insistence on the inseparability of the material and the spiritual.
This conjunction forces our attention back to the precariousness of the black subject within a
white supremacist social structure that banks on the purity of either form of being: the material
always at risk of slipping into objecthood (commodity) and the immaterial always at risk of amateriality, or literal not mattering. Poems like “Vowels 2” and “Sacred Chant for the Return of
Black Spirit and Power” vividly portray the concrete materiality of Baraka’s poetics in Black
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Magic, while other poems such as “Hegel” and “Cant” negotiate the philosophical truth of a form
of being that straddles the material and the mystical. In this way, his poems stage a dialogue with
the idealist thinking of long-past white European philosophers like Hegel as well as the
dialectical materialism and post-colonial marxist critics like C.L.R. James.
In “Vowels 2,” Baraka visually stretches the word “free,” often in all capitals, across a
horizontal page. The word takes up space and fills our gaze, while its sound fills our mouth and
ears.
Freeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
Freeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
Freeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
EEE EEE EEE
EEE EEE EEE
EEE EEE EEE
EEE EEE EEE
Freeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee (189)
The capitalized, repeated “EEE” punctures the free-flowing, extensive “frees,” as if a falsetto
trumpet were cutting up one long note into blips of sound. The sound calls to mind the image of
a trumpet, or rather, the sound is trumpeting. The word “BURST” interrupts the careening
“frees,” like a punch of new breath at the mouth of a horn or a word breaking open from a closed
mouth, its contents spilling onto the page. Certainly “freedom” is a term philosophers struggle to
define, and some doubt it exists, but in all capitals the word “FREE” resists any doubts as to its
substantiality and potential for self-dispersal, bursting through whatever skepticism or literal
bondage hems it in. More importantly, Baraka’s attention to the physicality of sound and its
mirroring in textual formatting begins to perform a theory of sound’s materiality. Brent Edwards
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tracks a similar phenomenon in Baraka’s “jazz” poem “AM/TRAK,” wherein Baraka’s “shit”
becomes sound,25 as in scat, as in creative ideas, taken at the literal, the most material
transformation into the immaterial.
As we see here, not just the physicality of the mouth-instrument but the whole body is
critical to the poem becoming material, actual, and useable shit; and movement is how we track
this becoming. After the first “BURST,” “FREE” stretches even further like sheet music or the
movement of “BODYS” across a stage:
Bodys moving in the light
BURST
BODYS MOVING
BODYS MOVING
FREEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE EEEEEE (190)
The introduction of the concrete image of “Bodys moving,” or dancers, transforms the poem
from chant-like reverie into a scene of physicalized freedom-making. The curious plural spelling
of “BODYS” as opposed to “bodies” forces us to see each particular letter and person, as
opposed to an anonymous, universalized crowd. “BODYS” also retains the integrity of the base
word, “body,” as if to say, you cannot destroy this “body” in order to reproduce it or multiply it
into “bodies.” “[B]odys” becomes multiple26 through accumulation. It retains its past self and
gains some more. Baraka attains this effect through his radical error, this empirical flaw,
peopling the poem and imagination of the reader. The material-visual construction of the word
(its spelling) and its sound co-exist despite their difference. We could say they collaborate but do
25

Brent Hayes Edwards, Epistrophies: Jazz and the Literary Imagination (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 2017), 24. Edwards also cites Ronald Radano’s Lying Up a Nation: Race and Black Music (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2003). Radano’s concept that black music’s poem comes from the instability between
sound and text—from the resonance between these unique forms.
26
This conflation of singularity in plurality reminds me of Kamau Braithwaite’s use of the pidgin Jamaican
pronoun “IandI”—a first person plural that retains the specialness of the person, the one, inside the people, the we,
the whole.
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not merge, do not disappear in each other. This collaborative effect is mirrored by poem’s motif,
the “bodys”’ collective dance.27
The word “BURST,” not “FREE,” dominates the rest of “Vowels 2,” as if freedom now
must disperse itself like an exploded seed or breath. But this dispersal, or diasporization, is
countered with instructions to remain in place.
BURST
(& stay
BURST
(& stay
BURST
BURST
BURST
(& stay (190-191)
While the speaker might disperse his particulate self and spirit through explosive breath, he
remains in place, stays connected to earth. The capital letters reach out, but the lowercase letters
root down, protect the home. Black Magic thematizes this tension between rootedness,
earthiness, and flight. This representation of burst sound dispersed far, speaks to what Jessica
Teague describes as Baraka’s stereophonic poetics.28 Working from Paul Gilroy’s concept of
stereophonic consciousness and the real contemporaneousness of stereo technology development
and the writing of Baraka’s It’s Nation Time (1972), Teague provides a metaphor for thinking
through the simultaneous materiality and mysticality of the way we experience the spread of
sound. Stereo technology not only reproduces sounds recorded in the past, transposing one time
on top of another; this device also presents us with the invisible and thereby occult logic of

27

In Mackey’s “Changing Same,” he quotes Baraka’s point in Blues People that the arts which yielded no product
were impossible for Eurocentrism to destroy in black culture, both magic and dance being among these arts: “Only
religion (and magic) and the arts were not completely submerged by Euro-American concepts. Music, dance,
religion, do not have artifacts as their end products, so they were saved. These nonmaterial aspects of the African’s
culture were almost impossible to eradicate” (qtd. in Mackey, 367).
28
Jessica E. Teague, “Black Sonic Space and the Stereophonic Poetics of Amiri Baraka’s It’s Nation Time,” Sound
Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 22-39.
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music coming from both a plastic disc and seemingly elsewhere too. To listen to music in stereo,
we feel it to be coming from everywhere, but no matter where, the true sources, the bodies, the
instruments, are hidden from us. The concept of stereo fuses the material and the mystical
together, be it in for music or poetics. For Baraka’s own mystical-material production of sound,
he seems to carve a sterophonic sound into the surface of the page—a seemingly impossible
trick, like the presence of music in the minute groove of a record.
Despite the physicality of the poem’s capital letters, repeated words, and extended
visualized sounds, “Vowels 2” confuses the location of actual being, or which being matters.
Perhaps this confusion results from the lack of any end-point to Baraka’s poetic spiritual quest.
Rather, as Mackey notes, process is central to Baraka’s product-less arts of music and dance:
“These ideas concerning process are important to an understanding of the synonymy of
blackness with spirituality during Baraka’s nationalist phase.”29 Baraka’s “Bodys moving mind
is soul is spirit is is the place” presents his reader with an animated image of consciousness, and
consciousness as in process, not in place (191). The mind is moving because the body is moving,
and the mind is inside it—a logical induction. If “mind is soul,” then this movement transcends
“body” and, with it, static physical limits. “Soul” slips into “spirit” which Baraka then spatializes
into “the place,” and, despite his pluralizing “spirit” with the double iteration of “is is,” these
become unified by the singular “place.” But why slip from the physical “body” to the mystical
“spirit” to the delimited “place”? Why would Baraka need both categories of existence to
mingle? What are the political stakes of this admixture? That Baraka’s “bodys” are both here and
not here, physical and not, means that they occupy two kinds of space at the same time and
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therefore possess a magical, diasporic bi-spatiality, perhaps akin to Duboisian double
consciousness.
An invocation based on the words “free” and “burst” can be easily read as political. There
is perhaps no greater political question than whether freedom is attainable for all or whether
freedom for some always depends on unfreedom for others. However, the political nature of
“Sacred Chant for the Return of Black Spirit and Power” becomes more evidently political in
Baraka’s dialectical engagement with materiality:
Ohhh break love with white things.
Ohhh, Ohhh break break break let it roll down.
Let it kill, let it kill, let the thing you are destroy
let it murder, and dance, and kill. Ohhh OhhhOhhh break
the white thing. Let it dangle dead. Let it rot like nature needs. (192)
The racialized violence of this “sacred chant” draws immediate attention. Yet the power
dynamics at play complicate categorical assumptions about who is subject and who is
subjectivized. The first line reads as a directive to black readers to separate from white
supremacist ideals, which includes middle-class values that traditionally rank blackness as
inferior. However, there appears utility in the white objectification of black being30: “let the thing
you are destroy / let it murder.” This body, this material thing, can be (must be?) an instrument
of violence against the force that makes it a thing, not a person. In the shift from breaking “with
white things” to “break / the white thing,” white things change from indirect to direct objects of
breaking, a breaking punctuated and formalized by the broken line. The speaker depends on this
relationship to materiality and thingliness in order to resist the structures and people that have
limited his agency. The end of the poem moves from the onomatopoeic violence of “Aggggggg. /

30

See Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. by Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972)
for his theory on how colonization produces the thingification of the colonized. Baraka seems to claim counteragency in response to his own thingification.
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MMMMMMMM / OOOOOOO,” to an acknowledgement that this violence is a reversal, a
retribution:
Death music reach us.
Bring us back our strength.
To turn their evil backwards
is to
live. (192)
These final lines feel calm in comparison to the commands to break and kill. The last word of the
poem, “live,” might suture black survival to violence against whites, but it also suggests a form
of being beyond thingly behavior.
The central idea that white people have enacted a violence against black people that must
and can be stopped, if not reversed, overlaps with Baraka’s poetic navigation of the differences
between mere being and conscious or spiritual being. But what draws together Baraka’s radical
stance on racial politics and the intensity of his ontological investigation? C.L.R. James calls for
a similar reversal when he calls post-World War II Europe “barbaric” in his 1947 “Dialectical
Materialism and the Fate of Humanity.”31 At the time of James’s essay, global colonialism,
American racism, and the Nazi genocide were nothing if not barbaric for their cruelty and
brutality: the West considered the still colonized global South primitive and barbaric; Jim Crow
was rampant in the United States; and the Nazi Holocaust had killed or dislocated most of the
Jews of Europe. When James uses the term “barbaric” to talk about Europe, he opposes the
black/white dialectic upon which rests not just white supremacy but also its Manichean system of
stereotypes that racializes goodness as white and evil as black, and that supposes whiteness
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should triumph. Baraka’s repeated reference to “white evil” achieves a similar, oppositional
effect.
Baraka and James are also tied32 by James’s critique of mystical materialism, although
Baraka’s poetics seems to restore a praxis to mysticism, one that James declares absent. What
does the poetic form allow Baraka to see differently about the relationship between the mystical
and the material that the Marxist theorist can’t afford to see? James embraces dialecticism as a
way to defeat mysticism, which he claims supports barbaric rulers. While Baraka (and W.E.B.
DuBois and James Baldwin) might refer to the bankruptcy of the white soul, C.L.R. James
describes “the bankruptcy of its thought,”33 where “it” is the white supremacist, Euro-centric,
capitalist “civilization” that enabled slavery, the Holocaust, and the atomic bomb. He describes a
world given over to barbaric irrationalism in which “[t]hought has abdicated. The world is
rudderless. All illusions have been destroyed.”34 James eschews “shallow empiricism” in favor
of discovering truth through dialectical thought, not material evidence. He embraces the
dialectical law of contradiction at the heart of Marxism (via Hegel). For James, it is imperative to
think the disappearance of civil society in order to know its existence. James also insists that
change is the inevitable product of any dialectic: “At a certain stage a developing contradiction,
so to speak, explodes, and both the elements of contradiction are thereby altered. In the history of
society these explosions are known as revolution.”35 Is it possible to read the “BURST” in
“Vowels 2” as Baraka’s own performance of a dialectical explosion? We could, but certainly the
poem wants more than just a materialist explosion.
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The literal, material burst of sound across the page of “Vowels 2” does not spell socialist
revolution; however, Baraka’s dialectical investigation of the mystical-material poem does break
open the finitude of such categories, a different “developing contradiction.” The language in
“Vowels 2” achieves what Moten calls “animateriality”36 or a kind of animated speech, a state
between words on the page and in the mouth. Moten uses this term to talk about a word attaining
materiality through anacrusis as “a note or beat or musicked word improvised through the
opposition of speech and writing before the definition of rhythm and melody.”37 Moten sees
Baraka’s improvisatory performance as a form of resistance to playing a set role within a system
that turns certain racialized subjects into objects. Thinking through Marx’s commodity that can’t
speak but does (as Marx speaks for it), Moten argues for an inseparability of black mattering
from black spirit, or aesthetics. He privileges the object’s sounding (in the poem’s case, the
word’s sounding) as the very instantiation of how material/meaning refuses to separate from
spirit/sound. Here the contradiction is subsumed, not resolved. As if to regain a racial past, one
also claimed by Négritude, Moten sees Baraka and others’ poetic performances of blackness
producing a “prefigurative rematerialization.” 38 This sound of blackness repeatedly materializes
due to the constant reach for (not attainment of) the maternal. Further, this sound is prefigurative because it is the voice of the object before subjectification under capitalistic systems of
exchange and valuation. Moten further posits that “writing’s description of sound (the literal
representation of aurality) is also a de-scription of sound, a writing out of sound, that
corresponds…with a denial, both conscious and unconscious, of the very idea of whole.”39 The
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“de-scription of sound” in Black Magic, the aurality represented by the elongated, stretched out,
capitalized words and non-linguistic diction in poems like “Trespass Into Spirit” enacts this
denial of wholeness, this fragmentation of mattering. The poem builds an improvisational bridge
across the break, one marked by the visible or material sonic, a break40 that not only signals the
failed divide between material and mystical being, but also premises Baraka’s access to “black
magic” and his own racial, spiritual and political becoming. In this sense, his experiments with
text and sound comprise a platform for theorizing black ontology.
It is important to note that Baraka does not just perform the materiality of sound in order
to test or manifest the metaphysicality of his own being. Rather, in almost an inverse move to
Fanon, who maps “blackness” through Négritude poetry in his Black Skin White Masks,41
Baraka’s performance de-scribes (or writes out of sound) the black experience as a philosophy of
mere being. In the first section, Sabotage, in which magic appears low and evil, Baraka rejects
rationalism and redefines the value of objecthood as “things with souls” (21). One might say that
language becoming sound is like things gaining their souls. The stereophonic capacity of
language to make sound undergirds Baraka’s interrogation of being’s contradictory fusion of
material and mystical experience. In his poem “Death is Not as Natural as You Fags Seems to
Think,” denaturalizing death, with language, is one step in addressing this hybrid sense of being:
Language spread into darkness. Be Vowel
and value
Consonant
40
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and direction
Rather the lust of the thing. (18)
Language here needs to venture into the shaded unknown in order to transcend thingliness and
know its own value, its own path, its internal systems. This is how words resist adhering to the
things they name. Baraka calls for language to detach, de-scribe, to sound out from itself, not the
object. In a kind of inverted animism, language intensely possesses itself and disavows the too
easily labeled commodity.
Through this subtle critique of name-ability and language and objects’ interdependence,
Baraka extends his critique of capital. The speaker of “New World” seems to welcome objective
knowledge but also acknowledge its risks: “Empty me for all knowing, and will the danger of
identification” (22). Knowledge might hem him in, capture him inside a word. The very next
poem, “Hegel,” targets the literal emptiness of “New World” knowledge. As opposed to settling
into identification, the speaker enters “the nightmare of economics” wherein you are ever either
master or slave. Still, Baraka aims beyond this dialectic:
This is turning. As a man
turns. Hardened or reconceived
sometimes the way we wish our lives
would be. ‘Let me do this
again,
another way.’ (23)
Here is what we could call Baraka’s theory of improvisation through reiteration, sounding and
resounding. Each line break allows the poet a chance to do it again “another way.” The visual
break materializes the existential break between “this,” becoming, and becoming’s others, their
reiterative, phantasmal plurality of possibilities. Strangely, “Hegel” begins with the abstractly
harsh image of “Cut out / the insides / where eyes / bungle their silence,” and proceeds through
the crude decree “that no fag go unfucked,” but lands on the very scream that Moten theorizes as

131

always maternal, and always symbolic of the pain of lost kinship. Pairing Baraka’s violent fear
of queers with his fear of capitalist cruelty seems to underscore the speaker’s vulnerability,
especially its taboo per masculine codes. To let one’s guard down for a minute, to ask to be seen
as human, or to attack an enormously powerful ideology might seem to necessitate naming a
perceived common enemy:
I am trying to understand
the nightmare of economics. On the phone,
through the mails, I am afraid. I scream
for help. I scream
for help. And none ever comes, has ever
come. No single redeeming hand
has ever been offered,
even against the excess
of speech, no single redeeming
word, has come
wringing out of flesh
with the imperfect beautiful resolution
that would release me from this heavy contract
of emptiness. (23-24)
The speaker’s fear or despair seems as much internal as external, as much belonging to him as to
a system or a contract. Neither the material nor the linguistic, neither hand nor word redeems him
in his despair. Yet the speaker seems to believe that flesh and words are imbricated in each other,
such that wringing one might produce the other, even if it hasn't yet. If it could, this procurement
of language from the body, from matter,42 would ensure the speaker’s self-possession, and
invalidate the nightmarish contract of capitalism through which the body contains nothing and is
named from without, made commodity, utterly alienated from labor and sense.

42

The Christian overtones of such concepts merit acknowledgement, word from flesh, etc. However, it is important
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In this superreal, commodified world, attempts at understanding the world through mere
sensing are nearly impossible outside of an aesthetic form like poetry. (Lévi-Strauss43 draws
attention to the poem as a modern example of primitive sensitivity to perception when he depicts
the art of the bricoleur who pieces together one image at a time as “savage”). Baraka’s poem
bemoans this loss of sense. The title, “Cant,” signals despair, but, it also announces Kant’s name.
The poem opens onto a city with “walls / of scattered paper, and autographed photos / of
Hobbes,” peopling the book with yet another long past, European philosopher (33). Baraka
expands the dystopic premise:
Thread of reason
whipped against the walls. New winds,
of complex weather. The naked seek clothes,
the holy, a faster God, to keep the known
in line. (33)
Magic and mysticism underlie reason’s unraveling. The “known” floats out of reach, and the
only thing in line, is “line” itself, the presence of the poem. The “holy” one(s) seeking a god of
speed miss(es) Baraka’s point that “Mystery // loves company” (33). In the break between the
sensed and the known, where Kant theorizes that intuition thrives,44 we become collectivized,
joined.
While courting the kind of intuitive presence Kant theorizes, Baraka avoids making a
purely metaphysical leap. In the poem “Blank,” the speaker seems utterly caught in a space
between material and mystical existence, between body and spirit. He catalogues the world
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around him, “shit world, iron world, wood world, fire world,” only then to question the
parameters of world and his concept of it:
where is time and who
flies speeding in the sun, is why I’m here in time, my thought
to have never had a chance to be finite, or anything but live meat
and image, live sound and image, thought, live shit, flying through the
universe, there’s no body
here, all body, we try to figure this out, and fail, how cd it be
otherwise. (95)
The speaker’s figuring ends up in the body/“meat” and its making (sound or shit), but it gets
there curiously through the spatialization of time—he is “here in” it. Being’s lack of finitude in
the above lines, its ultimate indeterminacy in space and time, underscores a mystical-material
concept of self and a desire to embody, not resolve, these contradictions. Again and again,
Baraka admits to not knowing or not being able to determine the outcome of his inquiry. As if to
ensure we do not think he is the magician at work here, in “Bumi,” Baraka writes, “don’t say I
can heal / or bring back / the dead” (196). The poem’s failure either to determine the self or
literally to enact the magic of resurrection raises of the question of what, for Baraka, is the magic
of this book. Baraka’s writing reworks our typical concept of magic as the capacity not just to
contain contradictions but to repeatedly “practice” them, like tricks or riffs, the jarring
asynchrony of two notes, the word and its sound, pulling against each other.
We might further consider whether Baraka’s magic is the liminal space he creates inside
his metaphysical dialectic or the materialization of the sounds and images produced by text.
Indeed, the instability of categories such as matter and spirit, or language and body, maintain a
space of possibility and imagining in Black Magic, through which thoughts, visions or spells can
be tested without hedging the actual risks of their consequences. The body can be wrung dry to
yield a single word, and then the body returns. The body can be used to commit violence, and the
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spirit returns. The improvisational, sonic, indeterminate aesthetics of Black Magic, an aesthetics
of doing it again, another way, underscores how I attempt to read its violence. This scattered,
non-finite poetics makes possible the destruction of the white aesthetic ideal and the creation of
an affirmative black poetry.

Imagining Violence, Textual Destruction
Not only have critics presumably distanced themselves from Black Magic due to its antiwhite, separatist violence and overall morbidity, but Baraka himself has disavowed the dystopic
aspects of the violent politics of Black Magic and earlier work in the preface:
You notice a preoccupation with death, suicide, in the early works. Always my own,
caught up in the deathurge of this twisted society. The work a cloud of abstraction and
disjointedness, that was just whiteness. European influence, etc., just as the concept of
hopelessness and despair, from the dead minds the dying morality of Europe. There is a
spirituality always trying to get through, to triumph, to walk across these dead bodies like
stuntin for disciples, walking the water of dead bodies Europeans call their minds. (front
matter)
However, Baraka’s riotous negativity serves a real purpose in Black Magic. While the early
Baraka critic Arthur P. Davis sees this “new poetry of Black hate”45 as a dead end for racial
politics, I see the same poetry as an opening. The directly violent imagery in the book’s realistic
poems and the violated, nonsensical language of the abstract ones don’t just end in violence but
become pathways to a spiritual and political uprising. Indeed, despite the thread of despair
throughout Black Magic, upward forces intensely compete against these downward ones, a
tension visible in Baraka’s poem, “Part of a Doctrine:”
RAISE THE RACE RAISE THE RAYS THE RAZE RAISE IT RACE RAISE
…WE…ARE RAISED ABOVE OUR BODIES AND MACHINES…(200)
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This simultaneous, sonic collusion of consummation (razing) and assumption (raising) reflects
Baraka’s negative aesthetic, as it premises the creation of a black aesthetic on the destruction of a
white one.
The violence in Black Magic becomes urgent and non-negotiable when we read it as a
form of anti-colonialism, anti-capitalism and anti-racism. Furthermore, reading Black Magic as
strategically in conversation with Césairean and Fanonian Négritude leads us to understand the
textual violence in Baraka’s poems as mediating the reading experience between poet and reader.
For example, applying Fanon’s theory that violence is a form of mediation between the colonizer
and colonized to the reader-writer relationship shifts how we might interpret Baraka’s textual
violence.46 Critic Reiland Rabaka’s consideration of the violence in Césairean Négritude is also
useful in considering Baraka’s work, especially due to Baraka and Césaire’s shared interest in
surrealism. Rabaka calls Césaire’s writing “fighting words, words, literally, used as weapons;
weapons that bring political praxis, social revolution, and cultural renewal.”47 This violence in
language is always already driven by the violent conditions of black life. As Rabaka asserts,
“Césaire’s violent self-defensive and anti-colonial coupling of words as weapons was also
symbolic of the ubiquitous violence of black lived-experiences and black-lived endurances in an
anti-black racist and white supremacist world.”48 When we consider word weapons in light of the
vibrational qualities or material effects of Baraka’s stereophonic poetics, we must ask if this
treatment of words also carries forth a view of the poem as magic spell. Perhaps the violent
repurposing of language is critical to understanding the relationship between Baraka’s
materialization of language and his concept of magic. Violence in conjunction with theorizing
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good and bad magic pushes us to value magic, like poetry, as a performative, improvisational,
ephemeral practice, capable of staging aggression.
Baraka’s use of language has determinate effects on some levels, on imagination,
ideology, and the senses, but no hazardous effect on the body. These poetic effects comprise a
survivable violence and an ephemeral one. Baraka’s depictions of violence, calls to violence, and
enactments of violence transpire at the linguistic, not corporeal, level. By thinking of reading as
an event, we can understand reading Baraka’s poems as decolonizing or anti-racist events, ones
Fanon calls always violent.49 Homi Bhabha describes Fanon’s psycho-affective or violent
writings as a strategy for mobilization and “a performance of agency in the present tense.”50
Bhabha implies that writing and the reception of that writing proposes a space and a time that
can accommodate political action. Surely, Baraka’s various instantiations of violence possess a
certain threatening or transformative power over his readers. Put another way, the violence of
these poems achieves a felt but unseen effect, what I would reframe through Baraka’s poetics as
an agentive, poetic magic.
Interestingly, Fanon depicts magic, and its incumbent rituals, as a pacifying tool used by
colonizers to keep the colonized afraid of both the unknown and colonizers’ knowledge. He
claims that calls to liberation “throw [the colonized] into disarray” because this politicization
forces a break from magical belief systems.51 And yet, the final poem of Black Magic, Baraka’s
ultimate call to liberation from whiteness and capitalism, conflates magic and revolt. “Black
People!,” the title, calls out:
…You know how to get it, you can
get it, no money down, no money never, money don’t grow on trees no
way, only whitey’s got it, make it with a machine, to control you
4949
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you cant steal nothin from a white man, he’s already stole it he owes
you anything you want, even his life. All the stores will open if you
say the magic words. The magic words are: Up against the wall mother
fucker this is a stick up! Or: Smash the window at night (these are magic
actions). (225)
While commands to take a white man’s life or steal the goods of a white man’s store (most often
figured as Jewish), proliferate in this book, Baraka equates this violence with magic: “magic
words” and “magic actions.” Revenge against racism either is or requires a kind of violence that
is magical. The question remains, how so? What effect does Baraka calling this kind of violent,
direct political action “magic” have, especially when written into a poem? Certainly this is not
the same magic that Fanon claims keeps colonized peoples terrified of the colonial state.
This magic emboldens Black people to “make our own World, man, our own world, and
we can not do this unless the white man is dead” (225). There are various ways to read Baraka’s
violent ultimatum. In the former case of “RAZE THE RACE,” the divisive, destructive concept
and category of race is burned down; perhaps similarly, in the phrase, “the white man is dead,”
the thinkability of the phrase “white man” is obliterated. One could read “the white man is dead,”
as meaning that all white men must die; however, this is not what Baraka writes. The singular
phrase, “the white man,” stands in emblematically for the social group—a symbolic dummy
perhaps akin to the doll pictured on the cover. But for the present event of this poem, the phrase
“the white man is dead” gives its speaker agency because he (“the white man”) “is” each time
the line is read. Such imagined or symbolic violence in the space of reading might produce a
cathartic effect. The physical body of a sympathetic reader experiences a release of anger and
despair through this immaterial process, the performative effect of the text.
These violent poems perform the process of arriving at a new Black aesthetics. “Black
Art” suggests that this new aesthetics can magically contain and manage this violence.
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Repeatedly in “Black Art,” violent revenge against white supremacy seems synonymous with the
poem or art itself:
Poems are bullshit unless they are
teeth or trees or lemons piled
on a step. Or black ladies dying
of men leaving nickel hearts
beating them down. Fuck poems
and they are useful, wd they shoot
come at you, love what you are,
breathe like wresters, or shudder
strangely after pissing. We want live
words of the hip world live flesh &
coursing blood. Hearts Brains
Souls splintering fire. We want poems
like fists beating niggers out of Jocks
or dagger poems in the slimy bellies
of the owner-jews. Black poems to
smear on girdlemamma mulatto bitches
whose brains are red jelly stuck
between ‘lizbeth taylor’s toes. Stinking
Whores! We want “poems that kill.”
Assassin poems, Poems that shoot
guns. Poems that wrestle cops into alleys
and take their weapons leaving them dead
with tongues pulled out and sent to Ireland. (116)
The poem shows multiple instances of “poems” animated as weapons, and it reveals a complex
range of targets toward which these daggerish lyrics lurch: black assimilationist “jocks,” Jewish
storeowners, light-skinned black women, and Irish-American cops. The speaker himself seems to
fear violent texts, saying, “Fuck poems,” for it seems they just might come back at “you” (insert
anyone). At the same time, he claims their usefulness toward imagining a reclaimed sense of self
and a fully realized black aesthetic. The speaker admits that such poems are “bad” but necessary
in order to “Clean out the world for virtue and love, / Let there be no love poems written / until
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love can exist freely and cleanly” (117). As if part of a cycle of renewal—“destroy, create”—the
violent voice in the poems literally makes room for love.52
Beyond positing the poem as violent action, Baraka also treats the poem as a portal into
person and world. “Black Art” concludes:
…Let Black People understand
that they are the lovers and the sons
of lovers and warriors and sons
of warriors Are poems & poets &
all the loveliness here in the world
We want a black poem. And a
Black World.
Let the world be a Black Poem. (117)
A legacy of love and a legacy of struggle intertwine just as poem and world do. Blackness
adheres as much to “people” as to “poem” as to “world.” It is significant that the litany of violent
images, the poem’s doing, ends with this image of a restorative, loving, Black world, one figured
as a poetic cosmos. If the poem can be a space-time or world unto itself, then it has the power to
contain events, including violence, and other forms of resistance necessary for making this poetic
vision of a “Black World” a more material-mystical reality. It is arguable that in staging this
violence within the space-time of the poem and the event of reading, Baraka’s poem achieves a
magical state. It produces immaterial effects without material, explainable causes. These harsh
images mark readers, invisibly, but the poem also cleanses or restores them to wholeness with its
closing evocation of love.
Differently from the actual imagining of violent acts, Dadaist aesthetics or the
representations of destroyed language could also affect an immaterial violence on a reader.
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Returning to “Trespass into Spirit,” we recall Baraka’s various performances of nonsensical
language. Extreme nonsense, lines like “diry jsolekks eoo fjoel fjkks ei OO
dkkle;pspekl”melks;;a;;sll” could be seen as violence done to language (152). Critic Won-hu
Kim thinks through the usefulness of Dadaist aesthetics to Baraka’s expression of anti-white
Black Nationalist violence at the level of the text itself.53 We might think that the brashness of
both capitalization, “THE LONE RANGER / IS DEAD. / THE SHADOW / IS DEAD” (103),
and the non-normative, ninety-degree rotation of certain poems destroy textual and linguistic
convention. These moves declare: no more neat couplings like text and reader, or word and
meaning.
Certainly, this destructive aesthetics not only strategically aligns with a Black Nationalist
agenda to break away from white cultural hegemony, but also illustrates the deliberate
indeterminacy that Mackey argues is the connection between Baraka’s textual art and the
tradition of black music detailed in Blues People. Music, according to Baraka, presents a unique
site of Black aesthetic formation that does not get assimilated into whiteness. Black music
refuses, while of course white music insists on appropriating everything from Black folk music
to the blues to hip-hop in the ongoing re-“invention” of white rock and pop.54 Nevertheless,
through the Black Arts movement and the poetry of Black Magic, Baraka sculpts a negative
poetics that refuses assimilation through its slipperiness. He traces the roots of the indiscernible
in the African tradition (what Mackey calls Baraka’s strategic disunity or “‘difficulty in
focusing,’”55 and what I would call a diasporic aesthetic):
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In language, the African tradition aims at circumlocution rather than exact definition. The
direct statement is considered crude and unimaginative; the veiling of all contents in
ever-changing paraphrases is considered the criterion of intelligence and personality. In
music, the same tendency toward obliquity and ellipsis is noticeable: no note attacked
straight…The denying or withholding of all signposts.56
In “Trespass into Spirit” and other instances of diffused sense, veiled contents, the reader and
speaker’s access to transcendence depends on accommodating the un-assimilatable sound.
Readers must deny a straight path from speech to meaning. To call these circumlocutive
moments in Baraka’s work merely Dadaist or Surrealist would be to miss his Afro-centric
grammatology and his attempt to know and wield a magical, veiled speech.
In each instance, the directly violent imagery and violated nonsensical language become
pathways to spiritual enlightenment or uprising. A truly black magic arises through decline or
death. In his poem, “Death is the beginning of a new form,” conceptualizing death allows the
speaker to imagine becoming plural through collaboration (“you are the total jazzman…”) and
through extreme particularity (“…a note on the horn”) (180). Grey is the dominant color of this
new form of being. Echoing this blurry ethos, dichotomies coexist in single lines: “ascending,
falling, being murdered, receiving enlightenment” (180). Most significantly, while “you,” the
transcendent subject of the poem, appears featureless, “a shadow substance a portion of all / of
every thing / simply / god / a whole,” this same “you” then arrives at a sensuously particular
place, “african shores with cool blue waves / graham cracker sweet sand and sun to lay out in /
thinking of colors bathing in the essence of hot green / hot blue hot / brown hot shore odor /
perfume of blackness” (179). The violent loss of selfhood imagined in death is rewarded with
eternally present experience: “an endless picture scroll / of doing thinking feeling being / forever
endless in the instant” (180). Baraka’s feeling and image of Africa, held at a distance, structures
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the paradisiacal space-time of this after-life, “death form.” This image begins at the “shores,”
implying the speaker’s arrival from elsewhere, from afar. The destructive, negative aesthetics in
Baraka’s Black Magic coincides with his “negative” or recursive imagining. Out of this new
aesthetics, it is possible for his poetry to constitute (and critically return to) the space of Africa as
the space of “the reality the existence of reality,” one only possible after the destruction of a
prior,57 colonial, white world.

Magical Critical Return
One can trace connections to the aesthetics and politics of Négritude across the entirety of
Black Magic. Baraka’s poems not only express a desire for a transatlantic return to “native land,”
figured as Africa; they also formulate an Africana cultural theory that differs from that of other
Négritude poets, like Senghor, by beginning in Harlem,58 then moving outward through the
Caribbean, Western Europe, West Africa, and finally returning to Harlem, and ultimately New
Jersey. The poems make a recursive thought journey. This recursivity—starting and ending in
situ, in America—is part of what differentiates the criticality of Baraka’s gestures at return59
from those of Senghor or Césaire, poets whose theories of return land in Africa.

57

The Black future imagined through Black Magic depends on a past before colonization, and a concept of primitive
time that exceeds historical time. In this way, it is always accessible or present. See Brown, The Primitive, the
Savage and the Aesthetic. This imagined African space-time is also utopic in the Blochean sense—no-longer-present
and not-yet-here.
58
For more discussion of how W.E.B. Du Bois’ Souls of Blackfolk and the poetics of the Harlem Renaissance factor
into subsequent Négritude movements, see Reiland Rabaka, The Négritude Movement, cited previously, and
Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing The Black Radical Tradition, From W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James
to Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral (New York: Lexington Books, 2010). It is also important to note that the
history of African-American thinking and history does not begin in Harlem but has formed over time, starting in the
American South through the history of slavery.
59
Baraka’s desire is ultimately not to go anywhere but to root down, re-root, in the Black tradition of being here.
This staying-put counters the kind of internal colonialism Spivak discusses in “Teaching for the Times,” cited
previously.

143

Baraka’s evident investments in the concept of black magic and spirituality in Black
Magic relate to the poems’ references to a primitivist and Afro-centric space-time. Some poems
represent the notion of a return to Africa as a way of constituting a mental-spiritual space for
Black consciousness to exist within (albeit Baraka also entertained the territorial option in Africa
and elsewhere). Baraka appears to make use of certain essentialist imagery and concepts of
blackness and African-ness, including magic60 and ritualistic spirituality, in order to re-imagine a
positive black identity. Both his improvisatory ethic, which draws on jazz and values beginning
again, and his commitment to the space of the poem as a trans-temporal space-time of ongoing
happening, futurity, and world-making, rely on essentialist concepts of blackness.
Some of this essentialism surfaces in his poetry as the product of rejecting American
nationhood and seeking some other “nation.” Baraka attempts poetically to shift readers’
consciousness toward a Black nationhood, one figured through this other (outer) space, a space
much more mental and mystical than terrestrial.61 “Race,” a poem near the end of Black Magic,
calls the reader to imagine an African elsewhere that is always more a feeling than a physical
location, an essence, not a marker: “There is an Egyptian feeling come back / to cleanse us”
(223). The reader is asked to transport herself mentally or to stay put and wait for Egypt to come
to her, and to believe that this Egyptian feeling can purify. “Race” mixes notions of a material
and spiritual place, and critiques modern development for its needless materialism:
Magic Cities
begin to re/form. Our strength is in the drums,
the sinuous horns, blow forever beautiful princes, touch
the spellflash of everything, all life, and the swift go on
go off speed. Blow forever, like the animals and plants and
sun. Forever in our universe there is beauty and light, we come
60
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back to it now. Throwing off tons of dumb metal the beast
has strapped us in. Those Things. These refrigerators, stoves,
automobiles, airships, let us return to the reality of spirit,
to how our black ancestors predicted life should be, from the
mind and the heart, our souls like gigantic kites sweep across
the heavens, let us follow them, with our trembling love for
the world. Let us look up at each other’s spirits zooming, and
enter the cities of Gods. (223)
The return depicted here eschews modern technology, not just its disenchanting services but its
“dumb metal,” its dead material of bondage. As much as references to animals, plants, and
sunlight conjure a pastoral, African somewhere, Baraka locates the reader in the generalized
space of “our universe” and “the reality of spirit.” Space is structured through the senses called
upon: ears perking up to the sound of horns, eyes tracing kites in the sky, skin feeling the drums’
vibrations. Importantly, this magic space, “Magic cities,” is composed of and known through
sound (“drums,” “spellflash of everything,” “horns”), that which is always at once material and
immaterial. Baraka positions himself as mythmaker through the generality and shiftiness of
motifs like sky and universe. He breathes into a lost or distant history: “Our lot / is vacant. Bring
the twisted myth / of speech” (25).62
Still, such mythmaking risks reifying essentialist notions of blackness, both of America
and of Africa. Titling his collection Black Magic, one might say, plays upon a subordinating
essentialization of blackness as that placeholder for the irrational, the spiritual, the backward, and
the pre-industrial. In his critical biography of Baraka, Jerry Watts remarks on the futility of
Baraka’s and Karenga’s attempts to use the religion Kaiwada to political ends: “[T]heir racial
essentialism created a severely constrained future. In a world in which blacks and whites could
not evolve or change, the potential for viable social transformation was minuscule…an
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apocalyptic intervention by God would be necessary for social change.”63 Critic Donna Jones64
also calls attention to the essentialist and racialist tendency in Césairean Négritude. Jones argues
that Césaire’s valorization of a return to racial roots and subsequent theory of black creativity
stems from the Bergsonian idea of élan vital. Her critique seeks to question whether Négritude’s
conceptual link to a Euro-centric concept of creativity risks reifying race as a biologicalhistorical organizing principal. However, Rabaka suggests that we think of innovation not as a
passive process but an act of intellectual agency.65 In this vein, not only might Jones explore how
Césaire’s engagement with Bergson models the deliberate, authoritative and strategic use of
racial essentialism for a specific political moment, but we also might consider Baraka’s
borrowings from Négritude as deliberate and political.
For various reasons, it is possible to read Baraka’s essentialism or nostalgia as shot
through with criticality. Interestingly, Baraka critiques Négritude thinkers like Senghor for
confusing “socialist realism and surrealism,”66 while he praises Césaire’s poetry and politics for
departing in important ways from others. Baraka accuses Senghor of using mystical values and
magic for “bootlicking French Colonialism” but celebrates Césaire’s awareness that “Blackness
is not a static, mystical, ‘eternal’ quality; it is concrete consciousness and with that, concrete
struggle.”67 For these reasons, Baraka’s invocation of a utopic African space can be best be
called a “critical return,” Rabaka’s term for describing the anti-colonial political dimensions of
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Césaire’s Notebook of a Return to the Native Land. Césaire does not advocate for a direct return
to French-ruled West Africa but to an Africa and African diaspora radically, materially and
ideologically reformed.68 Baraka’s American-ness, unlike like Césaire’s Afro-French-ness,
makes imagining returning to French colonial Africa nonsensical. However, like Césaire, whose
identity affords him consciousness of the Afro-French diaspora, and who locates “return” in that
diasporic feeling, not in a literal place, Baraka’s “return” also calls for a massive shift in
consciousness and a shared Black American concept of the Africana. This difference can be seen
in the mystical qualities of place invoked in his poem “Race,” quoted above. Those who criticize
political reliance on essentialist identities may detect assertions of a natural or universal
blackness in Baraka’s Black Magic, but I would argue that these poems are more invested in
essentialized states of being, not essentialist political categories.
Gayatri Spivak might add that this kind of essentialism was a strategic part of mobilizing
global anti-colonial movements and a Black Nationalist movement in the United States.69
Baraka’s temporary spiritual formation under Ron Karenga, who introduced him to Yoruba,
certainly relied on dislocated, translated, and generalized notions of the ancient West African
religion. Baraka adopted Kaiwada (Karenga’s form of Yoruba) to forge a more affirming
relationship to blackness. We might question how these internalized racial narratives about
African primitivity surface in Black Magic. It could be argued that Baraka bares these
essentialist, potentially reductive dimensions of his racial discourse as a way to stage his
negotiation of a political and aesthetic transition. Baraka toys with what could be called a “jungle
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aesthetic” or “jungle ambivalence,” writing “Pay me off, savages. / Build me an equitable human
assertion. // One that looks like a jungle, or one that looks like the cities of the West” (26). In
these poems, Baraka theorizes a critical, not idealist, notion of return, while still relying on a
general notion of African-ness as a pre-industrial, natural state of being: “We want to disappear
except for our essence, which / is rightness. / We want to be nature and a natural thing” (100).
Even Baraka’s use of the word “nature” confuses its essentializing qualities. We are forced to
consider the difference between being “nature,” a big abstract thing, and being a thing like
nature, “a natural thing.”
In light of this ambivalence, Baraka’s discourse of a return (to “nature” or Africa or…)
appears strategic. Cynthia Nielsen’s analysis of Fanon70 helps us to imagine Baraka’s conceptual
use of magic, despite being essentializing, as a strategic shift away from the oppressive white,
Beat aesthetic toward the affirming poetics of Black Arts. Contrary to expectation, stereotypical,
primitivist language in Black Magic often inverts the black-white binary, rather than reifying it,
much in the same sense that Nielsen claims that Fanon subverts the Manichean binary of
colonialism:
A Fanonian strategic essentialism recognizes Négritude’s positive reinvention of
“blackness” as a social reality, constructed by the oppressed for specific sociopolitical, emancipatory, and therapeutic aims. In light of the historical situation
into which blacks were thrown, Négritude begins within the Manichean frame;
however, the social identity it produces through discursive practices and political
acts transcends this white-imposed frame and creates something new.71
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Baraka too turns away from Western civilization, positing it as the uncivil, poisonous, “allergic”
space of the past: “But we have gone away / from you, one-eyed man, cannibal, / o slickest
weapon of the romes / we have left you to come back / to ourselves. We have gone away from/
the dead forests of your allergic kingdom” (89). Like Fanon, he reinvents blackness but does so
through the essentializing concept of magic. Furthermore, Baraka’s historicization of Black
American life and aesthetic production, perhaps most clearly seen in Blues People, serves to
ground his aesthetics in an American tradition of black innovation rather than in the spatial
fantasy of a return to African “roots.” So how does Baraka’s sense of the depth of black roots in
America square with his rhetoric of return? And how is magical thinking part of the praxis of a
return in situ, not a literal return to Africa? No doubt Baraka’s poem, the page, and the poetic
experience springing from it, are the where, the when, and the how of a performance of magic
that bodes transportation in place.
Baraka’s shifty definition of the site of return composes part of his criticality, or the
magic of his static movement, his staged improvisation. We wonder, repeatedly, if the “we” of
“we come / back to it now” is going anywhere or not (223). Both Baraka’s present-future poetic
space-time, where “doing it again, another way” remains possible, and the recursivity within his
concept of return, underscore the centrality of improvisation to Black Magic. Even just the
phrase “we come / back to it now” posits an unheard “here” through the present tense of “we
come” and “now,” meaning we’re already here—the coming is done. Baraka’s ongoing present
of a place that begins to “re/form,” his now-time of “we come / back to it now.” His readerly
invitations (“let us return,” “let us follow”) instantiate a new and different return every time the
poem is read. This present-ness echoes the contemporariness that Nielsen situates in Fanonian
Négritude, which she calls “a non-repetitive translation into contemporary society of those
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sociopolitical principles, cultural values, and ancestral practices lacking in Western ‘enlightened
civilization.’”72 Baraka’s improvisational returning to the beginning is similar to Fanon’s
gesture. His “non-repetitive translation” of something old into new terms signals his reformulation of Black aesthetics.
Baraka’s poems “Return of the Native” and “EveryBody Out” exemplify the
simultaneous here-ness and newness of improvisation (I am imagining the situatedness of the tap
dancer’s place on stage in contrast to the feet’s constant movement). “Return of the Native”
begins, “Harlem is vicious / modernism. BangClash” (108). The title and the mood of Harlem—
Baraka’s then home—collide, or merely refuse to mix. It is easy to read the title as implying that
Baraka finds an “aboriginal home” in Harlem, his having recently moved there from the Village;
yet, it is important to trouble the idea of this move as a return, since Baraka’s actual home was
across the river in Newark. The very violence of such a paradox—this not being the only one—
seems to grip the speaker of the poem:
Vicious the way its made.
Can you stand the beauty?
So violent and transforming.
The trees blink naked, being
so few. The women stare
and are in love with them
selves. (108)
This is not a pastoral return but an urban one to a place lacking much peace, greenery, or
community. The perceivable beauty is the bodily and ethereal beauty of black self-affirmation,
not communal. The landscape here is psychological, unstable, and full of contradictions.
Not only does viciousness get paired with beauty, in almost Futurist fashion, but also
place loses its substantivity and becomes action: “The place, and place / meant of / black people.
72

Cynthia Nielsen, “Frantz Fanon and the Négritude Movement,” 348.

150

Their heavy Egypt” (108). The poem signals Harlem and Egypt as places, but also the words
“place” and “meant” separated only by a line-break sonically produce “placement,” the action of
being put in place. And still, as if to claim agency in this action, to avoid making black people
the objects of someone else’s (dis-)placing them, Baraka breaks the sounded suffix “ment” onto
the next line and spells it “meant,” past tense of “mean.” Placing hereby gains historicity, past
meaning, or original intentions—what was meant to be, an almost native sentiment. The phrase
“heavy Egypt” appears in the same cluster of these lines about “place / meant” drawing the two
places, Egypt and Harlem, together like overlapping film frames: the first symbolizing a
celebrated ancient root of African civilization, the second the rebirth of Black culture in
America. However, Baraka’s poem invokes a certain slipperiness when he refers to “Egypt /
(Weird word!)” in a line about the black people of his “here and now” in Harlem where “We
slide along in pain or too / happy” (108). The poles are more imagined than real; indeed, Egypt,
Baraka tells us, is real to the reader merely as a “weird word,” not a material place. The ultimate
here or the ultimate there cannot accommodate the complex dimensions of Baraka’s unsettling
aesthetic, one that needs the point of return to keep moving in place, to hold on to contradiction.
The centrality of contradictions—happiness and pain, Harlem and Egypt, new and old—
continue more loosely in the neighboring poem “EveryBody Out.” This one reads as an answer
to the vicious beauty of Harlem (indeed, Baraka was hardly easily welcomed there73): “What
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kind of voice

wd come to // this” (109). The poem’s contradictions displace itself except for

the presence of voice or sound. Voice in these lines arrives at “this,” a general finger pointing at
nothing or a desire for a future that can’t yet be imagined. “This”’s generality points back to
itself, its shape and sound on and off the page:
the shape was
this way
reveal a new
thing, a
new place for feeling, all
together
any
way
Sounding BELLOWING (109)
The poem’s call for newness, for revelation, for a kind of coming out, lands on the word
“BELLOWING,” whose meaning and capital letters signal the “Body” of the title and the shape
of the body before its sound comes “Out.” We imagine the extending belly and chest as the site
of this sounding, and yet at the same time the sound bears no objective, specific language, or
meaning, just the feeling of release and communion: “all / together.” The poem’s lack of
pointing outward and insistent, inward affirming of its textual existence—what I call the poem’s
thisness—bolsters the poetic text’s immanence, or the completeness in its own being.
Baraka’s particular concept of return involves the ways in which the poem itself becomes
the space, the time, thing, and the movement of returning. The poem, as an immanent object,
instantiates return as an occasion for constant reinvention. The thisness of Baraka’s poetics—the
way the poem continually points back to itself—makes his call for a return to the African,
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primitive, or Black sense of things seem achievable within the space-time of the poem, its
composition, performance and consumption. Part of Baraka’s criticality is born of this insistence
on the here and now of the writing. Through his belief in the poem’s material effects, “returning”
does not require the further translocation, dislocation, diasporization or alienation of Black
peoples. In some ways, following Kathy Schultz’s description74 of Baraka's Wise Why's Y’s as an
Afro-Modernist epic, it becomes possible to see Baraka’s poem as a transhistorical space
containing all times. Through Schultz’s frame of the epic, it could be said Baraka transforms
trans-temporality into trans-nationality in his effort to build a trans-national Black consciousness.
Baraka’s trans-temporal and trans-spatial poetry performs the return as a rhetorical gesture and a
poetic effect.
Indeed, considering Gary Wilder’s concept of freedom time75 makes it possible to link
Baraka’s trans-temporality to his desire to decolonize and liberate black consciousness. Wilder
argues that decolonizing movements depend on imagining a different future in relation to the
past and present, and that the decolonization process is in fact trans-temporal as opposed to linear
and progressive. This different approach to the relationship between time and change suggests
that anachronistic or “naïve” attachments to a colonial past might actually be radically promising
for a decolonized future. When Baraka refers to Africa or Egypt or writes in “Black People: This
Is Our Destiny” of
a rhythm a playing re-understood now by one of the 1st race
the primitives the first men to evolve again to civilize the
world,
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it is possible to reconcile his references to first-ness, originality, and primitivity with the futurity
of the phrase “to evolve again” (emphasis mine) and the new definition of “civilize” he is likely
imagining (199). Because the poem gives us “a rhythm” and “a playing,” something sounded,
something felt, something performed from the page, we can understand how historicity and
futurity both depend on not just this poetic experience but the experience of sound materializing.
The static print, sound’s vessel, contains its past, present, and future readings all at once.
Perhaps the most magical effect of Baraka’s particular aesthetics is the reader’s
experience of immanence through the trans-temporal, trans-spatial poem; readers imagine
exceeding their typical boundaries. The poem not only imagines a place, but the space of the
poem becomes that space. The time of the poem draws the past and the future into its already
present being. Baraka performs this magical gesture of immanent space and time through
repeated invocations of breath or “blown flight”: all / existing forms of life, the gases, the plants,
the ghost minerals / the spirits the souls the light in the stillness where the storm the nothing in
God is complete except there is nothing / to be incomplete the pulse and change of rhythm,
blown flight / to be anything at all” (199). The poem contains and enables these forms of life
through its being breathed, spoken, blown into flight. With the literal reference to “gases,” we
are reminded that breath is literally a recycled material, old gas, spit back out as the potential air,
future food for the nearest plants. These particles, “ghost minerals,” are the seeming “nothing”
that is in fact not only something but the form of life, and likewise, the poem’s form and lifeforce.
In understanding Black Magic as magic, we must think specifically not just about how
the poem contains the experience of returning to another time, or contains all time, but also about
how the poem occasions the experience of primitive time, what we might call no-time or
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ahistorical, or what Baraka refers to as this time. Inside of “this time,” incompleteness is
impossible because there is nothing to complete, no-thing-ness, just ghosts and shadows. I
understand the raciality of this call for a return to a different time—one that is, in fact, not any
kind of time at all—through Tony Brown’s theorization of primitivity as the figure of the
nothing, or the figure of the primitive that grounds our imagining of the nothing. In examining
eighteenth-century historicism, Brown traces how “the exotic figure tends to be deployed at
moments when the [white] theorist encounters the uncertainty that inheres in that shadowy lining
of the self produced by the otherworldly insistence of a relation with something not quite
temporal.”76 Primitivity, its nowhereness and no-when-ness, interrupts historicism’s attempt to
mark and order a clear progression of mankind. The very dialectical attempt to verify the thing
through the not-thing, means there has to be a no-time, or a time before time. In some ways, the
irruption of the figure of the primitive into eighteenth-century thought resembles a precursor to
what David Eng calls the irruption of race and coloniality into modernist aesthetics.77 We might
ask, how does Baraka’s recursive reach back (and forth) to a before of blackness perform belief
both in the figurality of this primitive time and in the power of the poetic figure to produce this
a-temporal experience? Brown questions
what is at stake in the appearance of a figure that expressly imparts knowledge as it hides
knowledge. Can such a figure be controlled so that the knowledge it hides does not in fact
disturb the knowledge it imparts? That control is even at issue underscores my deeper
sense that figural language, and exotic figures in particular, have a certain energy or force
about them.78
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His description of the primitive’s simultaneous revelation and obfuscation of knowledge
resembles Paul Ricœur’s own correlation between a metaphor and a veil,79 that they are both
things that hide and show meaning at the same time. Thus, figurality both hides and shows. This
always-already, racially-determined brown figure of the poetic is always both here and sensible,
detectable, and nowhere, no when. At the same time, the very atemporality of this poetic
experience, the one that arrives through black magic, an experience outside of white time and
white space, posits an immanent poem, one that is capable of operating beyond the now, while
sticking to the present.
This magical doubleness or multiplicity (in terms of time-space and meaning)80 is critical
to the political gesture of Black Magic. When Baraka theorizes the poem as a site of process not
fixity, of multi-directionality not progression, he furbishes the text’s capacity to effect change.
To say that Baraka attempts magic at the level of text is to say that he attempts magic below and
above it too. Above, he imagines future renditions, improvisations; below, he gestures toward the
deep record and feeling of history. Mackey’s concept of Baraka’s aesthetic unfixability81 could
situate his poetry’s effect in a space between, the one between the realms of textual meaning and
the one between the magician and the bewitched object or person. In a sense, Black Magic’s
resistance to conventional structures of space, time, and body occasions this inventive,
improvisatory poetic experience. Such unfixity feels emblematic of what many call the
transitional moment of Baraka’s life (although I would argue this transitionality was emblematic
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of Baraka’s life generally). Walton Muyumba ties together what he reads as the improvisatory
quality of Baraka’s work and concurrent shifts in his sense of self, politically and aesethtically.82
Calling Black Magic Baraka’s “transitional vision,” Muyumba argues that “Baraka draws poetry
and jazz improvisation together so that he can simultaneously exercise the culture’s ‘diverse and
mutually contradictory elements’ while presenting a performance of the self-in-transition and
flux.”83 The significance Muyumba places on Baraka’s being in transition, or in media res,
pushes against an essentialist or linear notion of return. Thinking about Baraka in transition
repositions this “return” as a restlessness, a liminal position. The transitional self is literally one
between bodies, between worlds, between identities. It is the nowhere of being, a trans- or trance
state we might associate with willingly giving oneself over to some other power. For Baraka, this
power was Black consciousness.

Toward An Immanent Poem, Immanent Self
In the preface to Black Magic, Baraka writes that “we must see our selves again, as black
men, as the strength of the planet and rise to rebuild what is actually spiritual, what is actually
good…Black Art was a beginning, a re-beginning, a coming in contact with the most beautiful
part of myself, with our selves.” He prepares the reader for poetry that identifies and neutralizes
the forces of despair through the reconstruction of not just a spiritual self but the multiplicity and
limitlessness embedded in “our selves”—our many versions and revisions of self. At the heart of
any magic is the desire to transform, or a belief in transformation as a condition of being. Baraka
materializes the poetic experience and instantiates the poem as the place and time of destruction,
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reformation, and continual reiterative recreation of new and more beautiful selves. Poetry is not
just a beginning, but a re-beginning.
Black Magic occasions both this multiple becoming and the possibility for becoming
again and again. Indeed, despite Baraka’s immersive relationship with Hegelian dialectics and
Marxist politics, his poetry’s notion of immanence differs from Hegel’s, most importantly in
terms of how he imagines a non-universal self. Inside Baraka’s concept of immanence, it is
possible to plot the self, the particular, while staying oriented toward and connected to a sea of
other particulars: these points, “our selves.” Baraka’s poems preconceive a more Deleuzian
concept of immanence84 by both reaching beyond any one particular space and time and
premising Black futurity on this reaching. In Deleuze’s Pure Immanence, “Absolute immanence
is in itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not depend on an object or belong to a
subject….When the subject or the object falling outside the plane of immanence is taken as a
universal subject or as any object to which immanence is attributed, … immanence is distorted,
for it then finds itself enclosed in the transcendent.”85 Deleuze’s resistance to universality and
insistence on particularity, not subjectivity, provides a helpful means by which we can
conceptually defigure, de-subjectivize and de-objectify magic. Baraka’s “unstuffing the doll,” as
I call it, is a critical part of his poetic praxis. He imagines a collective relationality that disavows
subjectivization while instilling agency in both material and spiritual selfhood, a union of useful
souls.
Moten counters this resistance to universality, pointing to a transcendent or universalizing
force in the sonic mystical-materialism of a poetry like Baraka’s: “Here lies universality: in this
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break, this cut, this rupture. Song cutting speech. Scream cutting song.”86 “[B]ut to scat or scatter
is not to admit formlessness,” Moten admits, contradicting his claim about universality.87
Dispersal is not disappearance. In Black Magic, we get to lose the body, rescind the doll, and
rediscover or reappear in the form of the page, the poem, the word itself. This language both
scatters and holds its shape, its matter. Ultimately the question becomes, how does Baraka make
use of this aesthetic rupture and all of its incumbent contradictions? The poems are material and
spiritual, violent and loving, political and pastoral, nostalgic and inventive, magical and not.
Magic, above all, spills over the container of the black-white binary.
While the cover of the book imagines a retribution and a reversal, the poetry itself
maintains a willingness to exist beyond temporalities that merely seek to close the loop. Magic,
for Baraka’s poetics, performs a political-aesthetic refusal to abide physical law. Magic is
necessary, as a concept and an experience, not just for imagining a world beyond the unfreedom
of white supremacism, but for making that world sensible in the no-time and thisness of reading
(seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking) the poem. (The thisness of reading may well be a long
tradition in the genre of poetry, a genre that so often formally refers back to itself or to the
mechanisms of reading,88 but I want to emphasize here that Baraka re-tools this aspect of the
poetry reading experience for his anti-racist and marxist praxis.) “We need magic / now we need
the spells, to raise up / return, destroy, and create” (147), and Black Magic manifests an answer
to this need.
Black Magic reinvests in magical thinking and practice; troubles the dialectical barrier
between material and spiritual being; performs anti-white, anti-colonial violent, textual
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resistance; and reconfigures a non-teleological “return” to blackness, resulting in, ideally, an
improvisational, immanent poetics of praxis. Through each of these gestures, Baraka sturdies
magic against epistemological or racial category or body. Magic might remain inextricable (still)
from the knot of poetic innovation and race, and yet Baraka resituates it as useable for a radical
Black politics. Liberated from needing to figure as black or as magician or as the object of
voodoo pins, poetic magic or the magic poet assumes the complexity and indeterminacy
necessary for imagining revolutionary outcomes or worlds sufficiently otherwise than present
ones. The path to the future and to the magic imagined through Black Magic proceeds inevitably
through “circumlocution rather than exact definition” (31). Right when you think you know the
rhythm, it breaks; right when you think you read the word, it flies away, scatters free.
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Conclusion
Rethinking that Magic Feeling
When I set out to write this dissertation, I was deeply paranoid about the claims being
made by me and poets around me about poetry as a kind of magic. This paranoia formed in a
response to a pattern I observed in the work of modernist thinkers and critics—the founders of
the disciplines as we know them—a pattern of primitivistic and magical thinking about poetry.
Simone White is one poet in my community making claims to the contrary. As I conclude, I will
try to close the arc from my research into fin de siècle and modernist thought to my enmeshment
in poetry and criticism now.
At a recent reading by White, in which she read from her new book Dear Angel of Death,
she paused mid-reading to ask the DJ to play “Powerglide” by Rae Sremmurd. White let the intro
play—a combo of instrumentals plus one of the hip-hop duo not speaking or rapping but wailing,
ohhhh-ing—and then suggested that maybe Rae Stremmurd’s moans were the only real way to
(not) talk about the black experience, about the pain of descent. Her comment immediately made
me think of Baraka’s “ohhhh, break with white things,” the sound of the desire to survive, the
sound of living close to death. It also made me think of Benjamin’s earliest writings on magic,
his belief in the sensuousness of the alphabet, our capacity to make sounds and detect letters
without the need to delimit meaning, or speak logos.
When I arrived home from the reading I dug out White’s 2017 NY Times essay
“Exploring the Sources and Consolations of Poetry, in Prose” in which she reviews and responds
to two books making grand claims for the downtrodden genre: Why Poetry? by Matthew
Zapruder and Poetry Will Save Your Life by Jill Bialosky. Standing in contradistinction to the
books’ claims, White writes,
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Poetry isn’t magical or removed from dirty, compromising political and personal
acts, pettiness, racism, sexism, suffering. Absent the intervention of many other
sociopolitical acts, poetry won’t save your life. To suggest otherwise is a kind of
offense against poetry’s insistence on complexity, the multidimensionality of
understanding. Taking it seriously as a carrier of information about the real matrix
between language and power, which is truly upsetting — mind-blowing — when
we come near to it, changes the way you live. Believe it.1
Returning to White’s essay made me realize just not just how complex my view of magic is after
this study, but also how magic continues to be such a risky moniker and category of thinking.
For White, to call something magic is to reduce its complexity, and so to call poetry magic
would be antithetical to any efforts to buoy or save the genre. And yet, after my historical and
cross-disciplinary analysis of the ways critics and poets have thought about or sought to embody
magic, I wonder if part of what both Benjamin and Baraka’s work suggests is that magic
occupies a critical category of thought that resists the possible simplification at stake in
dialectical and pragmatist analysis.
Years before Benjamin’s ambitious Arcades Project, in which he wrestles with and
modifies Adorno’s dialecticism, Benjamin returned to past work of his own. He collaged and
revised it in his 1933 “Antitheses Concerning Word and Name,” a piece often cited in this
dissertation. Benjamin posits magic in the animistic communication between things:2 “In the
things from which it shines back silently and in the mute magic of nature, God’s word has
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become the communication of matter in magical community.”3 Yet I question the silence and
muteness of Benjamin’s nature; instead, I hear branches creaking, feet hitting the ground, birds
crying, Rae Stremmurd moaning. Benjamin later locates magic in the alphabet’s “nonsensuous
similarity with the enduring semiotic ground on which it can appear.”4 He locates this
nonsensuousness as much in the Saussurean gap between words’ spellings and their meanings as
in names’ innateness or originariness, their distance from our perception. I have to return then to
Simone White’s declaration that poetry isn’t magic and her simultaneous claim that poetry be
“tak[en…] seriously as a carrier of information.”5 If I read White’s commentary through
Benjamin’s theses, poem as carrier becomes poem as thing, poem as mute messenger, poem as
naming the destruction wrought by power.
Benjamin is often beheld as the philosopher-critic-prophet for war-torn Europe, for the
displaced intellectuals, queers, and Jews who either fled or ended their own lives in fear of
fascism and genocide. His criticism works toward a theory of loss. His mammoth Arcades
Project takes its name from the defunct Parisian shopping arcades, and also explores the more
symbolic disappearance of pre-war Western, European attachments—history, spirituality, and
aura—losses often called disenchantment.6 Dead Poets Society likewise depicts a period of great
political anxiety and post-war conservative backlash. The film’s own making coincided with the
popular rise of neo-Nazism and the multi-culti-revolutions across the academy. I continue to
wonder: how does the widespread feeling of cultural, political loss predicate a rise of intellectual
and creative interest in magic? And yet I also want to continue to delink magic’s role in a poetics
3
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of loss from magic’s role in colonial modernism or racially appropriative aesthetic
experimentation. We can think of both Stein and Baraka as responding to different kinds of
enormous loss. Stein writes Stanzas in Meditation after World War One and anticipating World
War Two. Baraka completes Black Magic at the close of the Civil Rights Movement and the
passage of the Voting Rights Act, considered by many to mark a defeat, a loss of critical
momentum.
This pattern moves me to attempt to understand today’s surge of magic-philia in the
context of the current state of political anxiety, ecological, economic, and democratic instability,
and the fear of mass loss. This magic-philia includes contemporary fascination with occult rituals
and beliefs, the vampire and Harry Potter literary craze, the mainstreaming of astrology in
popular print media, #blackgirlmagic, and continued widespread interest in magic and the occult
among contemporary poets from CAConrad to Precious Okoyomon. Amid this group is poet
(and, ironically, data scientist) Katy Bohinc who claims magic for poets of all time on the
webpage for her new book Trinity Star Trinity, published by the self-proclaimed occultist
London-based press, Scarlet Imprint:
Arguably the first use of poetry was witchcraft. Artists know a poem's birth can
be magic.
Trinity Star Trinity re-invents the rhythms of the ancient ode as "three cubed," 27
poems of 27 words each.
Dedicated to Hera, the last of the earth goddesses before a 2,500 year reign of
male deities, Trinity Star Trinity envisions a four-dimensional faith (trinity-cubed)
where spirit and muse are in dialogue and devotion on mutual terms.7
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Bohinc’s description of her book makes easy kinship between magical formula and poetic form,
and likewise beckons to a lost mythical past of feminine deistic rule. CAConrad’s Ecodeviance:
(soma)tics for the future wilderness8 stages rituals that aim to stop the time of ecological
destruction, to conjure an “extreme present” where all that is, stays. The title of Okoyomon’s
first book, Ajebota,9 is the word used by Nigerians to refer to the Nigerian who isn’t Nigerian
any more. In other words, her work centers on the common but always unique experience of
cultural loss in the wake of immigration. Each of these poets plays with the notion of magic in
different ways while contending with some form of loss.
The problem with which I began feels more complicated than when I started. The object
has more notches now, more places for fingers to latch on. If magic is a conceptual marker that
enters the secular when there is a strong cultural feeling of loss, a lost point of origin, or the loss
of an unrequited dream, then magic seems continually to promise reparation, or restoration of
what has been lost, yet always at the expense of its occluded colonial history. Still to critique this
desire for magic as a mis-aimed simplification, a primitivistic desire for the past, a colonial
desire for “mute nature” and pre-linguistic space-time, might in fact miss the accumulated
meaning of magic in this current moment, not to mention magic’s long history as a disruptor of
rationalist systems and desires or the Enlightenment’s fierce grip on contemporary thought and
culture.
In Benjamin’s essays, letters, and fragments on knowledge and history in The Arcades
Project, he theorizes the dialectical image, a concept central to the early formulations of this
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inquiry. (In a sense, my project has always attempted to work in the style of Benjamin’s
capaciousness, his ability to hold the incongruous together, to not oppose it to itself.) In trying to
distill the dialectical image, Benjamin quotes Adorno:
“Dialectic comes to a stop in the image, and, in the context of recent history, it
cites the mythical as what is long gone: nature as primal history. For this reason,
the images—which, like those of the interieur, bring dialectic and myth to the
point of indifferentiation—are truly ‘ante-diluvian fossils.”10
Notice how when dialectics stops, the primal begins (again); it re-enters the scene. Also, when
Adorno comparatively refers to the interieur, we cannot help but wonder how this interior is both
domestic and colonial, a Conrad-like interior. In response to Adorno, Benjamin explains this
“indifferentiation” (what Musgrove might have paralleled to the mixing of cause and effect), this
inability to tell apart dialectic from myth, logic from passion, knowledge from magic, as a
product of temporal collision, time’s refusal to stand still, or stay put. Benjamin explains, “It’s
not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what is past;
rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a
constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill.”11 I would add, in that standstill,
poets work their magic. And that standstill, I have argued in chapter two, is a concept premised
on a colonial concept of the space and time of the world.
Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to show how a magical concept of poetry
troubles the dialectical, much in the way that the image (which often meant film—motion
pictures—for Adorno and Benjamin) also does. Throughout magic’s description by early

10

Theodor Adorno quoted in Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), 461.
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anthropologists as well as its invocation by other social scientists, literary critics and cultural
critics, magic in the literary context almost always implies that some past sensorial experience
interrupts a present moment, a dialectical eruption of sorts. Adorno and C.L.R. James’s
criticisms of the barbaric present, and the barbaric poetry of their present, further exemplify how
the presenting of pastness, a colonial cross-temporal mixing, poses a stumbling block to the
smooth logic of dialectical materialism. Dialectics depends on the tension of an opposition or a
contradiction to lend absoluteness to its ultimate resolution. Applied to Marxism, it means that
socio-material contradictions will or should be resolved through revolution; and yet, progress
stumbles on magic. Through my own analysis, I have attempted to show how the concept of
magic, thinking magic, might offer a way out of the lacunae of dialectics—its linearity, binarism,
and resoluteness, if not absolutism. Poetry always has, and always should, both excavate our
lacunae and dream inside of them.
Thinking this way is the only way I can even begin to tolerate contemporary woo.12
Maybe my own and others’ desire to think beyond the is/is not-ness of dialectics partly explains
the trenchant phenomena of contemporary woo among not only my poetry community but my
queer one too. It is not supposed to strike me as weird at all that my poet friend and fellow queer
Gala Mukomolova also writes horoscopes for Nylon Magazine; or that poet Ariana Reines not
only offers astrological birth chart readings through her website LazyEyeHaver but also a
combined birth chart-poetry writing consultation (The Birth Rites Intensive), a “1-on-1 workshop
…where [she] do[es] stereo vision on your birth chart & your creative work.”13 I wonder where
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Ariana’s sense of herself as a poet comes into play when she is stereo-visioning—amplifying her
sight—into another person’s work and astral history. Almost all my queer poet friends have had
an astrological reading at least once, if not yearly; and countless ones I know have or plan to try
ayahuasca, a hallucinogen important for spiritual ceremonies of many indigenous Andean
cultures. A friend of mine posts to Instagram a set of photos of themself with the long caption, “I
did a performance piece curated by @CocoDolle @catincatabacarugallery fusing blackness,
transness, the pop culture of my childhood, Black girl magic, my body, with my voice I
attempted to cast me a spell. In Magic the Gathering, it takes most creatures a full turn to be
ready for battle: Ever the late bloomer… #transville #milkandnight #art #FtoAwesome
#transbody #blackexcellence #blackkidmagic #transmagic #blackmagic…”
I would like to have a student author I know, Judy Fordjuoh,14 talk to my friend about
why invoking #blackgirlmagic might not be as empowering for trans people of color as it sounds.
In her essay, Fordjuoh dissects the problem of figuring blackness as magical. Under the moniker
and concept of the magical, she argues that we normalize the disappearance of black girls; we
consider black mothers superhuman for providing for their families and teaching their children to
survive in a racist world; we ultimately discredit the intellectual, emotional, and physical feats of
black women every time we call them magic. In Precious Okoyomon’s poem “BLACK GIRL
MAGIC,” she too refutes the conflation of magic and blackness: “Blackness doesn’t move it stay
still holding steadfast she is abstracting comfort to reinforce the idea that she is not a magical
negro_ she can break_ she breaks_angel eyes.”15 Perhaps White was also feeling this knee jerk
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dislike for calling anything strong, like poetry, also magic. Perhaps this is also why Ta-Nehisi
Coates eschews magic in his passionate address to his son, Between the World & Me: “…some
time ago, I rejected magic in all its forms. This rejection was a gift from your grandparents, who,
never tried to console me with ideas of an afterlife and were skeptical of preordained American
glory. In accepting both the chaos of history and the fact of my total end, I was freed to truly
consider how I wished to live—specifically how do I live free in this black body?”16 Later in the
essay, Coates equates accepting magic with becoming a commodity: “your blood was as precious
as jewels and it should never be sold for magic.”17 You can sense a kinship between Baraka’s
sense of white magic as synonymous with racist capitalism and Coates’s idea of magic as a kind
of raw deal that spells the end of your personhood and thereby your freedom.
It could be said that the queer call for magic should be seen as a form of resistance to
homonormativity—capitalistic norms, class norms, relational norms—in the same sense that
#blackgirlmagic claims to resist white supremacist norms. But it could also be critiqued along
the same lines, perhaps depending on the racial positionality of the person claiming queer magic.
Both the broad popularity of magic among queers at this moment and the inevitably colonial
figure of blackness and brownness that this call for magic signals seems riskily to ensnare queer
whiteness and brownness. I say ensnare because if we acknowledge the coloniality and raciality
of the way we think about magic, then the particularly white queer grasp at magic proposes a
troubling perversion of Jose Esteban Muñoz’s idea that brownness is queer,18 implying that
queerness is brown. When white queers think or even imply that they are differently racialized
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by performing, speaking, believing, desiring magic, or that they make themselves more outsider,
more radical, more brown through magic, I detect of an out-of-whack symptom of a much larger,
longer phenomena.
Given all the trouble surrounding magic, its socio-political dismissals and reprisals, it is
only natural to ask again, if, as White suggests, calling poetry “magic” also discredits it. I also
continue to wonder if a genre formulated through the concept that language is as magical as it is
figural can ever undo that definition, ever de-figure itself or shirk the doll of its own demise?
Perhaps it is this desire to exceed the body that draws some queers, some people of color, some
poets (some all three) to magic’s promise.
Down in New Orleans, I fall into one of magic’s infamous backwaters. I call it research,
and head to the Voodoo Museum. I should have anticipated the incongruity of these two words
naming the institution, but I did not. The Western museum-goer in me expected an
anthropological, ethnographic portrayal of the history and mechanisms of voodoo—voodoo
museum-ified, disciplined—and yet, of course, it was anything but. You can’t discipline spirits.
One of the first lessons we get is the very meaning of the word voodoo, which we are told means
spirits, so our thoughts are drawn immediately to the gulf between the practice and the matter,
and feel reminded that the word is the matter.
The museum is not quite a museum but an installation accruing like sedimentary rock—
its materiality rising up as if to challenge the spirits that float above. There is plenty of old shit
here: one bone labeled two thousand years old, tawny small dolls, a pile of crumbling dried
juniper. Then the new stuff: cigarettes, pennies, dollars—crisp ones. It is dark inside. It is
disorganized. Instructions on how to get a good man paper the wall—follow these steps in order
(like I tell my students). The exhibit teaches outward, not about itself but about what you should
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do to change your life. Eschewing anthropology, the Voodoo Museum works biographically,
showcasing the people who could contact and control the voodoo. Marie Laveau was the most
famous among these and native to New Orleans. (Her grave, supposedly empty, lies in the city’s
oldest cemetery, St. Louis Number One.)
Multiple versions on Laveau’s portrait dot the walls, as well as the images and stories of
other priests and priestesses, some wrangling snakes, others extending potions in the palms of
their hands, eyes lit up against the dark background of the painting. The people around me stick
tightly rolled dollar bills or cigarettes into the eye sockets of skulls. Most of the written messages
stuck to wall art or skeletons convey the wish for either sex or money. No one seems to want to
hurt or help anyone but themselves. When I read that Laveau was most known for love spells, it
is difficult not to balk at the New Orleans voodoo queen’s seeming lack of seriousness. I think of
White’s desire to part the waters between poetry and magic. I think of Zora Neale Hurston’s very
serious study of magic in Lousiana, elsewhere in the American South, and in Haiti. However, if,
as I claimed earlier, the desire to think magic is a predictable response to loss or anxiety, then of
course someone would pay, would work, to return the missing beloved.
A new installment of Laveau’s legacy might be situated in contemporary poet (and
friend) Danielle Vogel’s life and work. Her Instagram feed casts an endless spell of writing and
magic intertwined. It is full of images of ritual at a standstill: a collection of shells and crystals
on a white tablecloth with a candle, a scene of handwriting with a crystal ball nearby, “spring
magic,” “Geranium magic,” “carnelian rose quartz,” moments to honor the seasons, the moon,
the writing process. In one recent post, a picture of a burning candle, a geranium on a white
plate, and surrounding it are selected leaves and flowers fanned out, and a small marble
sculpture, a feminine body, and uncapped miniature urn. In the caption: “a little Beltane magic.”
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Interestingly, Vogel’s caption fixes her ritual in a pagan history and tradition. But I also read
Vogel’s photo as a bit of queer magic. The Beltrane times and festivities carry the aim of
fertility, and there is always something queer about lesbian fertility. (A friend recently told me
that I might consult a queer they knew who is a womb witch—that her services might help me
conceive.)
I am unresolved with what to do about disarticulating the desire of some poets to root
their creativity in European paganism from the desire of others to root their creativity in a magic
that is inextricable from colonialism. It is possibly less useful, then, to categorize poetic intention
or provenance than to observe and describe the field of effects that these desires produce
together. In the similar sense, Muñoz wanted us to be able to conceive of racial and ethnic
identity and sociality as forms of thought, experience, and performance that exceeded
categorization. It feels more apt to think of magic’s various manifestations across poetic practice
and critique, what I call contemporary aesthetic forms of thinking magic, as magic’s structure of
feeling, after Raymond Williams’s conceptualization19 and Muñoz’s application of this concept
to queerness.20 I want to leave my reader with this suggestion: that magic is a structure of
feeling, and that, to this extent, it exceeds both the poet’s intention and its historical lineation.
Regardless of how we position our invocation of magic—in an explicitly European tradition, an
African one, a Native American one—its relationship to the colonialist production of knowledge
remains. A new structure of feeling proceeds from this dissertation—new in name and
conceptualization, not new in practice—one wherein poetic consciousness includes an
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understanding of how queerness, brownness, blackness, the ongoing desire for an impossible
reparation gets caught up in the drama of poetry’s relationship with magic.
We can turn again to Fred Moten’s lyrical theory of black magic to understand how to
restructure the way we think and feel magic. I quote Moten at length, again, for us to experience
the breadth, the paradox, and the jazz of his thinking and sounding:
Here lies universality: in this break, this cut, this rupture. Song cutting speech.
Scream cutting song. Frenzy cutting scream with silence, movement, gesture. The
West is an insane asylum, a conscious and premeditated receptacle of black
magic. Every disappearance in a recording. That’s what resurrection is.
Insurrection. Scat black magic, but to scat or scatter is not to admit formlessness.
The aftersound is more than a bridge. It ruptures interpretation even as the trauma
it records disappears. Amplification of a rapt countenance, stressed portraiture.
No need to dismiss the sound that emerges from the mouth as the mark of a
separation. It was always the whole body that emitted sound: instrument and
fingers, bend. Your ass is in what you sing.21
What would it mean for us all to scat black magic, to both dispel it, rid ourselves of it, and to
emit its sound? Would it mean to mourn the violent separation that sits at the root of American
blackness and coloniality—the maternal separation wrought by the slave trade, the cultural,
linguistic and spiritual separation wrought by colonial rule—and to feel one’s whole self still
there? To desire the reparation of a trauma, and to encounter the record of its disappearance, an
ephemeral mark, but a mark all the same, slicing the silence?
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Poetry, certainly, carries much: small sounds, big ones, important visions, petty woes.
Certain kinds of poetries, at times just some moans or palpable nonsense, have been what its
mouthers have needed to face the proportions of loss. Poetry’s entanglements with magic—its
funky mysticality, its animated material, its trancy spells—have offered not just a way out of
despair but more importantly a strategy for disrupting the delusion of dialectics: its impossible
forward momentum, its absolute truth, its inoperable negatives. We have seen the negative space
of dialectics which refuses to resolve. This is the space of magical thought. Here is where we get
to perceive magic’s structure of feeling. This resistance to dialectical norms, and other norms of
whiteness, has made magic particularly attractive to groups wanting to unsettle the status quo, to
find a different relationality to self, to each other, to power, and to the world. And yet magic’s
structure of feeling reveals the trouble with associating the aesthetics of poetry and identity with
magic, how the snares of a colonial and racist past and present continue to fleck the field of this
feeling. Moten’s way of imagining the both-and-ness of scat gives us something to riff on as we
plod along with poetry in one hand and magic in the other. In this manner of both-and-ness, we
might learn as poets to think magic in ways that always marks the record of its colonial
banishment, and that harnesses its material presence even while we watch it fly, like a bird, off
the page and away.
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